NIIA’s Seminar on Russo-Ukrainian War: When Diplomatic and Military Actions are not Equal and Opposite
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INTERNATIoNAL
Bola A. Akinterinwa
The Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA) organized a hybrid-virtual seminar on ‘Russia-Ukraine War and the Imperatives of a New Global Order’ on Wednesday, 9th March 2022 at the institute. The seminar was quite significant for various reasons. First, the theme of the seminar, by talking about imperatives of a New Global Order (NGO), intrinsically implies a request for a new order. But why have an NGO? Why seek an end to the current world of unipolarity? Where do we move to, if unipolarity comes to an end: bipolarity, tripolarity, quadripolarity or pluripolarity?
Second, the seminar was noteworthy because of the caliber of the speakers and quality of the intervening interlocutors. The paper presenters included General Ishola Olasehinde Williams (rtd), former Chief of Training, Operations and Plans (CTOP) at the Defence Headquarters, Abuja; Dr. Olufemi Adetuyole Otubanjo, Professor of Comparative Politics and International Relations, Federal University, Oye, Ekiti State; Ambassador Olusegun Akinsanya, former Nigeria’s Ambassador plenipotentiary to Ethiopia, with concurrent accreditation to Djibouti, and Permanent Representative to the African Union and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa; and Dr. Femi Nahzeem Mimiko, Professor of Political Science and former Vice Chancellor of Adekunle Ajasin University, Akugba, Akoko, Ondo State.
Third, perhaps more importantly, the organization of the seminar came on the heels of a very thought-provoking statement made by the French president, Mr. Emmanuel Macron, at an internal meeting. He said that Western hegemony appears to be nearing its end. In his words, ‘yes, I must admit that Western hegemony may be coming to an end. We have become accustomed to an international order based on Western hegemony since the 18th Century… We are used to this greatness that gives us absolute dominance over the global economy and politics, but things are changing.’
And more importantly, President Macron also had it that what is changing ‘is a transformation of the international order. ‘This is the perception of the incumbent French president, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It is against this background that the NIIA seminar is quite apt. If things are changing, if the current Western order is to be done away with, what replaces it? Who will be the new actors? What will the new international questions look like? Will the situation be a change and continuity or a change in continuity? Time will shed light on the problematique and the varying perspectives at the seminar.
Problematique and Perspectives
The first leg of the problematique is how to manage the emerging change of hegemony. Professor Jean-Baptiste Duroselle of the University of Paris 1, Panthéon-Sorbonne has theorized that ‘tout empire périra, that is ‘every empire shall perish.’ President Macron’s statement is a reconfirmation of Professor Duroselle’s submission. In this regard, while Professor Femi Mimiko, believes that the likelihood of a new global order is remote and that the current Western hegemonic world will still subsist, President Macron holds a contrary view.
As posited by Professor Mimiko, there is no reason why a powerful country, and for that matter, a nuclear and a veto-wielding power like Russia, would be complaining and not listened to. Any President of Russia would have, under normal circumstances, acted along the same line as Vladimir Putin considering how Russia is being treated by the West. And more importantly, he argued that, even though American power may be perceived to be on the decline, there is no disputing the fact that the United States remains economically vibrant and militarily strong.
Besides, even in the event of a new power, like China, coming out to challenge the United States, Professor Mimiko contends that China is most likely to pursue a policy of strengthening her ties with the United States in protection of her interests rather than adopting policies of hostility. Consequently, the status quo cannot but continue to be in his eyes.
On the contrary, in the eyes of President Macron, ‘when the emerging nations find their own national culture and begin to believe in it, they will gradually get rid of the “philosophical culture that Western hegemony has instilled in them in the past. And this is the beginning of the end of Western hegemony. The end of Western hegemony does not lie in economic decline, not in military decline, but in cultural decline. When your values can no longer be exported to emerging countries, that is the beginning of your decline.’
Professor Otubanjo explained the problematique differently. It is the conflict between the West’s belief in sovereignty and Russia’s emphasis on the protection of the national interest. As explicated by him, ‘the West is trying to uphold a principle it has not always respected. The irony is that national interest is, often, used to violate sovereignty.’ Without any whiff of doubt, Professor Otubanjo could not have been more correct as the list of past invasions by the United States is long.
Additionally, Professor Otubanjo identified Russo-American enmity as another element and dynamic of the invasion. As he explained it, when Putin became president of Russia in 2000, his first act ‘was to apply to join the NATO with the aim of working for a peaceful and more prosperous Europe,’ but Europe objected to it, considering that ‘Russia was too large and its policies not sufficiently democratic.’ The excuses given for the rejection of Russia’s request might be tenable, but they were, at best, secondary. The main untold rationale cannot but be to avoid a strong challenger to American policy stand.
