Australia’s Nuclear-powered Attack Boats: US-UK Magouilles or France’s Independent Dependency?

INTERNATIoNAL   Bola A. Akinterinwa

For a long time now, the leadership of the world, as provided by the United States, has either been jealously condoned or courageously challenged by other aspiring great powers. While the United Kingdom tries cautiously to sustain a warm rapprochement with the United States, being its former colonial master, France does not appear to accept US mania of foreign policy leadership, especially in terms of US superiority. Rather than for the French to accept American leadership or superiority in whatever context, they prefer to share leadership responsibility in the conduct and management of international questions.

There was the time former French President Valérie Giscard D’Estaing first proposed in 1974 a dialogue between the rich and poor countries in order to address energy and economic problems. When this suggestion did not fly, despite discussions by 27 countries that continued until 1977, President d’Estaing changed the dialogue on 15 January 1979 to a trialogue among the European Economic Community, the United States and Africa. In this regard, Africa was to be used essentially as a source for raw materials for the further development of the developed world. Dr, Okoi Arikpo, Nigeria’s Commissioner for External Affairs, vehemently opposed the French agenda. Europe was to provide development resources. The United States was to assume responsibility for security. Additionally, France was also required to protect the collective NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) interests because of her colonial experience in Africa. Thus, France wanted to share in the responsibility for global leadership with the United States, but the United States was not much favourable to the French agenda.

This leadership struggle was renewed last week with France’s strong disagreement with the United States over Australia’s decision to renege on the contract it signed with France on the purchase of 12 French diesel, nuclear-powered attack boats. The French considered the contract as the Contract of the Century. Australia has, in lieu, settled for eight UK-US more sophisticated nuclear-powered attack boats. In this regard, to what extent can the French government go considering the Anglo-American interests in the matter? How will the French respond to the Sino-Russian involvement concerning the dispute over who has sovereignty over the South China Sea? France has the support of the European allies in her dispute with the United States on the contract with Australia but the United Kingdom, which has Brexited out of the European Union constitutes an impediment in dealing with Australia. Quo vadis?

Background to the Dispute

In 2016, the Government of Australia called for international bids for the building of 12 submarines for the Australian Navy. France, Germany and Japan submitted bids and France won the A$50bn (€34bn; £27bn) contract. The French were to build the 12 Shortfin Barracuda submarines in Adelaide using Australian steel and creating 2,800 jobs. The call for open bids was prompted by the existing ageing Collins Class submarine fleet and the need to acquire a stronger submarine capability to conduct surveillance operations, Australia, being an island.

While the French began construction of the first phase, relationship with China became an issue, especially at the level of the Five Eyes alliance which comprises the U.S., UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The Five Eyes group was established during the Cold War as an intelligence mechanism to monitor the then Soviet Union and share classified intelligence. However, in May 2020, the group decided to expand its roles beyond security and intelligence, to include respect for human rights and democracy. It was on this basis that in November 2020 China was accused of stifling democracy in Hong Kong. In the eyes of China, allegations of stifling democracy were unnecessary interference in the domestic affairs of China, and which should not be condoned. This is one of the reasons why China constitutes a major dynamic in the making of the AUKUS.

The problem in this case is two-fold: is the AUKUS primarily aimed at undermining the French or primarily targeted at the Chinese? The answer may not be clear-cut. What is not disputable, however, is that both the United States and the United Kingdom have onions to grind with France and the AUKUS serves the purposes of containing the feathers of the two countries. Secondly, New Zealand has adopted a more cautious policy attitude towards China. New Zealand does not want a strained relationship with China, unlike the four others who have accused the Chinese of various international infractions: mistreatment of its Uyghur population in the Xinjiang province, de facto military takeover of the South China Sea, suppression of democracy in Hong Kong, as well as threatening to take back Taiwan by 2049. For various reasons, and particularly because China is the most important export market for New Zealand, New Zealand has refused to join others in the anti-China strategic calculations, even though New Zealand is acknowledged to be one of the frontline proponents of defence of human rights.

As explained by Frank Gardner, the BBC Security Correspondent, ‘New Zealand’s Foreign Minister, Nanaia Mahuta, declined to join in this Western condemnation of Beijing, saying “it felt uncomfortable” with expanding the alliance’s role by putting pressure on China in this way.’ More important, even though the New Zealand’s Prime Minister, Jacinda Ardem, admitted that ‘differences with China are becoming ‘harder to reconcile, the country still prefers to pursue its own bilateral relations with Beijing,’ Gardner has said. Thus, the understanding of the tripartite contract agreement, AUKUS, cannot be separated from the regional geopolitics as a dynamic.

