Resurrection of NIIA: A Review and Agenda Setting for Nigeria’s Foreign Policy

The Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) held a two-day Virtual Roundtable on Nigeria’s Foreign Policy on Monday, 12th and Tuesday, July 13, 2021. The theme of the Roundtable was ‘’Looking Back, Going Forward: Setting the Agenda for Nigeria’s Foreign Policy.’’ The methodological implication of the theme is not far-fetched: the need to draw lessons from the past using the present to define the new way forward. It also requires a holistic approach in the choice of which past issues to draw lessons from. And perhaps more significantly, it requires the articulation of which type of future is to be desired and which type of agenda will be good enough to enable the Government of Nigeria respond to the current challenges of a changing world of globalisation.

And true enough, the Roundtable was not simply a platform for academic reflections but, most significantly, a platform for the resurrection of the NIIA, which suffered an academic thrombosis inflicted on it by the NIIA Governing Council, chaired by General Ike Omar Nwachukwu. The NIIA slumbered, not to say dead, as a result of the thrombosis, but was brought back to life by the new Director General, Professor Eghosa Osaghae. The NIIA is gradually becoming again a living institution. It was under this recovery effort that the NIIA held the Roundtable and also an Ambassadorial Forum on Nigeria-Bangladesh Relations on July 26, 2021. The quality of the Roundtable, in terms of paper contributions, methodological approaches, theoretical analyses, and conjectural submissions, lend much credence to a new NIIA in the making.

The virtual Roundtable was structured into four main parts which were organised into two sessions per day: morning and afternoon. Twelve papers were scheduled for presentation on the first day, but eleven papers were actually presented. The ten papers were scheduled for presentation on the second day. This report focuses on some papers that bother more on the use of foreign policy as an instrument of national security, national development, national integration, and particularly for policy-making and implementation.

Some Problems of the Past

Professor Hassan A. Saliu gave an overview of the structures, processes, outcomes and reviews of Nigeria’s foreign policy since 1960 and noted that ‘the Presidency has, more or less, become the only face of Nigeria’s foreign policy and that the role of the unoffficial channels is diminishing by the day. Ditto for the research arms. The existence of these structures has not guaranteed much coordination of the foreign policy.’

More important, Prof. Saliu said the Nigerian Diaspora Commission ‘invades the policy environment without proper synergy with the Ministry of foreign Affairs,’ which still makes policy briefs, but its views under the current Republic, are sometimes not considered and (are) kept in (the) dark on some issues. Attendance at international fora has proven the point on lack of coordination in Nigerian foreign policy.’ On the way forward, he suggested doing away with ad hoc approaches to foreign policy, making greater efforts to resolve domestic problems, embarking on a comprehensive review of Nigeria’s foreign policy and paying more attention to Nigeria’s relations with the Western world.

‘’Nigeria and the Emerging Economies: China and India,’’ was the focus of the paper of Dr. Efem N. Ubi, the Director of Research and Studies at the NIIA. He began his presentation with a quotation that ‘the striking thing about the global economy is how little it relies on the United States as the main engine of growth. Since 2007, China’s rapidly expanding economy has provided the largest contribution to global growth, while half of the world’s expansion over the past year has come from three countries: China, India and Russia.’

In his analysis of Nigeria’s relations with China and India, Dr. Ubi noted at the level of India that India is Nigeria’s largest trading partner and Nigeria is also India’s largest trading partner in Africa. As he put it, ‘total bilateral trade between India and Nigeria during the year 2019-20 registered US $13.82bn, as against US $13.89b recorded during the year 2018-19.’

On relations with China, Dr. Ubi had it that ‘the turn of the Millennium saw a stronger Nigeria-China relation in socio-political and economic terms, especially in terms of the Nigeria-China strategic Partnership agreement, done in 2006 and which underscored the need for expansion of trade; investments in agriculture; telecommunications, energy; and infrastructure development. In this regard, Dr. Ubi strongly believed that Nigeria should harness its relationship with the Emerging Economies for its development.

As regards Dr. Tola Ilesanmi’s ‘’Gender and Nigeria’s Foreign Policy,’’ she provided an exegesis of the problems of policy making and implementation. Considering that Nigeria currently ranks number 139 out of 156 countries on the 2021 Global Gender Gap Report (vide World Economic Forum, 2021), she suggested a pro-gender approach in which more women are appointed into leadership positions within the foreign and security services; adoption of explicit gender equality policies, especially within the framework of the National Action Plans (NAPS on Women, Peace and Security; and the elevation of ‘gender equality to a foreign policy priority by establishing dedicated budget and stand-alone funds for women’s rights programs and organisations.’

She also placed a particular emphasis on the need for Nigeria to domesticate the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 which requires UN Member States ‘to ensure increased participation of women in peace keeping missions and in the security sectors.’ A basis for domestication can begin with the adoption of the First (2013) and Second (2017) National Action Plan as basis of implementation of the UNSCR 1325.

