Will the PIB Guarantee a Better Petroleum Industry?

The Petroleum Industry Bill 2020, is unarguably the most controversial piece of legislation that Nigerian lawmakers have ever been challenged with. It was conceived and birthed in animosity. It has gone through several Assemblies, and sat comfortably as the oldest Bill in the National Assembly, until its eventual passage last week. Several versions had been bandied around, until it was eventually passed by both Chambers last week. Will President Buhari assent to the final version of this controversial legislation? How did the present crop of lawmakers manage to scale the ethnic, religious and political hurdles to pass the final document into law, especially as those from the oil producing areas still seem quite dissatisfied with they deal they got? Senate Spokesman, Senator Ajibola Basiru, delves into the highlights of the new law

Background

The oil and gas industry contributes less than 10% to the country’s gross domestic product, but it contributes about 90% of the foreign exchange earnings and 60% of total income. So, expectedly, any happening in the industry tends to have ripple effect on Government finances.

The past efforts at reforming the industry have remained largely unfruitful, until the introduction of the Petroleum Industry Bill 2021 (PIB). The PIB started as an omnibus Bill, and was later divided into four separate Bills before emerging in 2020 as a consolidated Bill. Previous attempts at passing the PIB in 2009, 2012 and 2018 failed because of factors such as lack of ownership, misalignment of interests between the National Assembly and the Executive, perceived erosion of Ministerial powers, stiff opposition by the petroleum host communities, and push back by investors on the perceived uncompetitive provisions in those versions of the Bill.

The PIB is not just an ordinary piece of legislation drafted to curry political marks, it is an outcome of deep research and commendable industry. The Bill is realistic, fair and balanced, as Government has tried to strike a balance between immediate revenue demands, and the need to attract long-term investment for the industry.

According to the National Bureau of Statistics, only $53.5 million or 0.55% of total investment of $9.680 billion in Nigeria in 2020, was made in the industry. If we must achieve our ambition of 40 billion barrels of oil in reserves and four million barrels of oil per day, we need to attract new investments into the sector. The oil in the ground is of no use to the country if it cannot monetise it, therefore, the PIB must lead to a massive transformation of the industry, and succeed in attracting the desired investment required to reposition the industry.

Chapter 1 of the PIB

Chapter 1 of the PIB 2021 vests the property and ownership of petroleum within Nigeria and its territorial waters, continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone in the Federal Government of Nigeria, and outlines the following objectives for the governance and administration of the industry: • To create efficient and effective governing institutions, with clear and separate roles for the petroleum industry; • To establish a framework for the creation of a commercially-oriented and profit-driven national petroleum company; • To promote transparency, good governance, and accountability in the administration of the petroleum resources of Nigeria; and • To foster a business environment conducive for petroleum operations.

The PIB segments the Nigerian petroleum industry into upstream, midstream and downstream sectors. The upstream sector is to be overseen by the Nigerian Upstream Regulatory Commission (‘the Commission’), while the midstream and downstream sectors are to be under the oversight of the Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority (the ‘Authority’) with general oversight powers over the petroleum industry vested in the Minister of Petroleum, whom the Commission and Authority are required to report to. This remains unchanged, from the previous governance regime under the Petroleum Act.

A far-reaching change is in the power hitherto held by the Minister, of absolute discretion and power to grant or revoke oil licenses – this has been curtailed. In the PIB 2021, the Commission is to recommend to the Minister, before the Minister can exercise such powers. The PIB has generally vested considerable powers in the Authority, or Commission.

The Commission

Section 4 of the PIB establishes the Commission to have primary regulatory powers and oversight over the technical, operational, and commercial activities of the upstream petroleum industry. The Commission will regulate all technical activities in the upstream sector by enforcing, administering, and implementing all laws, regulations, national and international policies, standards, and practices relating to the sector. The Commission is also to enforce compliance with the conditions of all leases, licenses, permits and authorisations issued to companies in the sector. Given that these powers were exercised by the Department of Petroleum Resources (‘DPR’), the Commission will replace the DPR in that regard, as Section 10 vests the Commission with the power as the successor to the DPR and the Petroleum Inspectorate Division.

The PIB empowers the Commission to oversee commercial activities in the upstream, such as reviewing and approving commercial aspects of field development plans, supervising costs and cost control in upstream petroleum operations, implementing cutback orders by the Minister.