In this regard, the policy stand of the United States is noteworthy: opposition to a strong Russian influence in Europe, opposition to a Europe that would be free from Russian threats, opposition to a strong Europe that would be independent of the United States and the NATO, and most importantly, opposition to a polycentric world. The arguments of Professor Otubanjo lent much credence to the position of President Macron that the exclusion of Russia from being part of European strategic calculations largely explains the decline in and rejection of European hegemony by emerging great powers.
The virtual contribution of Professor Kola Ezekiel Ogundowole was also quite interesting from three perspectives: First, he not only studied in Russia but also married a Russian academic. His contributions were experiential and a primary source. Second, he was a university mate of President Vladimir Putin, and in fact, Putin was two years his junior. And third, he sees the Russian invasion as an intra-family misunderstanding. As he presented it: ‘Russia and Ukraine are not just neighbours. More than that. They both, including Belarus, claim one and same ancestral root – “Kievski Rus.” Similar to the Yoruba nation’s claim to “Ile-Ife” as the common ancestral home of all ethnic Yoruba, the “Source.” The Slavic nation generally admit that position of having the “Kievski Rus” as their common source.’
From the perspective of Professor Bola A. Akinterinwa, the war is a fortiori between the US-led NATO and Russia and secondarily, between Russia and Ukraine. He argued that, contrarily to the submissions of some scholars that the 1823 Monroe Doctrine is the immediate rationale for the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the George Bush Doctrine and particularly the gentleman agreement he reached with Gorbachev in September 1990 on non-expansion of the NATO were the deep rationales for the invasion.
The Bush Doctrine, he observed, is predicated on three main pillars: that the United States must never allow any country to challenge it; the United States must remain superior and the primus inter pares, and that the United States must be very cautious of the USSR/Russia. The Russo-American gentleman agreement, which the United States is trying to vehemently deny but which declassified documents have lent credence to, has it that, if Russia would accept that Germany be accepted as a full member of the NATO, there would never be an expansion of the NATO beyond Germany. However, this agreement has been thrown into the garbage of history by the United States.
And true enough, the NATO that had 12 original members at its inception in 1949 – Belgium, Denmark, France, Iceland, US, UK, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Portugal, Canada, Italy, and Norway – registered the accession of seven more countries in the period from 1952 to 1982: Greece, Turkey, Germany, Spain, Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic.
Russia did not fail to register her complaints about this. Despite Russia’s complaints, NATO’s expansion continued. Poland and Hungary joined the NATO in 1999, while, in between 2004 and 2009, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Romania, Lithuania, Croatia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Albania also acceded to the NATO Treaty. It was the turn of Montenegro and North Macedonia to join in 2017-2020. Russian complaints continued but reached their crescendo in the continuum of anger in 2021 when Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and Ukraine also aspired to join. Then Russia saw the whole expansion as an anti-Russia agenda and as enough is enough, that is, enough of disregard for Russia’s security concerns.
Before then, Russia had given the last friendly warning to the US and many seasoned US foreign policy experts had advised US government against such NATO expansion, but the advice has been to no avail. The implications of the warning are made clear by Russia at the 2007 Munich Conference: ‘NATO has put its frontline forces on our borders. This expansion reduces the level of mutual trust. And we have the right to ask against whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our Western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact.’ Thus, the common saying that prevention is better than cure, or the need for a defensive-preventive aggression, appears largely to have informed the Russian aggression. All former Soviet allies have been gradually incorporated into the NATO framework which Russia finds very contestable.
While Russia believed she is invading to ensure self-survival and self-preservation, Dr. Rita Agu of the NIIA argued at the seminar that Russia acted ultra vires, based on UNGA Resolution 2625 on general principles governing friendly relations and Article 2(4) of the UN Charter which prohibits ‘the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.’ What is noteworthy about Dr. Agu’s argument is that Russia’s action is illegal, but she still admits that ‘despite the failure of the UN Security Council to prevent the conflict in Ukraine, international law has proven generally ineffectual when it comes to checking great powers’ actions.’ Thus, which takes priority: international law (sovereignty) or National interest (national security)?
Impending Pluripolarity and Implications
Professor Otubanjo rightly pointed out that the contemporary world is playing host to polycentricism in terms of power configuration. But beyond this fact, the challenge is ascertaining the character of the impending polycentric world: is the world moving from the unipolar world of the United States to bipolarity in which the principal actors will be the United States and China or the United States and Russia? Will the movement be to tripolarity that will encompass the United States, China, and Russia or to quadripolarity in which the European Union will also be a stakeholder? And more concernedly, will it be pluripolarity in which case countries like India and Japan and more States will also be included?
