Security on My Mind

 GUEST COLUMNIST   BY GUEST OSITA CHIDOKA

It is time to rethink our national security architecture. The current security architecture in place today was created by the military and largely upheld by the 1999 constitution.

The 1986 reform of the security agencies was in line with the character of the Gen. Babangida regime, which was bold in thinking and reform-minded. The security architecture of that time was a direct response to the challenges of that time and served its purpose for many years. Today it is no more fit for purpose.

By 2003 the first signs of stress arising from the Niger Delta agitations and militancy began to rear its head. The rise, growth and mutation of the militant groups appeared to have caught our security services napping as they held the nation at the jugular. It led to President Obasanjo meeting with militants at the Presidential villa advertising the helplessness of our security agencies. President Yar’ Adua had to cobble together an Amnesty program to contain the embarrassing situation of weak state capacity.

In 2010 Boko Haram rose to national consciousness with the killing of the sect leader
and the subsequent terror unleashed by the group. Again, the growth, evolution, radicalisation and militarisation of the sect caught the national security system pants down. The war, this time unlike the Niger Delta agitation, found manure in religious fundamentalism that could not be appeased with an amnesty. The story of Boko Haram and its terror machine is well known, but the lessons of its emergence and sustained war machine needs interrogation.

My take is that the security architecture designed in 1986 and the institutional framework created by the 1999 constitution are inadequate for today’s security challenges. The trajectory of crime, national security challenges and cross-border crimes cannot be understood and dealt with by yesterday’s institutions.

A redefinition of our concept of security in line with new trends and mutants is sorely needed. Time is running out.
The event of the past few years that has placed Nigeria high on the Global Terror Index and consumed more souls than September 11 requires a national enquiry. The rise of kidnapping, criminal herders, pipeline vandalism and armed militancy requires that we remap our security network to reflect the situation’s complexity. Remapping our security system will require new definitions, a new regulatory and institutional framework and new personnel recruitment and training strategy.
The experience of Niger Delta militants, Boko Haram, kidnappers, cross border herders and marauders indicate either the absence of intelligence or failure to act.

Since the 1986 reform of the security system, organisations like the Federal Road Safety Commission, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, Maritime and Port Security and Airport security systems have become part of our security network. The Nigeria Police, Custom, Immigration and Prisons have all grown astronomically, though not keeping pace with the growth of population and crime.
The State Security Services, National Intelligence Agency, Defence Intelligence Agency and the various intelligence units of the armed forces remain the fulcrum of our security architecture.

The Jonathan administration attempted to rethink our national security architecture. It came up with a new national security policy to identify key issues and proffer new pathways for mitigation, management and resolution. The policy is embodied in three documents, namely National Security Strategy, Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Cyber Security Plan and Strategy.
The National Security Strategy was a carefully thought out document and a step in the right
direction. The range of stakeholders, including foreign institutions, consulted was wide and the outcome a helpful document that can guide action.

However, as a former head of a paramilitary agency,y I still think that the rethinking and reimagining of our national security architecture needs to happen at a more local and primary level.
We need a new consensus NOW.

The past two years have witnessed an unparalleled rise in criminality, terror and brigandage. Many argue that the mismanagement of our diversity and refusal to respect the federal character law is at the root. While I concede the plausibility of this school of thought, I also believe that the failure of our security system is a significant issue that requires a thorough review. The danger of not fixing the security services is that even if a government emerges in 2023 and resolves our national diversity management challenges, that government will be hard-pressed to restore order in the country.

Statisense, a data consulting company, reported that terror-related activities killed 5800 persons and 2943 kidnapped as of June 2021. A further breakdown according to Statisense revealed that Northern Nigeria recorded 4,490 deaths, while the Southern part of the country had 1,310. The trajectory of crime, national security challenges and cross-border crimes cannot be understood and dealt with by yesterday’s institutions.

A redefinition of our concept of security in line with new trends and mutants is greatly needed. Remapping our security system will require new definitions, a new regulatory and institutional framework and new personnel recruitment and training strategy.
The experience of Niger Delta militants, Boko Haram, kidnappers, cross border herdsmen and marauders, the unknown gunmen terror, and Oduduwa and IPOB rising insurgency indicates either the absence of intelligence or failure to act.
Rethinking our security system along the lines of Intelligence, Enforcement, Adjudication, Corrective, and Rehabilitation will enable executive and legislative action to bring all agencies to a specific bucket and create an alignment framework. My proposal for a revamp is detailed below.

First, at the root of our new national security architecture should be a unique identity for all citizens. Now, Nigeria has multiple identity schemes that boast of biometric data. What is vital now is harmonising the data and creating a verification platform that ensures unique identification on demand.

The unique identity will make it possible to build the security system around a core foundation of uniquely identified citizens helping in tracking behaviour, transactions and public records. The National Identity Number is a step in the right direction.

