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Francophone Africa’s Survival without France: Beyond De-Frenchification, Russianisation and Coupsd’État
![Francophone Africa’s Survival without France: Beyond De-Frenchification, Russianisation and Coupsd’État](https://global.ariseplay.com/amg/www.thisdaylive.com/uploads/2021/11/8bd0068e-emmanuel_macron_portrait_officiel.0.jpg)
Bola A. Akinterinwa
The notion of Francophone Africa or Francophonie is not simply about French speakingness. It is a strong belief that all French language speakers in Africa and elsewhere do share a common history and destiny. It was this belief that served as the foundation of the French Community that was put in place in 1958 by General Charles de Gaulle, the President of the French Republic. In this regard, former dependent French colonies and territories were encouraged to accept changes in continuity, that is, change from a dependent status to that of an independent, sovereign state, but still within the framework of the rule of assimilation. All Francophone countries in Africa accepted the de Gaulle agenda except for Guinea Conakry, which expectedly would be variously sanctioned thereafter.
Based on the erroneous belief that Francophone African people are also French, France’s foreign policy laid the foundation of a special and privileged relationship with the French Community. For instance, a Ministry of Cooperation, as distinct from the Quai D’Orsay (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) was established to deal exclusively with the Francophone countries while the Foreign Ministry deals with all other countries of the world.
For various reasons, the French government later discovered the meaninglessness of sustaining two Ministries on foreign affairs and therefore merged the two under the Quai d’Orsay. The merger is a first unconscious pointer to the de-emphasis in importance of French speakingness in Franco-African relations. The merger or the de-emphasis did not however imply reduction in aid to the Francophones, but the de-emphasis continued to be manifested differently. For instance, at the 1990 Franco-African summit held in La Baule, France, French development aid was subjected to acceptance of democratization by any would-be recipient.
This meant that there would no longer be the factor of automaticity. The issue of the CFA franc was not to be affected. French Central Bank continued, up till today, to play host to Francophone foreign reserves and investment deposits. As a matter of fact, a new generation of Francophone Africans are now asking for de-Frenchification, that is, reduction in French presence in their countries. One major rationale has been the issue of jihadist terrorism in the Sahel and the inability of France to contain it, despite French military presence in the region.
One reason often given for the increasing coups in Africa, particularly in Francophone countries, is the problem of insecurity. The jihadist terrorists are increasingly attacking and killing people in many villages. Even in Nigeria, an Anglophone country, people believe that France is aiding and abetting Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. Nigerians protested at the French Embassy in Abuja in this regard. This perception is similarly held by some Francophones because decades of French military presence in the Sahel have not solved the problem of Al-Qaeda in the Sahel. But will the agitation for African Renaissance, de-Frenchification, through coups d’état do?
African Renaissance and Coups d’État
Apart from the strong French militaro-political presence in Francophone Africa, the struggle for African renaissance is necessarily against the French agenda. The conception of African Renaissance by Cheikh Anta Diop in 1946 was mainly aimed at overcoming development challenges in Africa by seeking cultural, scientific, and economic renewal. In the words of Anta Diop, a Senegalese pan-Africanist, ‘the development of our indigenous languages is the prerequisite for a real African Renaissance.’ Put differently, France has an agenda of promoting the French language and civilisation internationally and this cannot but be in conflict with the promotion of African languages.
In 1997, the South African President, Thabo Mbeki, revisited the idea of African Renaissance and identified social cohesion, democracy, economic rebuilding, and growth, as well as the establishment of Africa as a major player in geo-political affairs (vide the African Union Echo, A Special Edition for the 20th AU Summit, Number 05, January 27, 2013, p.2).
To fast-track African Renaissance, the African Renaissance Institute was established in Gaborone, Botswana. To what extent has the struggle for African Renaissance prevented foreign influences and interventions in Africa? To what extent has African Renaissance prevented jihadist terrorism and bad governance in Africa? And perhaps, more disturbingly, how do we explain the fact that both the African Union and the ECOWAS policies of non-acceptance of forceful change of government in Africa are increasingly being disregarded by many countries? Why is it that the recent coups d’état are taking place in Francophone African countries?
In the past one and a half years, there have been one failed coup and four successful coups d’état in Francophone countries, and particularly in West Africa. The first and the failed coup was that of Republic of Niger, which took place on 31 Wednesday, 31 March 2021 at about 3 am, West African time. The failed coup was championed by Air Force Unit leader, Captain Sani Saley Gouroura. As noted by Cyril Payen of the France 24, ‘heavy weapon fire was heard for half an hour in the area of the Presidential Palace. But the Presidential Guard repelled this attack, and the situation seems to have come under control.’ Some of the coupists were arrested but many others, including the ringleader, Sani Saley Gourouza, are still at large.
