Gauging Current Counter – Terrorism And Counter – Insurgency Efforts

Colonel Timothy Antigha

Recently, public information channels were awash with news and messages of the resurgence of Boko Haram insurgency and the lack of progress in the efforts of the Armed Forces of Nigeria to deal with the crisis. A few reports and commentaries recognized the nuances and ramifications of counter–terrorism and counter-insurgency, and offered holistic and balanced assessments of the situation. Others, unfortunately, a majority rendered platitudes and sensationalized reports on the crisis. These have seriously confused the situation and added little value to efforts at understanding the dimensions of the crisis which is in its seventh year. An opportunity therefore arises for this write-up to assess what has been achieved in the counter–insurgency efforts in the general sense and the military line of operation in particular.

Before examining the efforts of the military in the North East, it is relevant to facilitate a deeper understanding of the Boko Haram phenomenon. At its outbreak, Boko Haram insurgency represented what Combs describes as “a synthesis of war and theatre, a dramatization of the most proscribed kind of violence – that which is perpetrated on innocent victims – played before an audience in the hope of creating a mood of fear, for political purposes’’. It is also relevant to note that apart from being religious fundamentalists, Boko Haram group is a terrorist social movement. Like all social movements, Boko Haram represents groups that are on the margins of society, and from outside the structures ofinstitutional power they seek to change the system in fundamental ways through a mix of dogma, criminality and terror. From available literature and communication from Boko Haram leadership, the strategic end state of the insurgency is the establishment of an Islamic State in the Sahel covering parts of Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria, in the likeness of what ISIS envisioned for Iraq and Syria.

Without doubt, 2011 to 2014 was Boko Haram’s most active and successful years. During this period, the public lost confidence in the ability of the military to defend Nigeria’s territorial integrity. At a point, the three North-eastern states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe were placed under a state of emergency. Some commentators even called for the removal of service chiefs. However, this order of events was not entirely strange. Extant literature on the life cycle of terrorist organizations suggests that terrorist groups are most violent at the initial stages of their campaign. In this regard, Peter Phillips argues that “at the centre of the life cycle sits the grassroots support for the terrorist organisation. Competition for grassroots support shapes the timing and intensity of the terrorists’ competition with the government. The grassroots support that is captured during the early stages of conflict will eventually shape the life cycle of the terrorist organization”. Therefore, the priorities and behaviour of Boko Haram leadership could be rationalized within this thesis.

However, the emergence of a new government and leadership in the Nigerian Army in 2015 resulted in a new operational framework and design for the North East. The restructuring directed by the Chief of Army Staff, Lt-Gen. Tukur Buratai brought about the creation of the Theatre Command and 8 Task Division, as well as Logistics and Forward Operational Bases. Additionally, the concept of Mobile Strike Teams enhanced troop’s capacity to undertake fast strike operations to suppress Boko Haram Terrorists. These efforts gave traction to full spectrum and logistics supported kinetic operations across the North East theatre. Similar reorganizations carried out by the Nigerian Navy and Nigerian Air Force helped to shape the battle space for effective joint operations. For instance, the Nigerian Navy established a naval operations base in Fish Dam, Baga, while the Nigerian Air Force upgraded its formation in Maiduguri to a division equivalent and established a Forward Operational Base in Munguno, among others. At the Multinational level, the Multinational Joint Task Force commanded by Major General Lucky Iraborcontinued to coordinate and intensify multi – sectoral operations against Boko Haram terrorists in Chad, Cameroon, Niger and Nigeria, including ungoverned spaces in the Lake Chad Basin.

Earlier efforts to analyse Boko Haram insurgency have been hampered by fixation on assessment metrics developed for conventional wars. Such approaches have been largely irrelevant to the situation at hand and accounts for the inaccurate and misleading conclusions regarding efforts to deal with Boko Haram in the North East. Therefore, in seeking to put forward a realistic assessment of current Counter –insurgency operations, it is essential to reference the pioneering work of S.Bjelajac, developed during the Vietnam War. Though articulated decades ago, the indices remain valid and applicable to similar insurgencies, such as the Boko Haram Insurgency. Some of the indices for carrying out a realistic evaluation include the following:

Military/ Paramilitary Operations And Activities
The latitude which a nation’s security forces enjoy in the conduct of military operations, Military operations other than War and civic duties within a contested territory (the 3 States of the North-east were considered contested territory following Boko Haram’s declaration of a Caliphate) is a huge indicator of its firm standing during a counter – insurgency war. From a position where in 2015 troops were barely able to hold positions in Damaturu, Maiduguri and Yola, to a situation where troops currently hold and conduct offensive operations in border towns like; Mallam Fatori, Damasak, Baga, Bama, Bani, Gwoza, ChikunGudu, amongst others, clearly show that the Armed Forces of Nigeria have made considerable gains in its counter – insurgency operations against Boko Haram. It is also important to note that paramilitary organizations are also re-establishing authority in these localities.