Dr. Habu Mohammed of the Political Science Department of Bayero University, Kano, noted in his own paper, ‘Economic Diplomacy and Nigeria’s Foreign Policy,’ that Nigeria adopted economic diplomacy in 1988 as a new direction to hasten economic revival and sustainable development, but under subsequent administrations, the policy ‘was either relegated to the background or its vigorous implementation reduced to near oblivion until its resurgence as a foreign policy framework of the new civilian administration in 1999.

The paper investigated what the changes and continuities in the conduct of Nigeria’s international economic relations were, with emphasis on the challenges and prospects in the current unipolar world. He observed that the introduction of economic diplomacy in Nigeria is a shift in the direction of the country’s foreign policy from its traditional posture of afrocentricism and that the shuttle diplomacy embarked upon by Foreign Minister Ike Nwachukwu ‘was more of a declaration of intent’ to the outside world, that investment opportunities abound in Nigeria, but ‘the gesture was rarely responded (to) by host countries largely because of the climate of the domestic environment.’

In his examination of ‘Nigeria and the European Union: the Cotonou Years and Beyond’, Professor Victor Adetula of the University of Jos, observed that ‘despite some critical remarks on Nigeria-EU relations, there are some positive aspects of the relationship, mainly traceable to the period of the Lomé Conventions. However, the benefits from the Cotonou Partnership Agreement and its impact on national development are negligible.’ He also noted the likelihood of the expired Cotonou Agreement being renewed and defined by the international system ‘which has become increasingly less charitable and characterised mainly by rising nationalism, a decline of multilateralism, and the continued fragmentation of global governance architecture and international regulation.’ Consequently, he submitted that the Nigerian government must pay more attention, reappraise its capabilities against its values and interests, and advance its interests in the international system. For instance, while the relationship with the EU is desirable, Nigeria needs to critically assess its membership of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States (OACPS) and its relevance to its development needs and priorities.

Dr. Willie Aziegbe Eselebor wrote on ‘Border Security in Nigeria: a Strategic Variable in Foreign Policy,’ and noted that ‘border security remains a variable because an open (borderless) border or globalised border, without control cannot guarantee peace, security and development.’ Therefore he opined that Nigeria should ‘do a scenario analysis to determine what Nigeria realistically wants to do with its borders. He also submitted that what Nigeria ‘should address in agenda setting is how to … engage with UN-AU-ECOWAS in relation to peace and security; and/or the role of European Union and especially, France when it comes to the G-5 Sahel and in the Lake Chad Basin Commission. Nigeria must aim to play active roles through foreign policy making in AU and other regional blocks.’

Professor Alaba Ogunsanwo of the Center for Diplomatic Studies and Public Affairs, Lead City University, Ibadan, spoke on “National Values, Interests and Nigeria’s Foreign Policy in the 21st century,’ and drew attention to the fact that most countries have their values: Equality, Liberty and Fraternity for France; Harmony, Benevolence, Righteousness, Courtesy, Wisdom, Honesty, Loyalty and Piety for China; Life, Liberty and pursuit of Happiness, Common Good and Justice for the United states; Justice, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity for India; Protection of Human Dignity, Human Rights and Democracy for Germany, etc. Professor Ogunsanwo noted that these values are mostly aspirational and not necessarily respected by all citizens.

On the basis of the December 2019 document on National Security Strategy, Nigeria’s values are ideals of freedom; equality and justice; sanctity of human life; human dignity; democracy; rule of law; free enterprise; respect for human rights; and equal opportunity and access to justice. These are in addition to the values of respect for elders, honesty and accountability, cooperation, industry, discipline, self-confidence and moral courage articulated in the 2014 National Economic Empowerment Development Strategy (NEEDS).

Additionally, he differentiated between and among vital national interests, which are hinged on national survival and require that all resources be deployed; strategic national interests that are also important, but less than vital; and peripheral interests. As he put it, ‘regional security by way of combating terrorism, insurgency and other transnational crimes, also fall under this category of strategic interests. The defence of these interests will enhance the protection of Nigeria’s vital interests. Peripheral interests deal with Nigeria’s international obligations, assisting in humanitarian operations, etc.

Agenda Setting and Quo Vadis

In terms of agenda setting and way forward, in addition to the various recommendations noted above, Professor Ogunsanwo believes that the future of Nigeria’s foreign policy depends ‘to a large extent on the success or failure of present efforts to transform the economy, industry, energy, infrastructure and digitalisation.’ And perhaps, most notably, he said ‘it will be share hypocrisy to pretend that you can promote abroad values such as respect of human life and the rule of law when no such exists in Nigeria. Where there is selected criminal administration of justice and thousands of Nigerians in farming communities all over the country are killed with the government unable or unwilling to do anything, we cannot talk about promoting justice and the respect for lives and property abroad. He who goes to equity must go with clean hands. We should learn to do just that with our domestic affairs.’