The dispute between France and the United States, which has profound, coincidental and immediate causal factors, is another major background factor in understanding the AUKUS. The profound causal factor is essentially about global leadership rivalry between France and the United States. This struggle for global or shared leadership largely explains why there has always been many irritants in Franco-American bilateral ties regardless of public claims of warm rapports on both sides.

For instance, recall the case of the French-British turbojet-powered supersonic passenger airliner, The Concorde, especially how US opposition to the alleged too much noise of the aircraft in the United States led to the non-viability and eventual closure of the airline business. The supersonic passenger airliner was designed to fly from Europe to New York in only three hours. It was considered by the Franco-British entrepreneurs to be a good technological breakthrough in terms of the velocity of the aircraft.

Second, recall also the movement of the NATO Headquarters from Paris 17è, France to Brussels, Belgium following France’s withdrawal of her military integrative membership of the NATO. Explained differently, membership of the NATO is of two types: integrative membership at the military level and political membership. Militarily, Article 5 of the NATO pact provides that an attack on any member signatory to the pact is necessarily an attack on the whole membership, and, therefore, warranting a collective response. In such a situation, the NATO Chief Commander was always an American who the French saw as always giving instructions without prior consultation with the French Government. The French were not happy with this vertical type of command-relationship. This partly led to an irreconcilable disagreement and NATO’s decision to relocate its headquarters from Paris to Brussels, Belgium. It was the former NATO Headquarters that was turned into the modern-day University of Paris-Dauphine.

Third, and perhaps more important, is the current French protest regarding the UK-US entente with Australia which wants to acquire nuclear-powered submarines on the purchase of eight sophisticated nuclear-powered attack boats. The contract was done in 2016. What is particularly interesting at the level of leadership struggle is the diplomacy of the repudiation of the contract. For example, the French government has it that it was sent a letter from the Australian authorities explaining extreme satisfaction with the French submarines.

In the words of Hervé Grandjean, the spokesperson of the French Ministry of Defence, ‘on the same day that President Biden and Prime Minister Morrison made the announcement, the defence ministry and Naval Group received an official letter, a letter with an official stamp on it, from the Australian navy.’ More important, he said the ‘admiral who is overseeing the project in the Australian Ministry of Defence made it clear that he had ‘taken a close look at the state of progress in the contract, in line with the contract, and was extremely satisfied that performance of the French submarine was excellent, which clearly means that we were to move to the next phase of the contract.’

Many questions can be raised at this juncture: how do we reconcile sending a letter of commendation to the French and also denouncing the contract? When did the negotiations for the contractual agreement with the U.K. and the U.S. begin? How do we also explain the fact that all the three Anglo-Saxon allies, Australia, U.K. and the U.S, have shared Indo-Pacific interests with the French, and yet, there is an apparent gang-up against the French? Why were there no diplomatic exchanges on whatever might have prompted Australia’s new direction, so that the French would not have been caught unawares?

Australian Defence Ministry noted on 15 September 2021 that ‘the formal exit of a system review had been achieved as required under the contractual arrangements in place at the time.’ Does the contract agreement not require giving notice for withdrawal? Without doubt, France was mistreated, and she is not in any way happy about it even if the contract agreement reportedly provides for non-notification. For allies, this type of mistreatment should not be condoned if the alliance is to be sustainable in the foreseeable future.

Fourth, the AUKUS is primarily done as a preventive or countermeasure against the rising military profile of China. When the contract with France was done in 2016, probably the rising military profile of China was not quite visible by then. Now that China is perceived to have an emerging superpower status, the need for more powerful submarine fighters dawned on the Australian government to change position. In all cases, it is a manifestation of preparation for the new Cold War in the making: It is the U.S. and its allies versus the Chinese, and in essence, with the sympathy of the Russians.

UK-US Magouilles or Independent Dependency?

The United States under President Joe Biden appears to want to build a new foreign policy image that will de-emphasise war-war, to the advantage of jaw-jaw, policies. President Biden made it clear at the current 2021 UNGA that US foreign policy would henceforth emphasise ‘relentless diplomacy’ and restore better understanding with U.S. allies in the next decade to the detriment of ‘relentless war.’ In other words, it is no to ‘relentless war’ and yes to ‘relentless diplomacy.’ Can President Biden successfully chart a new foreign policy direction that can nip in the bud the Sino-Russian and French challenges? In which way is this relentless diplomacy going to be different from gunboat diplomacy, especially in light of AUKUS pact?

