Israelo-Gaza Imbroglio from a Polemological Perspective: The Nigerian Foreign Policy Dilemma

By Bola A. Akinterinwa

The word polemology, is the English translation for the French word polémologie, coined from the Greek words, polemos, meaning war, and from logos, meaning discourse or study. Polemology therefore simply means the study, or more precisely, the science of war. A French school of thought has differentiated between a crisis and a conflict in a study of all the wars since the 1770s. The fundamental difference between crisis and conflict is that a crisis is the beginning of a conflict in the continuum of violence.

A crisis is first a dispute that is managed by diplomatic means, without allowing the dispute to degenerate into the level of a conflict, at which level there is use of force. Put differently, crises are managed by mediators and conciliators without the use of violence, but when diplomatic conciliation or mediation fails and gives room for the use of force, then the dispute necessarily becomes a conflict that has to be addressed from a multidimensional perspective. In this regard, there will be need to move beyond crisis management to conflict management and conflict resolution..

The Israelo-Gaza imbroglio is at the stage of a conflict, and, now therefore, beyond the crisis level. The imbroglio has a recidivist character which is driven by international hypocrisy, injustice, unfairness and dishonesty of purpose. Put differently, the international community is placing greater emphasis on the management of the conflict, rather than seeking an enduring solution to the conflict. It has been more than 54 years of conflict management policies to no avail and lack of conflict resolution commitment.

Even though, on Friday, 21 May, 2021 a ceasefire between the Israelis and the Hamas was agreed to, thanks to much international pressure, there is nothing to suggest that the ceasefire will last. Ceasefire is nothing more than temporarily putting an end to the shooting war or the hot war. The real war, in terms of holistic hostility, which includes strategic objectives (that is, continued effective occupation of the territories illegally acquired during the 1967 Six-day war and the October 1973 Yom Kippur war, etc) is yet to be addressed. And there is no signal to the effect that Israel is ready for a change in policy attitude.

At the level of the Palestinians, who have shown readiness to recognise the State of Israel, and desiring to have Eastern Jerusalem and Gaza as part of the constitutive territories of a sovereign State of Palestine, Israel is still vehemently opposed to such an agenda. It is against this background that the dynamics of the current Israelo-Gaza saga, which is a dimension of the larger Arabo-Israeli dispute in the Middle East, should not only be understood, but the implications for Nigeria’s foreign policy should also be explicated.

The Imbroglio and Dynamics
At the epicentre of the conflict is international hypocrisy and protection of imperial interests to the detriment of the interests of the indigenous people of Palestine. First, following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire during World War I, Britain was given Palestine as a Mandated Territory by the League of Nations. By then, Palestine was inhabited by a Jewish minority and Arab majority. The Jews began to mount a lot of pressure on Britain for a homeland. The then British Foreign Minister, William Balfour, already pledged in a Declaration in 1917 to create a Homeland for the Palestinians and also another Homeland for the Israelis. The Declaration was included as part of the Mandate given by the League of Nations in 1922.

In fact, in between 1933 and 1939, the Jews began to migrate to the would-be State of Israel. The Zionist pressure was to the extent that Britain had to refer the matter to the United Nations for possible solution. The United Nations, in Resolution 181 (II) of 1947, not only opted to terminate the mandate given to Britain in 1922 to administer Palestine, but also decided by a vote of 33 for, 13 against and 10 abstentions, to partition Palestine into three: Palestine Arab State, Jewish State, and Jerusalem, which was given an international status, as a corpus separatum (separate entity) meaning that neither of Palestinians nor Jews can claim sovereignty over it. Palestinian Arabs did not accept the UN Plan partly because of international intrigues.

International intrigues began with the double speak of the British, who ensured a homeland for the Jews but not for the Palestinians. Ensuring the creation of the State of Israel was driven by principles of inequity, unfairness and injustice. For instance, as at 1948, the population of Palestine rose to 1,900,000 people, 68% of whom were Palestinian Arabs and 32% were Jews. When Palestinian territory was partitioned into two, 55% of the territory was allocated to the Jews with a fewer population. The Arabs, with greater population was given 42% of the land.

This was most unfair in the eyes of the Arabs for various reasons..Jewish immigration to Palestine from 1933 to 1939 had already generated much resistance, controversy and domestic unrest, especially with the 1937 protests. Second, the United Nations approved the plan to partition Palestine into Arab and Jewish States on November 29, 1947 and the Mandatory Power was required to hand over power not later than August 1,1948, while the State of Israel was also required to take off not later than two months thereafter. The State of Israel was eventually established on May 14, 1948 with David Ben-Gurion as pioneer Prime Minister.

Indeed, the problem in this case was that the British acted completely as if there were no Palestinian objections to the plan of partition by the time of creation of the State of Israel and by which time the League of Nations’ Mandate was also to come to an end. There was no State of Palestine. This situation largely explains Arab hostility against the establishment of the State of Israel, and also why the Arabs (Egypt, Jordan, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon) not only took the initiative of an unprovoked aggression against the newly created State of Israel in 1948, but why some of them again (Egypt, Jordan, and Syria) engaged in another war against Israel in 1967. This was the foundational dynamic or the cause profonde of the current Israelo-Hamas saga.

