China-Africa Infrastructural Cooperation: The Physiognomic Implications of the ECOWAS New Secretariat

Bola A. Akinterinwa 

Chinese relationship with Africa, speaking grosso modo, is quite interesting. First, China relates with every African country bilaterally. China also relates with regional groups, such as the Economic Community of the Central African States (ECCAS) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This is the plurilateral aspect of the ties. There is also the simultaneous bilateral-multilateral dimension in which China, on the one hand, and the whole of Africa with 54 countries, on the other, hold summits. It is bilateral, because African countries sometimes act together as one. It is also multilateral, because during such bilateral discussions, other meetings are still held on the margins with individual countries. Thus, several layers of conversations are put in place to deepen the relationships.

Secondly, the relationship is conducted within the framework of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) which was initiated in 2013 and from which various economic opportunities are created for many African countries. For instance, the BRI cooperation is predicated on five main pillars of policy coordination, financial integration, trade, people-to-people understanding, and facility connectivity. Several cooperation agreements are being signed under the BRI. As noted in 2019 by Charles Onunaiju, the Director for China Studies, ‘the deliberate pursuit of green development, embodied in the Belt and Road Strategy, can help reconcile the urgent national need of sustainable development with the preservation of our ecosystem, a balance that is not easy to maintain in any quest for fast development.’ 

In the context of China-Nigeria relations, both countries have signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation within the framework of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative. Additionally, in January 2021, Nigeria and China signed another MoU to coordinate their cooperation and relations which is co-chaired by the Foreign Ministers of the two countries.

When the Chinese State Councillor embarked on a 5-country official visit to Africa, he came to Nigeria first. In the eyes of Nigeria’s Foreign Minister, Geoffrey Onyeama, ‘this visit by the State Councillor is a very important one, … [w]e agreed to sign an MoU on establishing an inter-governmental committee that will be in charge of coordinating all aspects of cooperation between the two countries in many areas and in many sectors in which we are cooperating with the Chinese.’ Nothing and more interestingly, at the end of the bilateral talks, Foreign Minister Onyeama announced a donation to Nigeria of 100 million Renminbis (about $US 50 million or N6 billion; vide News Agency of Nigeria).

Thirdly, and most importantly, Chinese ties with Africa are particularly noteworthy in the areas of infrastructural development. It is within this regard that the analysis of the Chinese offer of infrastructural assistance to the ECOWAS in building its new secretariat is undertaken.

Parliamentaro-Infrastructural Support

Of the many areas of cooperation between China and Africa, the educational and

 Infrastructural sectors appear to be the most noteworthy. At the level of educational support, there is the interesting case of the University of Liberia in Monrovia. When a former Director General of the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Professor Osita Eze, led an NIIA research team to Liberia, the then President of Liberia, Mrs. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, who was the first elected female Head of State in Africa, received the delegation and some other visiting guests in audience. She related her governance challenges. One of them is the issue of how to refurbish the University of Liberia.

The University of Liberia had been destroyed by the civil war in the country: several walls of the university had been perforated by the bullets of war. In fact, the war seriously devastated the university. The devastation prompted the Liberian government to seek for international assistance. As told by the Liberian president, the Monrovia government first sought assistance from the Washingtonian authorities but the conditional authority given by the United States was very difficult for Liberia to meet. This was in spite of the special ties and historical links between the United States and Liberia.

At one reception, the Liberian Ambassador to China was exchanging banters with his Chinese Ambassador to Liberia and the conversation led to the discussion of the issue of difficult U.S. conditionality for assistance to Liberia in refurbishing the buildings affected by the Charles Taylor war. The Chinese ambassador expressed surprise at the US conditionality and asked if the Liberian government still wanted help. The Liberian ambassador responded ‘yes,’ with much enthusiasm and his Chinese counterpart said he would inform his home government and report back on the possible way forward.

And true enough, the Chinese Ambassador came back to report about the Beijing authorities’ preparedness to assist Liberia, but with different, but more encouraging conditionality. The Chinese Ambassador said his Government was not interested in refurbishing any building donated by another country or maintained by the funds of any foreign country, but will be prepared to provide a replica of the affected building if the Liberian government was prepared to provide land for it. The Liberian ambassador, who was quite happy, went to report to the President of Liberia who quickly arranged to provide another land. The quick response of Mrs. Johnson-Sirleaf was quite understandable. Refurbishing an old building and having another new building cannot be the same. An additional building is another expression of expansion. The old building could still be upgraded by the Liberian government with or without international help.

However, without doubt, land was given and the Chinese organised the construction of a new building entirely and also equipped the new building with computers. The new building was specially digitised. President Johnson-Sirleaf could not easily understand why the United States could not help and still was complaining about the Chinese intervention. This was an expression of Chinese largesse which helps to explain why the Chinese are increasingly being able to widen its influence in Africa. Several concerns are being shown in the Western world about an emerging recolonization by China but which African leaders hardly see as recolonization. They simply see the whole scenario as shared interests.

Nigeria also benefitted from Chinese educational support with the establishment of Confucius Institute at the University of Lagos campus, Akoka and University of Nnamdi Azikiwe in Awka. The Chinese have the October 1st Scholarship for China-Nigeria Friendship and the Access to Satellite TV for 10,000 African villages project under the people-to-people connectivity.