To ensure that the desired promotion activities over frontier basins are undertaken, the PIB proposes a Frontier Exploration Fund, to consist of 10% of rents on petroleum prospecting licences and petroleum mining leases. The vision to promote exploration activities in frontier basins is seen by many as commendable, because they believe it will ensure long term sustainability of the industry by boosting the available reserves.

The Commission is to be run by a Governing Board, which is responsible for its policy and general administration. The members of the Governing Board, which is to be headed by a non-executive Commissioner, are to be appointed by the President subject to the Senate’s confirmation, however, the President solely has the power to remove the members without deferring to the Senate. The Commissioners are to hold office for a term of five years, which is renewable for a another five-year term. The confirmation of the members of the Governing Board, enables the Senate to discharge its constitutional oversight function.

The Commission will have six Executive Commissioners for its operational management, although only two of the Executive Commissioners (those for Exploration and Acreage Management, and Finance) are to be members of the Governing Board, along with the Chief Executive Officer. The PIB requires that the salaries of the Commission’s employees be benchmarked against the general standard in the petroleum industry, after consultation with the National Salaries, Incomes and Wages Commission. One of the sources of funds to the Commission, will be from fees earned from services rendered to licensees. This is concerning, given the reputation of Nigeria which is rife with incidences of rent seeking by government officials, and issues of conflict of interest, as well.

The Authority

Section 29 of the PIB establishes the Authority to have technical and commercial regulation of midstream and downstream petroleum operations, in the midstream and downstream segments of the petroleum industry. The Authority’s functions include the regulation of petroleum liquid operations, domestic natural gas operations and export natural gas operation, among other functions. The Authority is also empowered to issue regulations, in pursuance of its regulatory oversight powers.
Interestingly, the PIB seems to suggest that the sole power to grant, issue, modify, cancel, or terminate all licences, permits and authorisations for midstream and downstream petroleum operations, is vested in the Authority. This is a significant departure from the previous regime, whereby such powers were typically vested in the Minister.

The Authority is also to be run by a Governing Board, which is responsible for its policy and general administration. The members of the Governing Board, which is to be headed by a non-executive Commissioner, are to be appointed by the President subject to the Senate’s confirmation. Also worthy of note, is the 1% levy to be imposed on the wholesale price of petroleum products in Nigeria. The stated intention of the PIB is to move away from regulated prices, to those determined by market forces.

Midstream Gas Infrastructure Fund

Section 52 of the PIB establishes the Midstream Gas Infrastructure Fund, which is to be a body corporate with its own Governing Council chaired by the Minister of Petroleum. The stated purpose of the fund is to “make equity investments of Government owned participating or shareholder interests, in infrastructure related to midstream gas operations aimed at – (a) increasing the domestic consumption of Natural Gas in Nigeria in projects which are financed in part by private investment; and (b) encouraging private investment.

The major source of funding for the Midstream Gas Infrastructure Fund is a 1% levy on the wholesale price of petroleum products sold in Nigeria, and natural gas produced and sold.

NNPC Limited

Section 53 directs that the Minister, within six months of the PIB’s commencement, incorporate a Nigerian National Petroleum Company Limited at the Corporate Affairs Commission (‘CAC’). The shares are to be held by the Ministry of Finance Incorporated, on behalf of the Government. The PIB provides that the Minister of Petroleum and the Minister of Finance are to determine which assets, interests, and liabilities of the current statutory NNPC, are to be transferred to NNPC Ltd. Any other assets, interests and liabilities not transferred to NNPC Ltd will continue to be held by NNPC, until they are extinguished or transferred to the Government upon which the NNPC would cease to exist.

Section 58 indicates that the Board of NNPC Ltd is to be constituted in accordance with the provisions of the Companies and Allied Matters Act (‘CAMA’), and the company’s Articles of Association. The Government has taken a bold step by incorporating NNPC Ltd as a CAMA entity; it should bite the bullet by freeing it up to run the same way that other private companies are run, albeit with interventions as its shareholder. Interestingly, Section 65 encourages NNPC Ltd and its joint venture partners to explore the use of incorporated joint venture companies, under the principles enumerated under the Second Schedule to the PIB.