Without doubt, the problem became more complex with the Six-day Israelo-Arab War that lasted from 5th to 10th June 1967. Israel first of all launched a pre-emptive air attack on Egypt and Syria, followed by a ground offensive on Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Height, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, all of which were captured by Israel. Egypt and Jordan were compelled to accept a ceasefire on 8 June and 9 June, 1967 respectively. A ceasefire pact with Israel, was done on 11 June, 1967. All the captured territories were annexed by Israel.

What is noteworthy about the outcome of the wars is the controversial term of settlement. Israel is internationally required to return to the prevailing status quo ante before the Six-day war. Israel has not accepted this, apart from the return of Sinai Peninsula to Egypt. After the war in 1948, Israel ended up controlling most of the Palestinian territory, including a part of Jerusalem, while Jordan inherited West Bank and Egypt occupied Gaza. More than half of the Palestinian Arab fled or were evicted. Israel therefore had freer hands to take over their land.

Again, following Israeli victory in the 1967 war, Israel took over the control of the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria, and the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan in reciprocal action for Arab aggression. Israel offered to return the acquired territories in exchange for Arab recognition of the right of Israel to exist and guarantees against future attacks on Israel. Arab leaders did not accept, except Egypt which did and negotiated for the return of the Sinai Peninsula to it.

Third and polemologically, the object of dispute is Palestine as a territory, as a people, and as a religion. As a territory, Palestine, which used to refer to the region located between the Mediterranean Sea and the Jordan River until 1948 and the Arabs living there were called Palestinians since the early 20th Century, is geo-politically divided into four regions: Jordan Valley and Ghawr, Coastal and Inner Plains; Mountains and Hills, and Southern Desert. It is bounded by the Jordan River towards the East; by the border between Modern Israel and Lebanon in the North, by the Mediterranean Sea towards the West and by the Negev towards the South. Palestine has some big cities, like Gaza, which is the largest; Hebron; East Jerusalem; Khan Yuris; and Nablus. With the geo-political location of Palestine Arab in the southern part of the modern day State of Israel, both countries are necessarily contiguous territories. This factor of contiguity largely explains their border clashes.

What is important to note about Palestine as an object of a territorial dispute is that the current violence between Israel and Hamas is traceable to the geographical structure and the time of the Ottoman Empire in the 19th Century. As explained by an Emeritus Professor of Political Science at the University of Notre Dame University, Alan Dowty, there were then clashes between religious and ethnic groups in Palestine. The then existing Arab residents considered the new Jewish settlements as European in character and therefore developed much hostility towards foreigners.

But perhaps, more interestingly, Professor Dowty also has it that ‘the Jewish settlers had tremendous incentives to minimise all obstacles to settlement, including the inconvenient hostility of the existing population.’ This observation clearly suggests that the origins of the saga between the Israelis and the Palestinians should not be simply located at the level of the immediate causal factors.
Additionally, as regards the specific issue of East Jerusalem, both the Palestinians and the Israelis want to have it as their political capital. Jerusalem as a whole, though internationally a corpus separatum, is traditionally divided into four quarters: Armenian, Christian, Jewish, and Muslim. the State of Palestine already considers East Jerusalem as its own seat of power, while Israel has already effectively shifted its primary political governmental institutions from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.
It is useful to also note here that Jerusalem was divided into East and West Jerusalem following the victory of Israel when five Arab countries launched an attack on the newly established State of Israel in 1948. One major resultant impact of the victory was that the more than 30,000 Arabs living in Western part of Jerusalem either fled or were evicted, thus enabling Israel to effectively occupy the Old City as part of its new territory and re-populated it with the Jews, while East Jerusalem fell under the rule of Jordanian government

Implications and Foreign Policy Dilemma
The first and most important implication of the more than 54-year old Israelo-Arab conflict is the principle of self-determination and right to live. The principles were meant to be applicable to both the Jews, who have been recklessly persecuted and who the international community believes should be given a homeland on the basis of their right to live and also live in peace. In the same vein, As the Jews declared the State of Israel, having met the criteria of territory, vibrant population and an effective government, they have entered into international relations, with more than 130 international recognitions.

In this regard, the lesson from it for Nigeria’s foreign policy is that, sooner or later, if not sooner than later, the application of self-determination principle cannot but be applicable in the struggle by the Yoruba South West and the Igbo South East in their struggle for sovereign existence. Even though Nigeria does not subscribe to the Monist doctrine in International Law, her acceptance of the Dualist School cannot still prevent the implementation of the supranational obligation imposed by the principle of Self-determination.

It is important to recall here that the UN General Assembly not only reaffirmed in 1974 the inalienable rights of the Palestinians to self-determination, national independence, and sovereignty, but also created a Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. In fact, Nigeria acceded to both national and international sovereignty in 1960 on the basis of Britain’s acceptance of the right of self-determination of the people of Nigeria. In the same vein, there is no way those people agitating for the status of a corpus separatum would not qualify to enjoy their own inalienable rights to self-determination.