Four points are noteworthy about the attempted coup. First, Niger Republic had been under military dictatorship for 23 years before returning to civilian rule in 2011. The country had had four coups d’état before then: 1974, 1996, 1999 and 2010. It took about 22 years, from 1974 to 1996, before the second coup took place and only 3 years before the third coup occurred. No room was given to democracy to thrive at all until 2011. In fact, the failed coup occurred two days before the scheduled inauguration of an elected president, Mohammed Bazoum, on April 2, 2021. Interpretatively, the coup attempt was meant to prevent the inauguration, but why?
The answer brings us to the second point. There had never been any transfer of power from a civilian government to another civilian administration since 1960 when Niger acceded to national sovereignty. When the presidential election results were officially announced on 23rd February 2021, Mr. Mohammed Bazoum, a former Minister of Interior scored 55.75% of the votes, while former President, Mahamané Ousmane polled 44.25% of the votes. Mr. Ousmané alleged electoral fraud, claiming that he scored 50.3%. Could or should the former president have vexed his anger through coup making?
Thirdly, while the government spokesman condemned the coups and described it as ‘cowardly and retrograde act which seeks to jeopardize the democracy and the rule of law to which our country is resolutely committed,’ Nigeria’s President Muhammadu Buhari described the coup as ‘naïve and old-fashioned.’ As good and apt as these observations were, they completely missed the fact of existing ethnic tensions in the country which were largely due to governmental politics of nepotism.
Olayinka Ajala of the Leeds Beckett University has it that the largest ethnic group is constituted by the Hausa (56%), followed by the Zarma-Songhai with 22% and the Tuareg with 8%. What is noteworthy is that ‘successive military governments have taken various steps to stifle discussion about ethnicity in a bid to prevent it from dominating the polity.’ The grievance is to the extent that the Tuareg once threatened to secede.
Fourthly, the military was very divided and as Olayinka rightly pointed out again, ‘the most common criticism is that the army is negatively affected by appointments that are made along ethnic lines rather than for professional reasons.’ The additional point of interest is that neither the African Union nor the ECOWAS leaders attended to the various complaints before the coup. The declared concern of the African leaders was no forceful change of government.
The coup in Guinea is similarly disturbing. It took place on 5 September 2021 and led to the removal of President Alpha Condé, who was elected in 2010 and re-elected in 2015. And true, Guinea had been under dictatorship since 1958. Even though President Condé tried to improve the economy, his efforts had very little impact on the people, especially with the petrol price increases from 9,000 to 11,000 Guinean francs in August 2021; increased funding of presidential services and National Assembly but cutting off some support for the security forces (police and the military); and increased price of 250 gm of loaf of bread from 1,500 to 2,000 Guinean francs.
Condé made matters worse when he dreamt of a third term in office, and he organized a review of the Constitution in 2020. The public demonstrations that started in 2019 and continued in 2020 did not stop Condé’s repression of the opposition. It was brutality galore, a situation that prompted France to take its distance from Guinean affairs, but which also created a vacuum for China and Russia to fill.
What is useful to note is that the coup occurred at about 8.00 a.m. local time (GMT), and thatColonel Mamady Doumbouya announced the dissolution of government, suspension of the Constitution and shutting land and air borders. He proposed an 18-month transition period. These measures prompted large crowds to come out to welcome the coup. Military coups are prohibited by African leaders, but the African peoples hailed them.
This situation is not different from what obtains in Mali and Burkina Faso. Mali had two coups, or what has been described as ‘coup within coup’ within one year. The first coup opposed the French-supported government of Ibrahim Keïta Boubou Cissé and the Assimi Goïta-led National Committee for the Salvation of the People elements of the Malian Armed Forces. Malians had been protesting government policies (June 5 Movement or the Rally of Patriotic Force), but to no avail. The military took advantage of it and sacked the government on August 18, 2020. The second coup began on the night of May 24, 2021, when the Vice President, Assimi Goïta, captured President Bah N’daw and enthroned himself as President.
Burkina Faso played host to the most recent coup on 23 January 2022 which ousted President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré, the coup leader, Paul-Henri Sandaogo Damiba, suspended the Constitution, dissolved the National Assembly, and closed land and air borders, for reasons of insecurity and inability of the president to unite the country. Again, the coup enjoyed popular support. In this regard, both the African Union and the ECOWAS, as well as the international community have condemned the various coups, but the peoples supported them. Thus, quo vadis?