Functions of the Commission

The Commission is empowered to make recommendations to the Minister, on granting licences or leases to operating companies incorporated and validly existing in Nigeria under the Companies and Allied Matters Act. The Commission has the responsibility of receiving application for licences and leases, and making necessary technical and commercial appraisals that will form the basis of its recommendation to the Minister on the grating of licence/lease to respective applicants.

The form of the major licences/leases to be issued for upstream operations are: –
Petroleum Exploration Licence (equivalent to the current Oil Exploration Licence): A Petroleum Exploration Licence (PEL) is granted for exploration of petroleum on a speculative and non-exclusive basis and shall be for three years and may be renewable for additional period of three years.

Petroleum Prospecting Licence (equivalent to the current Oil Prospecting Licence): A Petroleum Prospecting Licence (PPL) is granted for exploration of Petroleum on an exclusive basis. A PPL for onshore and shallow water acreages shall be for a duration of not more than six years, comprising an initial exploration period of three years and an optional extension period of three years. For deep offshore and frontier acreages, it shall be for a duration of not more than 10 years, comprising an initial exploration period of five years and an optional extension period of five years.

Petroleum Mining Lease (equivalent to the current Oil Mining Lease): A Petroleum Mining Lease (PML) is granted to qualified applicant to search for, win, work, carry away and dispose of crude oil, condensates and natural gas and shall be for a maximum period of 20 years and may be renewable for one or more additional period of not more than 20 years each, subject to meeting specified conditions.

The PIB prescribes that, where the Minister does not act upon the recommendation of the Commission for the award of licence within 90 days, the approval shall be deemed as given. However, for Ministerial consent, it is 60 days. These provisions will greatly help, in enhancing transparency.

The Commission has a regulatory role of monitoring and ensuring compliance with the PIB, with respect to environmental sustainability and environmental degradation that may result from petroleum operations of licensees and lessees. A licensee or lessee, who engages in upstream petroleum operations, is required by the Commission to submit for approval, an environmental management plan in respect of projects which require environmental impact assessment within one year of the effective date of the PIB, or six months after the grant of the applicable Licence or Lease. The Commission gives its approval of such plan, provided it follows regulations issued under the Act, and the applicant has the capacity or has provided for the capacity to rehabilitate and manage negative impacts on the environment. Furthermore, to be sure of the safety of people and the environment, the PIB requires that the applicable permit and approval is granted by the Commission to upstream operators, before chemicals can be used for their operations. As a condition for the grant of a licence or lease and prior to the approval of the environmental management plan by the Commission, a licensee or lessee is required to pay a prescribed financial contribution to an Environmental Remediation Fund established by the Commission, for the rehabilitation or management of negative environmental impacts with respect to the licence or lease issued to such licensee or lessee.
This is a notable feature of the PIB, that is aimed at engendering a culture of good environmental consideration practice that has been called to question in the sector. It may also help to deal with the perennial issue of oil spillage in the Niger Delta, because of petroleum operations.

Gas Flaring

Gas flaring is one of the age-long ills that has plagued the Nigerian Oil and Gas sector. The PIB has upheld the prohibition of gas flaring, except for a few circumstances in which there is no other reasonable option than to flare gas. According to the PIB, a licensee or lessee shall pay a penalty prescribed pursuant to the Flare Gas (Prevention of Waste and Pollution) Regulations 2018. The only recognised few instances where gas flaring may be allowed by the PIB are as follows: i. in the case of an emergency ii. pursuant to an exemption granted by the Commission. iii. as an acceptable safety practice under established regulations. As part of the efforts to manage the flaring of gas, the Commission requires upstream operators that produce natural gas to submit, within 12 months of the effective date of the PIB, a natural gas flare elimination and monetisation plan to the Commission.

This is expected to be prepared, in accordance with regulations made by the Commission under the PIB.

Supply to the Domestic Market

In line with the principles of free market and healthy competition, the PIB provides that the supply of crude oil and condensates for the domestic market, shall generally be on a willing supplier and willing buyer basis. However, to manage national exigencies and in the interest of the Nigerian people, the Commission is empowered to issue regulations or guidelines on the mechanism for setting domestic crude oil supply obligation for lessees in the upstream petroleum operations. This power is exercised where, in the opinion of the Commission, the domestic market results in shortages or inadequate supplies of crude oil and condensates for holders of crude oil refining licences. The Commission liaises with the Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority (the “Authority”), to ascertain the crude oil requirements of refineries in operation. This is a mediation role of the Commission, to ensure that the local market is adequately supplied to the extent possible for the benefit of the Nigerian people, in line with the objectives of the PIB.