A second lesson, which is derivable from the foregoing is the attitudinal disposition of the international community, which, as noted above, is largely predicated on selfishness, unfairness, inequity and injustice. Explained in other words, all the Arab countries that have come out, purporting to defend the interests of the Palestinian Arabs, are on record to be seeking the protection of their own national interests. The same is very true of the various mediators, conciliators, adjudicators, etc. Consequently, in the event the Government of Nigeria does not manage well the quest for separation by the Igbo and Yoruba, opportunity will not only be created for foreign intervention, the intervention will also be defined by deceit that will prolong the conflict in the mania of the Israelo-Arab conflict.

A third lesson is the timing of the Israelo-Hamas ceasefire. It only came after the Israelis were quite satisfied that they had done much damage to Hamas, and particularly to non-combatants, and the internationally-protected civilian areas. When the destruction was on, not much was done to arrest the situation. After the deleterious destruction, pledges of international assistance were quickly pledged and forthcoming. This is a true manifestation of international politics: condoning deterioration of atrocities in preparation for grant of aid in controlling them.

A fourth lesson is the uncertainty of policy attitude of the development partners of both the Israelis and Palestinians. The United States, for instance, account much for the activities of Israel, legally and illegally. When the US interest is challenged by whatever factor, the Washingtonian authority is always ready to change attitude, but generally in favour of Israel. It should be recalled that the United States President, Dwight Eisenhower, compelled Israel to withdraw from Sharm el-Sheikh, during the Suez Canal crisis, in 1956, in spite of non-concession from Egypt. To ensure the security of Israel, the US sponsored a UN Resolution that established a UN Emergency Force presence between Egyptians and Israelis.

The United States also approved in 1963 the transfer of Hawk Surface-to-Air Missiles to Israel and also recommitted itself to its security. And true enough, following the 1958 Iraqi revolution, the United States also developed very warm ties with many Arab and Middle East countries: Egypt, Israel, Kuwait, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Tunisia, Morocco, etc.

However, when President Nasser of Egypt deployed in 1962 troops to Yemen to fight Saudi-supported royalists, the United states not only opted to assist Saudi Arabia, but also approved the Hawk missiles for Israel as noted above. US relations with Egypt became sour. This is one aspect of non-reliability of so-called friendly relations. Another aspect is this: as good as this policy attitude may appear to be, the truth is that in 1965, US President Lyndon B. Johnson cut US economic aid to Egypt, a situation that pushed Egypt towards the Soviet camp, apparently in protection of Israeli interests.

The policy attitude of other major powers was not different. The former Soviet Union supported the State of Israel when it was created, but became its enemy in the 1950s when Israel extended its influence to the Middle East. In reaction, the Soviet Union quickly changed support in favour of the Arabs because of the Cold War. And perhaps true enough, if the Soviet Union had not raised a false alarm on May 13, 1967 informing that Israel had massed troops along or near the Israelo-Syrian border in preparation for an eventual aggression on Syria, there would not have been any basis for the Six-day war in 1967.

The point being made by the foregoing is that, one, no country can be held reliable enough to sacrifice its own national interest at the altar of Nigeria’s interests. There is therefore the need for a foreign policy that anticipates or foresees imminent dangers. If there is a civil war today, what is the likely to be the strategic calculations? Any military unrest in Nigeria will not only attract foreign intervention but the intervention cannot but also worsen an already bad situation. This is precisely what currently obtains with the Israelo-Arab conflict. Cautionary lessons must be drawn from it. Additionally, Nigeria cannot afford the luxury of opposing US position without also incurring reciprocal sanctions. The United States does not always show any readiness to accommodate the exercise of democratic freedom to the extent of adopting anti-American politics.

Above all, and in terms of foreign policy dilemma, it is difficult, if not impossible, to be the friend of the Arabs and the enemy of the Israelis at the same time. In the same vein, Nigeria cannot be friendly with the Israelis and be unfriendly with the Arabs. Perhaps, more disturbingly, Nigeria’s foreign policy of non-alignment cannot be applicable. This is precisely why there is a dilemma. The situational reality of the struggle for sovereign autonomy in Nigeria is the dynamic of the main dilemma. Unlike when Nigeria had a strong policy supporting the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, allowing it to have an office in Nigeria, and also straining ties with Israel in order to support Egypt, any encouragement of the rule of self-determination in any country of the world today cannot but negate the strategy of preventing disunity at the home level. And yet, self-determination is a fundamental right of every people.

Besides, if Nigeria supports Israel, she will not only be acting contrarily to the UN Resolutions that have been consistently condemning Israel’s illegal activities in the occupied territories. In terms of non-alignment, the policy is not about aligning or not to, but about the freedom of decision to do whatever. In this case, aligning to support or not to support is also cannot be in Nigeria’s foreign policy interest. What is required is a non-alignment policy of true neutrality and not that of freedom of choice of what to do. This is the dilemma of any foreign policy action or inaction for Nigeria.