From the perspective of Professor Femi Otubanjo, whose paper is entitled ‘’Is there a Doctrine and Orientation in Nigeria’s Foreign Policy?’’, it is argued that in the 60 years of Nigeria’s independence, ‘there have been as many doctrines as there have been regimes, but there has been only one significant change of orientation.’ A doctrine ‘is the articulation of a country’s vision of its preferred role and priorities in its relations with other countries or the general international system,’ while ‘foreign policy orientation is the predictable disposition of a state in its relationship with others and its preferences in the international system. It is the axis from which all policy choices and even, instruments radiate. Orientation is very much like a paradigm from which theories, hypothesis, doctrines and choices flow.’

In sum, Professor Otubanjo said ‘doctrines have been ephemeral in Nigeria, the orientation of Nigeria’s foreign policy has changed only once: from Balewa’s pro-western inclination to Gowon’s broadening of relations with the Eastern Bloc as a result of military necessity. All the attempts at doctrinal postulations, since then, have been based on the presumption of Nigeria’s robust relations with all nations and regions of the world.’

It is noteworthy that the submission of Professor Otubanjo is quite interesting and right on the basis of the good distinction made between a foreign policy doctrine and a foreign policy orientation. However, when he noted in his paper that ‘in spite of the grand declaration of non-partisanship in East-West ideological disputes, Balewa could not untie Nigeria from the umbilical cord of Nigeria’s colonial master and her allies,’ Professor Otubanjo is simply implying that the Balewa government was aligned contrary to the official policy of non-alignment. We hold a different understanding of the subject-matter.

In this regard, it cannot be rightly argued that the Balewa government was aligned or partisan without having factored into the partisanship Nigeria’s national interests. Nigeria’s policy of non-alignment does not and never meant that the Government of Nigeria could not or cannot align. What is noteworthy about the policy of non-alignment is that the decision to align or not to do so must be a direct and free decision of the Government of Nigeria, without foreign intrusions. It must not be by intimidation or pressure. The decision to align must be a resultant from, and a reflection of, the national interest. More importantly, the alignment must not be routine in character.

As explained by Tafawa Balewa, ‘it is better to state briefly the principles which we accepted as the basis of our policies in international relations. First, it is the desire of Nigeria… to remain on friendly terms with all nations and to participate actively in the work of the UNO… Africa must not be allowed to become a battleground in the ideology struggle. For this reason, the Congo situation must be a matter to be dealt with primarily by African States at the political level…’ Additionally, he noted that Nigerians ‘are willing to learn before we rush into the field of international politics, but we are totally unwilling to be diverted from the ideals which we think to be true. That is the reason we in Nigeria will not be found to align ourselves as a matter of routine, with any particular bloc. Indeed, I hate the very ideas of blocs existing at all in the United Nations.’ The implication of no routine alignment is that there would be alignment but not routinely. Consequently, Nigeria’s non-alignment policy is about the sovereign freedom to determine when to align and Prime Minister Balewa essentially did not breach Nigeria’s policy of non-alignment.

In his paper on ‘Imaging Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: pinpointing the Ever Missing Link,’ Onoja Adagbo of the Department of Political Science of the Veritas University argued that ‘the fundamental crisis of Nigerian foreign policy is its crisis of representation practice of power in relation to hegemony in a world of States. In other words, it is not lack of industrialisation, military capability or a better organised Ministry of Foreign Affairs that are blocking Nigeria from being a case study in active, credible, influential and responsible state actor as much as the poverty of Nigeria’s representational practices and her subsequent low score in structural, institutional and coercive power in world politics.’

In addressing these problems, he made a number of recommendations: Government should not leave the framing of every foreign policy to chance; elaboration of training in discursive capability for Nigerians; organisation of the cultural domain; establishing a 24-hour global channel that is global technologically, coverage and narratives; integration of foreign policy instruments for the purposes of representational praxis in power politics, etc. Speaking, grosso modo and in evaluative terms, the Roundtable was a good development. It woke up the NIIA Research Fellows from their long academic slumber and also provided a renewal of opportunities for their peers in other institutions to share ideas with them on foreign policy. The major challenge, however, is the environmental conditioning of foreign policy agenda setting, which was only tangentially discussed by Professor Eghosa Osaghae and Professor Alaba Ogunsanwo. The Roundtable had little discussions on the dilemma of the domestic setting which has made intellectual activities very difficult. There is the need for agenda setting, for foreign policy, which is really not the problem. Agenda setting should, lato sensu, be for the foreign policy makers, as they are the noisome problems. Put interrogatively, what type of agenda setting can be helpful to Nigeria’s international image if there is selected criminal administration of justice, if thousands of farmers ‘all over the country are killed with the government unable or unwilling to do anything’ to borrow the words of Professor Ogunsanwo? What type of agenda setting is required when foreign policy institutions are being bastardised even by the Governing Councils and Foreign Ministry meant to be a supervisor and a guide?