For instance, a couple of months ago, the Nigerian Army in collaboration with the Air Force conducted Operation DEEP PUNCH 2 in Sambisa Forest with successful outcomes. Also,recently the army launched Operation LAST HOLD which culminated in the 2018 Nigerian Army Day Celebration in Monguno.Similarly, the Multinational Joint Task Force has been undertaking intensive kinetic and humanitarian operations across countries of the Lake Chad Basin Commission, namely; Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria. Between April and June 2018, the force conducted Operation AMNI FAKATto clear areas stretching the banks of the Komadougou River in the North West to the borders of Mora in the South East and the Lake Chad Islands. The areas mentioned are the most Boko Haram endemic areas and critical to the stability of the Lake Chad Basin. National armies of the respective countries have also conducted successful operations in this regard. From the foregoing, a clear conclusion therefore, is that Boko Haram and its ideology are in recession.

Control of Intelligence
The Chinese military strategist and philosopher Sun Tzu noted, “If you know your enemy and know yourself you need not fear the results of a hundred battles”. This assertion highlights the primacy of intelligence in military operations, particularly counter – Insurgency. Consequently, the pattern of the flow of intelligence is an excellent barometer for measuring progress in insurgency or counter – insurgency. Probably, the most significant general indicator of progress has to do with the source of intelligence. If the bulk of government intelligence is acquired as a result of volunteered support from the civilian population, it indicates strong support for the government and declining support for insurgents. The successes achieved by security forces in the North East, vis a viz theoperational losses and unrealised dream of an Islamic Caliphate are indicative of the fact that the primacy of power in the North-east is in favour of the organs of the state. It is important to note that the critical issue is not the validity of the intelligence brought in by the population, but the voluntariness of the action.

Political Control
The exercise of political authority and control in a contested area is also a key determinant of who has won the war, the insurgent (Boko Haram) or counter – insurgent (Government). Across the three states of the North-east where Boko Haram had declared its caliphate, there is nowhere the terrorist group has political control or administrative machinery in place. Currently, the legitimate authorities in the three states determine and make political decisions across the strata of political authority. From all observable criteria, Boko Haram has no political influence whatsoever.

Control of Legal System
Certain legal indicators also point to who is in charge and in control in contested areas. For instances, it would be relevant to ponder on the following issues; How effective is government detection and prosecution of crime in the North East? Are laws being enforced? Is law enforcement being supported by the civil population? Is Boko Haram successful in their efforts to impose their own shadow laws on the population? As it stands, the answers to these questions and their implications for the North East are obvious and do not call for any debate.

Control of Transportation And Communication
Another critical factor in determining which side has clearly established and imposed its authority is control of transportation and communication. For instance, the degree to which government feels free to transport its goods and services in unarmed or less armed convoys is a clear indication of firm government control. Also, the degree to which government has possession or guarantees the operability of telecommunication infrastructure is an indicator of its strength. In this regard, it is relevant to note that major arterial road networks within the North-east which were hitherto closed for safety reasons have reopened and are currently being used daily. The fact that occasional attacks have been reported on some routes cannot invalidate the fact that other routes still remain safe. Also, communication has been restored to most areas within the states.

Terrorism and Sabotage
Contrary to the widely held belief, acts of terrorism such as the suicide bombings being experienced in the outskirts of Maiduguri of late do not represent an escalation, but a sign of weakness on the part of Boko Haram. At this stage in theBoko Haram Insurgency, such actions serve primarily to compensate (psychologically) their sponsors and sympathizers within the population for the failures and lack of progress in other areas, particularly, combat. Therefore, the recent resort to suicide bombings is basically an indication of Boko Haram’s frustration, declining influence and loss of confidence in its ability to achieve its strategic objective.

On the whole, Insurgency and Counter – Insurgency Operations are complex conflict situations that require deliberate and painstaking analytical efforts. Such efforts facilitate the observance of subtle and swift changes that occur in the conflict environments, the understanding of which is indispensable in analyzing trends. Drawing from the foregoing therefore, the national strategic narrative that Boko Haram terrorists have been defeated is unimpeachable. The factors discussed above are very clear indicators. However, the successes achieved by the Multinational Joint task force and the Armed Forces of Nigeria in the Lake Chad Basin / North East and their multiplier effects in other sectors do not summarily mean the end of Boko Haram Insurgency. It should be understood that the issue is largely ideological. Therefore, credible threats still abound. Consequently, there are still imperatives for continuous investment in the militaries of countries of the Lake Chad Basin, particularly in the areas of training, Intelligence gathering, aerial surveillance systems and combat platforms. The time to do thisis now.

––Colonel Timothy Antigha is the Chief of Military Public Information at the Headquarters Multinational Joint Task Force, N’Djamena Chad.