Besides, when discussing new centres of power, should the defining criterion be holistic – military, economic, cultural, technological, global influence, etc? Whatever is the case, the Russian-Ukrainian war is more of a catalytic agent of major setbacks for the NATO countries because they have bargained for what they cannot easily cope with. Several questions are now raised about past invasions by US and its NATO allies and particularly about the contradictions in US foreign policy behaviour. Shortly after the end of World War II, the United States is on record to have been acting contrarily to what it preaches: values of democracy at home on the one hand, and promotion of dictatorial regimes and increasing anti-American sentiments abroad, on the other.
Recall that in 1953, in order to protect Western oil interests, the US government supported the overthrow of the democracy in Iran by removing the elected leader, Mohammad Mosaddegh. The United States re-installed the Shah of Iran who led a very corrupt, dictatorial, and unpopular government, but which was an ally of the United States, so to say. Twenty years after, in 1973, the United States supported the Augusto Pinochet-led coup against Salvador Allende in Chile. The US invasion of Iraq as from 19 March through May 2003, of Syria in September 2014, of Libya on March 11, 2011, etc. are cases of US foreign policy double standards. In fact, the implications have become deleterious, not only for the United States, but for the whole of the European Union.
One cannot but therefore agree with Bernie Sanders who has observed that ‘it is reasonably easy to engineer the overthrow of a government or a regime. It is far harder, however, to know the long-term impact that that action will have.’ And true enough, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a resultant of US foreign policy. What cannot but be more disturbing is listening to Vladimir Putin promising to get the NATO completely dismantled and nip in the bud the aspirations of countries waiting to join the NATO. This simply means that harder days are still coming, especially that the sanctions taken against Russia are already self-defeating.
For instance, the President of the Association of European Leasing Companies, Mr. Phil Seymour, has made it clear that airlines all over the world do not own their aircraft, they only lease them. In this regard, the European Union has directed that the 520 aircraft leased from Russia by the European Leasing Companies be taken back not later than March 28, 2022. Mr. Seymour has explained that such directive cannot be easily complied with because it is not in their interest for various reasons.
First, ‘how can we get 520 crews to Russia when the airspace in Russia, Belarus and Ukraine is closed? Mr. Seymour has asked. Secondly, ‘once the handover has taken place in Russian airports, the planes will no longer be Russian. But a non-Russian plane is not allowed to fly in Russian airspace. The Russian airspace is blocked. We won’t be able to fly out,’ he also said. Thirdly, taking back the planes will serve no good purpose because ‘nobody wants them and it’s impossible to sell them.’ Fourthly, ‘if Europe takes the planes away from the Russians, the US will supply Russia with its Boeing planes and become the world’s number one airline, bankrupting both the European Leasing Companies and Airbus. Fifthly, and perhaps more disturbingly, ‘February is over, and Russia has to pay the lease payments for the month. Russia is willing to pay but cannot pay because it is excluded from SWIFT. We ourselves have to pay fines because of the terminations, but in view of the lack of incoming payments from Russia we have no money for such payments,’ Mr. Seymour explained. Thus, sanctioning Russia carries more self-sanctions.’
One observation made by General Ishola Olasehinde Williams at the NIIA seminar, and which requires further special reflections is the international character of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. General Williams noted that the Ukrainians have never accepted to be part of the former USSR. He asked what Russia needs influence for and drew attention to the fact that if Russia has been behaving as a good parent to all member constituents of the USSR, there would not have been any good basis for them to leave their union. More significantly, General Williams observed that, considering the ongoing killing of several Russian soldiers, President Putin may end up being killed by the soldiers. This is a tenable hypothesis. However, the more critical international question that is begging for attention is how to control the abuse of state power by the great powers. The world is witnessing the movement from unipolarity to pluripolarity. A pluripolar world cannot but also be hegemonic. Why is there no counter-hegemonic platform to serve as check and balance? For the umpteenth time, we submit that the Nigeria-initiated Concert of Medium Powers, which was articulated by Professor Bolaji Akinwande Akinyemi, but which was myopically set aside, needs to be revisited. It has become a desideratum. Nigerians must learn how to appreciate Professor Akinyemi’s hard thinking by providing a Black Bomb and leadership for Africa.
The need for an urgent revisiting of the Concert of Medium Powers is because the Western great powers do not want a confrontational war with Russia so as to avoid a Third World War, but they still want to maintain their hegemonic influence. The implication is that they want to sustain the status quo, which is that of injustice, unfairness, inequality, and oppressive domination. The way forward is to have a Concert of Medium Powers to be led by Nigeria and which should operate based on the principles of renewed non-alignment.