In order to establish an orderly, fair and competitive commercial environment within the petroleum industry, the Commission, working hand in hand with the Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority, is responsible for determining, monitoring and ensuring that the volume of natural gas that is expected to be supplied by lessees to strategic sectors and aggregators, is achieved. The Commission will manage this through an allocation system among lessees, as determined by the Commission upon consultation with the Authority with consideration of supporting infrastructure availability. Lessees who fail to comply with the domestic gas delivery obligation placed on them by the PIB, shall incur a penalty of US$3.50 per MMBtu not delivered, subject to the penalty for failure to deliver, as may be stated in any gas purchase and sale agreement between a lessee and a wholesale supplier of the strategic sectors. The penalty amount may be adjusted as the Commission may prescribe, in a Regulation made under the PIB. The penalty does not apply in the following circumstances: i. force majeure ii. the inability of a purchaser to accept allocated natural gas volumes iii. the inability to transport the allocated natural gas for reasons beyond the control of the lessee; or iv. the failure of a purchaser to pay for allocated natural gas volumes. Apart from the penalty for non-compliance, the PIB has made compliance with the domestic gas delivery obligation, a condition for approval of the supply of natural gas for export projects by lessees.

Functions of the Authority

The Nigerian Midstream and Downstream Petroleum Regulatory Authority (the “Authority”) shall be responsible for the management and administration of the midstream and the downstream sector of the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry.

The notable administrative areas of influence by the Authority are as follows:
Licence Application: The Authority is responsible for granting, renewing, modifying and extending licences and permits to operators, in the midstream and downstream sector. Where the licence relates to the operation of a refinery, this is issued by the Minister on recommendation by the Authority. In performing this role and making relevant decisions, the Authority is saddled with the responsibility of considering commercial, technical, and environmental factors, among others. The Authority is empowered to make and enforce regulations and guidelines that will help it discharge its duties in relation to licensing matters.

Tariff: The Authority has the power to use Regulations to determine the pricing framework for transportation, distribution, and processing of petroleum. The PIB requires that tariffs be determined in US dollars, but may be paid in Naira, where the applicable exchange rate shall be based on the Securities and Exchange Commission over-the-counter market rate or any successor rate. The prices should be cost reflective, and should allow for reasonable return for the operators. The Authority, prior to establishing a tariff methodology, is required to initiate and conduct a stakeholders’ consultation with applicants, operators, consumers, prospective customers, consumers associations, associations of prospective customers and any other persons with interest in the subject-matter of the proposed tariff methodology.

The PIB requires a holder of a subsisting lease, licence or permit, who is engaged in activities in midstream or downstream gas operations prior to the effective date of the PIB, to apply to the Authority within 24 months from the effective date of the PIB for the appropriate licence or permit, as applicable. To properly administer gas operations in the sector, the PIB provides that the Authority can issue special guidelines and regulations as may be deemed necessary. The Authority performs the customer-protection function, by issuing regulations that require oil and gas product distributors and suppliers to: i. publish their terms of supply or distribution including tariffs; and ii. facilitate the establishment of a forum at which customers can express their views and raise concerns, among others. The PIB provides that the Authority shall, prior to the 1st day of March of each calendar year, determine the domestic gas demand requirement and inform the Commission of this requirement.

One of the overarching objectives of the PIB, is to engender a competitive market devoid of customer exploitation. Subject to the provisions of the Federal Competition and Consumer Protection Act, the Authority is to, among other responsibilities, curb monopoly and restrictive market practices of “powerful” operators, diagnose and forestall all tendencies of barrier to market entry. This will create and encourage an environment, conducive for foreign direct investments. Where an operator is engaged in acts that contravene the requirements of the relevant chapters of the PIB, the Authority is empowered to state its intention to issue a “cease and desist” order to curb the unwanted actions of the operator. There is a penalty of a maximum of 10% of the annual turnover of the operator, that fails to comply with the provisions of the “cease and desist” order.