Without doubt, the Americans want to sustain their leadership of the world, while the French are still quietly working towards the restoration of la grandeur de la France as espoused by General Charles de Gaulle in 1960. The British, who led the world with their industrial revolution, do not want to be left behind in the current global leadership struggle, an objective that explains in part Brexit politics and the strengthening of stronger alliance with the United States. While many great powers are seriously struggling to replace the United States as leader of the world, the Americans themselves have not shown any visible disposition to call it quit. This point may also explain the need to circumvent France’s supply of 12 diesel electric submarines to Australia. A diplomatic row is already in the making as a result. For China, AUKUS is ‘extremely irresponsible.’ In the words of the Chinese Foreign Minister, the pact ‘seriously undermines regional peace and stability and intensifies the arms race.’ The Embassy of China in Washington simply described it as an expression of ‘Cold War mentality and ideological prejudice.’

The U.K. does not agree with the Chinese position. The British Defence Secretary, Ben Wallace, has it that China was ‘embarking on one of the biggest military spends in history. It is growing its Navy and air force at a huge rate. Obviously, it is engaged in some disputed areas… Our partners in those regions want to be able to stand their own ground.’ The British Prime Minister has also added that the AUKUS would ‘preserve security and stability around the world and generate hundreds of high-skilled jobs.’

Without any scintilla of doubt, many strategic considerations underly the making of the AUKUS. First, the U.S. believes that stationing its submarines in Australia has the potential to enhance its regional influence. Rather than have the Chinese or the French influence to be contended with, priority should be given to the American influence. In fact, this explains why the Americans opted to share its submarine technology for the first time in 50 years with Australia after that that of the UK. And by so doing, Australia will now be the 7th country in the world to operate nuclear-powered submarines after the US, UK, France, China, India and Russia. The signatories to the AUKUS pact frown at China’s trade sanctions against some countries, including Australia, even though China is the biggest trading partner of Australia. Additionally, even though the French model of submarines was unanimously accepted in 2016, the new situational reality is such that the US submarines are quite faster and much harder to detect than conventionally powered fleets. The truth is also that they can easily stay submerged for many months, as well as shoot and carry more missiles for longer distances.

For France, AUKUS cannot but be most unfortunate, especially in reconciling Australia’s commendation, on the one hand, and denouncing the operational contract without notice, on the other. As noted by the French Foreign Minister, Jean-Yves Le Drian, ‘we had established a relationship (of trust-worthiness but) this trust has been betrayed.’ France has been so embittered to the extent of having to recall her ambassadors to the United States and Australia. The Chinese simply cut off all diplomatic contacts with Australia.

Thus, the challenge to be addressed by France is first to seek an understanding of what the future holds for her: any foreseeable war between the West and the Chinese? China has vowed to unite Taiwan with Mainland China not later than 2049 even if it will require the use of force. In the same vein, President Joe Biden has responded that the U.S. is also prepared to use force to protect the independence of Taiwan. On whose side does France want to be: the West or China? Can France afford the luxury of aligning with the Chinese against the U.S. and the Western allies? Can the whole of the EU be on the side of the French?

Secondly, magouilles is a French word, meaning intrigue or doubtful manoeuvre or struggle for influence in a dishonest manner. In short, magouille is dishonesty. In this regard, should France simply take the AUKUS as a magouille or not? What is really at stake is for France to decide on the acceptance of the Anglo-American magouilles or accepting to review her policy of independent dependency. France is on record to have generally being adopting an independentist foreign policy posture while also depending on countries from which she is also taking her independence in strategic matters. France strongly believes in the principles of equality, fraternity and liberty in the conduct of her foreign policy.

For instance, while the French can always boast of their assistance to the Americans during their revolution, the Americans can also write about how they served as catalytic agent in bringing Franco-British colonialism to an end in Africa. William Roger Louis’ book, Imperialism at Bay, published in 1977, is quite instructive on this matter. Besides, France’s alliance with the United States is largely predicated on suspicions. Put differently, Franco-American mutual suspicions predate the current imbroglio surrounding Australia’s contract on nuclear-powered attack boats in which France has had to take the bad end of the stick in her bilateral ties with the United States.

True, France can be seriously embittered but the AUKUS pact is now a fait accompli. There is not much the French could do about it, except in looking at the damages for the repudiation or denunciation of the agreement. France as a medium power cannot confront with ease a coalition of forces, like the U.S. a superpower, the U.K a great power on its own right and Australia. Unlike in the past when France could call on her former colonies to join her battles against Germany during the World Wars, any French disagreement with the Anglo-Saxons cannot but leave the French alone to fight.

True, democracies do not go into war with themselves. Therefore, there cannot be any hot war between the U.S. or the U.K, on the one hand, and the French, on the other. If we admit of this hypothesis, the next challenge for France is reconciling her independentist disposition in NATO politics and going along with the Anglo-Saxons in their anti-China strategy or accepting to engage with China alone. This may imply a house divided against itself at the NATO and EU levels. Whatever is the case, China is an emerging superpower that the AUKUS pact cannot stop and that French grudges against it can only boost and serve as a catalytic agent in the making of the new superpower.