Second, as a quick win and intervention mechanism, the government should set up a new Special force like the Colombian Jungla Force. Decades ago, Colombia was descending to an ungovernable entity due to the activities of FARC rebels, two major drug cartels, the Cali and Medellin cartels. At that time, the homicide rate in Colombia stood at 80 per 100,000, multiple times higher than in Nigeria today. A series of coordinated actions involving a special force under the Police trained by the British Special Air Service and the US Army led to successes in the degrading and destruction of the cartels.

The reform of the broader Colombian law enforcement and judicial institutions helped sustain the Jungla force’s successes. One of the lessons of Jungla success, ranked number four on the list of elite special forces worldwide, is the realisation of the limit of the military in fighting internal insurrection.

Interestingly, in 2015 former President Obasanjo led some Colombian experts to meet with President Buhari. I do not know if much came out of that visit. We need a Special force recruited from existing staff of security agencies between the ages of 21 to 30 and trained as a paramilitary force capable of engaging in urban, desert, forest and amphibious operations. In Austria, their elite Police force “applicants are chosen from a pool of current officers. They must complete a six-month training program including marksmanship, tactical instruction, sports driver instruction, and computer instruction.”

We need a special force to restore order in the hot spots in the country. Recruitment to the special force should be purely on merit with dedicated funding for equipment and operational cost. Federal character and ethnic-inspired leadership will defeat the aim. It should be a Nigerian Force with proper indoctrination, regular polygraph testing and zero-tolerance for corruption.

Third, the next step would be to thoroughly evaluate all security agencies’ recruitment, promotion, and discipline standards. The most critical failure in our security system is the covert, nepotistic and low-quality recruiting strategy. The security agencies should adopt the Nigerian Military recruitment process. The Military recruitment standard of public advertisement, known examination dates and publication of names of successful candidates is a worthy step to follow.

Fourth, resolving the coordination crisis in our current security setup is the next critical step. The SSS, NIA and DIA report to the National Security Adviser with the SSS granted direct access to the President. The Police vacillate from the Ministry of Police Affairs to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Customs report to the Ministry of Finance. Immigration Service, Prisons and Civil Defence Corps report to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Attempts to resolve coordination issues through the Joint Intelligence Board and the Intelligence Community Committee do not deal with the core issue of coordination. There is an urgent need for a one-stop-shop for security agencies.
Fifth, the State Security Services should be unbundled to remove the VIP protection unit as a separate body saddled with protecting our ever-increasing number of dignitaries past and present. The new VIP protection wing will allow security details with primary training for VIP and regime protection to develop more robust capabilities in that area.

The remainder of the unbundled SSS responsible for internal security should be a pure intelligence organisation coordinating with the newly established Special Force and other law enforcement agencies. The new Service divested of its regime protection role would focus on coordinating and enhancing the data collection capabilities of data producing agencies.
Sixth, the Police, as presently constituted, cannot deliver on securing the nation. As of 2021, the latest available data online, the Police, with a total of 5556 police offices across the country, poses both administrative and logistical challenges beyond the capacity of any central authority.

A police ratio of 1 police officer to 459 Nigerians and a budget of 447 billion, which at 412 Naira to the Dollar translates to about 1 billion US Dollars cannot secure a country the size of Nigeria. In comparison, this is less than a quarter of the 5.6 billion dollars 2021 New York City Police annual budget. The New York City Police has 50,000 employees covering a population of over 8 million residents in a land area of 1,214 kilometres.

In contrast, the Nigerian Police has about 400 thousand staff covering a population of about 200 million residents over a land area of 923,000 Kilometres. To further understand the challenge, the 2021 Police budget provided 4 billion Naira, against the Police budget proposal of 24 billion Naira, for fuelling, which according to Dataphyte, a data company, translates to 2,000 Naira per day per Police station.

I propose that the federal government continue to centrally recruit officers of the Police, pay their salaries and hand over operational control to States. States should take over the overhead and capital cost of running the state command. State governments using a portion of the current security vote could have easily provided an average of 700 million Naira to fund the fuelling of police vehicles. The 25 billion from the states would be more than the 24 billion requested by the Police, and the local control would ensure efficient usage of the funds.

The 2021 budget provided 13.9 billion Naira for the capital vote and 27 billion Naira for overhead costs. This budgetary provision is meagre. If the states were to take over the funding of overhead and capital costs of Nigeria Police at a conservative 4 billion Naira average, it would amount to 144 billion Naira. The increased funding, according to state capacity, would turbocharge the Police.
Our security architecture must become dynamic, agile and responsive to the emerging threats, technological advancement and morphology of crime.
As a transition and to allay fears, we need a federally owned but state-managed Police force to enable the enforcement arm of our security architecture function.