The Commission and Authority are required to consult with stakeholders, such as licensees, permit holders and lessees, prior to finalising any regulations or amendments to regulations. This may not be the case in instances of exigencies. A regulation made shall be valid for not more than one year with effect from its commencement date, except it is confirmed following a stakeholders’ consultation.

Provisions for Decommissioned and Abandoned Wells

The PIB requires that necessary and adequate provisions be made for the decommissioning and abandonment of onshore and offshore petroleum wells, installations, structures, utilities, plants and pipelines for petroleum operations and shall be conducted in accordance with international best practice and guidelines by the Commission or the Authority. This exercise shall take place with the approval of the Commission or the Authority, as applicable. The PIB requires that each lessee and licensee shall set up and maintain a decommissioning and abandonment fund, which shall be held by a financial institution that is not an affiliate of the lessee or licensee. The fund so set up, will be used for abandonment and decommissioning purposes. Where the licensee or the lessee fails to comply with the abandonment plan, the Commission or the Authority will access the fund for this purpose. Operators are required to make periodic payments, as may be determined from time to time, into the fund. A licensee or lessee is required to inform the Commission or Authority, as the case may be, of the establishment of its decommissioning and abandonment fund not more than three months from the date of commencement of production for upstream petroleum operations, or the commissioning of the facilities for midstream petroleum operations; and furnish the Commission or Authority, as the case may be, on an annual basis with statements of accounts with respect to its decommissioning and abandonment fund. The PIB provides that, from the effective date, contributions to the decommissioning and abandonment fund are eligible for cost recovery and shall be tax deductible, if decommissioning and abandonment costs disbursed from the decommissioning and abandonment fund shall not be eligible for cost recovery or deductible for tax purposes. Where there is excess in the decommissioning and abandonment fund after the decommissioning and abandonment has been carried out and approved by the Commission or the Authority, the excess will be available for consideration as income for production sharing or tax purposes and the residual amount left over after the withholding of profit oil and any tax has been deducted shall be returned to the licensee or lessee. The PIB further provides that, from the effective date, contributions to the decommissioning and abandonment fund is eligible for cost recovery and shall be tax deductible, provided that decommissioning and abandonment costs disbursed from the decommissioning and abandonment fund, shall not be eligible for cost recovery or deductible for tax purposes.

Conversion and Relinquishment of PPLs & PMLs

All existing OPLs and OMLs will be automatically converted to PPLs and PMLs, upon their expiration. However, the PIB allows holders of OPLs and OMLs under the current regime to voluntarily covert them to PPLs or PMLs, respectively. The PIB provides some condition precedents which are to be contained in the Conversion Contracts. One such condition, is a stipulation that all on-going arbitration and court cases will be terminated. Other conditions are that the fiscal stabilisation clauses, will not be grandfathered.

OML holders will need to designate their acreages into five broad classes: – parcels that merit an appraisal (for exploration); – parcels to make a declaration of commercial discovery, for which a field development plan is to be submitted; – parcels that have a significant gas discovery; – parcels which already have development programs underway; and – parcels in which regular commercial production is occurring. The PIB prescribes that these five parcels should cover 40% of the area of the licence granted, and other areas are to be relinquished. The limitation to 40% suggests that if the parcels cover more than 40% of the entire area of the lease area, there would be no relinquishment under such OML. The proposed relinquishment of 60% appears to be onerous, and may serve as a disincentive to conversion.

Host Communities’ Welfare

One of the issues that contributed to the delay in passing the previous versions of the PIB, is host communities. The host communities, Government and operators could not agree on the best way to address the concerns of the host communities. While the host communities are demanding more to deal with the issue of the environmental effect of oil operations, the Government believes that enough is already being done in this area, given all the agencies that are involved in the development of the Niger Delta region. It is, therefore, not surprising that the PIB 2021 adopts a novel approach to this issue.

Chapter 3 of the Bill introduces the Petroleum Host Community Development (PHCD) which has the following objectives: • To foster sustainable prosperity within host communities; • To provide direct social and economic benefits from petroleum operations to host communities; • To enhance peaceful and harmonious co-existence between licensees or lessees and host communities; and • To create a framework to support the development of host communities. The PHCD is expected to improve the quality of life of the host communities’ population, and improve accountability in the management of host communities’ development trust (HCDT or “the Trust”) fund. Some of the significant provisions of the framework are as follows:

•Section 235 of the Bill requires a settlor or a group of settlors under a joint operating agreement, to incorporate a HCDT. The Trust is to aid the development of the economic and social infrastructure of the communities, within the petroleum-producing area. Where the HCDT is incorporated by a group of settlors under a joint operation, the operator under the agreement will be responsible for the Trust on behalf of the other parties. The Bill requires the settlor to appoint and authorise a Board of Trustees (BoT), which will be registered with the Corporate Affairs Commission, for the purpose of managing the Trust.