Beyond De-Frenchification and Coups d’État
Some preliminary observations about the various coups are noteworthy. The first is that they are all taking place in Francophone countries and one after another. Why is it so? Why the anti-French sentiments at this juncture of the Franco-African relationships? The Francophones have argued that they still love the French people but are only against French government’s policies. Why are French government’s policies now more antagonizing to the extent that the Francophones do not want the French anymore? Can the Francophones de-Frenchify themselves?
Secondly, the timing is significant. The coups are coming in succession. The ratio decidendi for all the coups are the same and they bother on bad governance, governmental insensitivity, and political repression, all of which have compelled the people to seek redress on the streets.
Thirdly, the increasing number of coups not only raises many questions on the ability of the African Union and the ECOWAS to enforce their declaration on the need for good governance and non-acceptability of forceful change of government, but also raises questions about development assistance. The current economic diplomacy is that development aid can only be given to countries where democracy is the system of governance. Dictators are not eligible. This is the principle established at the end of the Franco-African summit held in La Baule, France in 1990. The economic powers have all bought into this recommendation and can be expected that they will unite their efforts to sanction the new dictators. But to what extent?
Fourthly, a new East-West Cold War appears to be in the making simply because the vacuum being created with the possible exit of France is being filled by Russia. In both Mali and Burkina Faso, the governments have called on Russia to assist them in the struggle against the jihadist terrorists. Terrorist attacks in the two countries have become very recidivist. Confidence that the French are prepared to ward off the international terrorists is no longer there. What is most likely to happen, especially that the French do not want to be in collaboration with the Russians in fighting terrorism in her special sphere of influence, is that the Francophone countries cannot but become a new terra cognita for proxy battles between Russia, China and possibly North Korea, on the one hand, and France and her allies, on the other. The battle grounds will suffer the most.
Fifthly, the irritants being created in the Franco-African ties have the potential to impact positively on France’s relationships with the non-Francophone countries. Nigeria cannot but be the first beneficiary for economic motivational considerations, because France differentiates between political grievances and economic interests. France does not allow political differences to prevent the promotion of French economic interests in Nigeria. In fact, the economic interests of France in Francophone West Africa put together are not as significant as France’s interests in Nigeria.
Seventhly, the domino effect of the coups in the Francophone countries may not be ruled out in Nigeria, that is, a military coup can occur in Nigeria regardless of the more than two decades of sustained democracy in the country. As shown in the Francophone examples, the inability to contain the jihadist terrorists is a major dynamic of the hostility against France and the invitation extended to the Russian professional mercenaries to come and help. Nigeria is currently seriously challenged by the same jihadist terrorists.
And perhaps more importantly, the late Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi has told Nigerians that there would never be peace in Nigeria until the country is partitioned into Muslim North and Christian South. The implication of this is that there will be sustained international insurrection to ensure disorderliness in Nigeria and this appears to be what is happening as at today in the country. Armed bandits and the boko haramists are nothing more than the tools for the partitioning of Nigeria into Muslim North and Christian South, but which is not being taken seriously.
Eighthly, France’s development aid may end up being replaced by Russian and Chinese assistance. Currently, France’s development aid, when compared with some DAC (Development Assistance Committee) countries is significant but not much comparatively: France gave a total development aid of $12.18 billion and a development aid per capita of $137.35 compared to Germany’s $23.81 billion and $214.73.
As noted by the OECD, France is the fifth among the OECD’s DAC donors in volume. 39% or €3.6 billion of French bilateral development aid funding was for Africa in 2020. 80% (€2.9 billion) of it was earmarked for sub-Saharan Africa. Explained differently, Africa accounts for one-third of France’s official development aid.
From the foregoing, the likelihood of Francophone Africa surviving without France is remote for now. France is not likely to accept Russianisation of her zone of influence, Francophone Africa. There are two emerging Cold Wars: Sino-American and Franco-Russian. China’s emerging superpower status and its serious contentions with the United States will attract Russian support, as the United States and its allies cannot but give active support to France within the NATO framework. Whether the volume of international aid currently given by western allies to the new dictators can be equaled by Russia or China and whether the sanctions taken by the ECOWAS against the military juntas will be enough to bring about good governance and stop the deepening jihadist terrorism remain mute questions. In essence, ECOWAS and African Union leaders cannot be preaching the gospel of non-forceful change of government while condoning bad governance and ignoring the wishes of the people under the pretext of constitutional democracy, which should not be in the interest of only elected presidents, but also in that of the people who elected the presidents. Consequently, the policy of unconstitutional governments should be redefined to reflect the peoples’ interests. The matter goes beyond de-Frenchification, Russianisation and coups d’état. Africa must not be the theatre of a new Cold War.