The following administrative activities of the BoT are determined by the settlor – • the selection process, the procedure for meetings, financial regulations and administrative procedures • the remuneration, discipline, qualification, disqualification, suspension, and removal of members of the BoT; and • other matters other than the above relating to the operation and activities of the BoT.
•Section 251 requires the settlor to conduct a host community needs assessment to determine the needs of each host community, and develop a Community Development Plan to address the identified needs.

The Bill requires the BOT to set up a Management Committee that comprises one representative of each host community as a non-executive member, and other executive members of high integrity and professional qualification. Further, it empowers the Management Committee to prepare the budget of the fund, manage project awards on behalf of the Trust, supervise project execution, and other functions that may be assigned to it by the BOT.

The Host Community Advisory Committee (“Advisory Committee”) is to be set up by the Management Committee in accordance with the constitution of the Trust. The Advisory Committee will be responsible for nominating members to represent the host communities on the Management Committee, communicating community development projects to the Management Committee, monitoring the progress of community projects, securing project facilities, and advising the Management Committee on measures to improve security and peace within the community.

Petroleum Industry Fiscal Framework

Chapter 4 of the Bill introduces the Petroleum Industry Fiscal Framework (PIFF), which has the following objectives: Fiscal Provisions: • To establish a progressive fiscal framework that encourages investment in the Nigerian petroleum industry, balancing rewards with risk and enhancing revenues to the Federal Government (FG); • To provide a forward-looking fiscal framework that is based on core principles of clarity, dynamism and fiscal rules of general application; • To establish a fiscal framework that expands the revenue base of the FG, while ensuring a fair return for investors; • To simplify the administration of petroleum tax; and • To promote equity and transparency in the petroleum industry fiscal regime.

The Bill amends and repeals various laws that have implications for the oil and gas industry, and provides for the current Petroleum Profits Tax (PPT) to be split into two namely: Hydrocarbon Tax (HT) and Companies Income Tax (CIT) both of which will apply to companies engaged in upstream petroleum operations. The fiscal and tax amendments in the PIB will apply upon: a. conversion of existing Oil Prospecting Licences (OPLs) and Oil Mining Leases (OMLs) to Petroleum Prospecting Licences (PPLs) and Petroleum Mining Licences (PMLs) b. termination or expiration of unconverted licenses, and c. renewal of OMLs. Consequently, holders of OPLs and OMLs that do not convert to PMLs will continue to be taxed under the current PPT Act, pending the expiration of their licences.
The Bill introduces the HT, which will be chargeable on the profits of upstream petroleum companies. The HT will be charged at varying rates depending on the terrain, contract type, and whether it is a new or converted acreage.

The PIB has effectively resolved the controversy relating to the applicable fiscal legislation for condensates and NGLs that are subsequently commingled with oil. The determination of the applicability of HT will depend on whether the volumes of the condensate or NGLs can be determined at the measurement point or exit of the gas processing plant. Further, only the costs that cannot be deemed to be exclusively incurred to produce associated gas will be claimed as tax deductions under the HT.

Based on Section 277 (3) of the PIB, companies yet to commence bulk sales or disposal of chargeable oil are required to submit their tax returns within 18 months from the date of incorporation in the case of a new company, and within five months after any period ending on 31st December of the following year, in the case of any other company. Further, Section 281 of the Bill has significantly increased the general penalty for non-compliance from N10,000 and an additional N2,000 for each day of continued default to N10,000,000 and an additional N2,000,000 for each day of continued default. The stiff penalties, are to encourage voluntary compliance. However, Section 218 provides for taxpayers that have genuine reasons that may impact their ability to file their tax returns as and when due, to proactively engage the FIRS and agree an extension to avoid payment of the penalties.

Senator Surajudeen Ajibola Basiru Ph.D, Notary Public