At the level of infrastructure connectivity, Nigeria also has many stories to tell. The Abuja-Kaduna railway, inaugurated on 18 April 2019, is one of the expressions of infrastructure connectivity. Other good illustrations include the Lagos-Ibadan railway laid in November 2018, the Ogun River Bridge of the Lagos-Ibadan Railway that was connected on 20 November 2018, as well as the Abuja rail mass transit project. These are manifestations of the infrastructure connectivity identified as one of the five pillars of the cooperation between China and Africa. 

Another aspect of infrastructure cooperation is the facilitation connectivity. The Chinese were awarded the contract for the construction of the new international terminal project of the Nnamdi Azikiwe international airport by President Muhammadu Buhari (PMB). The construction of the airport was completed and inaugurated by PMB on 25 October, 2018.

The Chinese are also responsible for the construction of the Lagos Light Rail, which has two ends of the cross-sea bridge and is the first of its kind in West Africa. There are the projects for the livelihood of local communities, such as the deep well drilling at the depths of 550 metres in Borno, Zobe irrigation project in Katsina, the Gombe State Treatment Plant, and the China-aid Agricultural Demonstration Centre Project in Nigeria.

The Lekki Deep Sea Port Project is expected to be the biggest container port of West Africa. It is being constructed by the Chinese. There is also the Dangote Refinery Project, which is one of the biggest oil refineries in the world. The ground-breaking ceremony of the refinery was attended by the Vice President, Professor Yemi Osinbajo, on 19 December 2017. The anchor piles for the pile layer barge were completed in November 2018. The Zungeru Hydroelectric Project that grants the university students in Niger State of opportunities of internship is noteworthy. With the oil refinery, there is no disputing the fact that the People’s Republic of China is much engaged in the very critical sectors of Nigeria’s national economic life.

In fact, more visible is the road development sector: the Chinese have been much involved in the development of road infrastructure in the whole country. Township road projects include the Abuja Outer Northern Expressway, the Katsina Township Road Project, and projects for the livelihood of local communities, such as the deep well drilling at the depths of 550 metres in Borno. More interestingly too is the aspect of trade connectivity: Lekki Free Trade Zone (LFTZ), Ogun-Guangdong Free Trade Zone (OGFTZ), the Sun ceramic FZE, the CNG Glass Nigeria FZE and the Skyrun products and the welding work on freezers. 

Similarly interesting is the pillar of financial connectivity. In September 2011, Nigeria decided to diversify her foreign exchange reserve by including the Chinese Renminbi. By the end of 2018, Nigeria had over a reserve equivalent of $2.04 billion. This was about 4.8% of the national foreign exchange reserves. Additionally, the Governor of the People’s Bank of China and his Nigerian counterpart, Godwin Emefiele co-signed a bilateral currency swap agreement on 27 April 27, 2018 which ‘contains a currency scale of RMB 15 billion equivalent to 7.2 trillion Naira and bears a validation of 3 years extendable on mutual agreement.’

ECOWAS Secretariat and Physiognomic Implications

In understanding the physiognomic implications of the Chinese offer of a new integrated secretariat, it must be recalled that the Chinese are already actively engaged in other regions of Africa. For example, China has assisted the Kenyan Foreign Ministry, public institutions in Democratic Republic of Congo, and announced the construction of a US $80m Africa Centres for Disease Control and Prevention headquarters in Ethiopia. In fact, the offer of assistance to the Kenyan Foreign Ministry was announced on 13 May 2021 and two Chinese buses were also donated for use by the Ministry. 

China built a USD 230 million new secretariat for the African Union and also provided an additional US $10m for maintenance for the first ten years. It is useful to note that African countries found it difficult to fund their own secretariat. It was China that had to bail out the whole of the African Union. The secretariat is often referred to as the ‘AU Building that China built for Africans.’ If the whole of African continent could not afford the luxury of building a befitting secretariat for itself, why should the ECOWAS be expected to be solvent enough to build one for itself? True, Nigeria contributed the current ECOWAS secretariat. However, apparently because of the bad economic shape of Nigeria, she cannot venture to assume responsibility for the construction of the new integrated secretariat.

Without doubt, the ECOWAS, which is the leader in regional integration efforts in Africa, is the newest recipient of Chinese parliamentaro-infrastructural support. Earlier recipients of the Chinese largesse include Zimbabwe where China built a six-storey parliament building at a cost of $200 million in Mt Hamden, which is about 18 km (11 miles) west of Harare. What should be noted about the building is the architectural style. As noted by Farai Mutsaka, the Chinese building, which is very imposing, ‘marks a departure from the colonial-era Victorian-style parliament in central Harare.’ This observation clearly suggests that there is now an interesting architectural design that is peculiar to the Chinese and that can be exported to the world. Which type of architectural design is China trying to offer to the ECOWAS? 

The Chinese-aided construction of a permanent integrated secretariat began on Sunday 4th December, 2022 in Abuja. The ultimate objective of constructing a new secretariat is to consolidate ECOWAS operations in one complex rather than operating from three different locations as it is currently the case. Without doubt, the ECOWAS has many institutions: Secretariat located in Abuja, Nigeria; Foreign Exchange Clearance House, and West African Monetary Agency. In this regard, the idea of an ECOWAS integrated secretariat is to enable the various agencies or institutions of the ECOWAS to operate from the same place for greater efficiency and convenience. But this development cannot but have some physiognomic impact.

First, there are fears of how to repay China for her offer of financial connectivity and assistance. Fears of China attaching strategic government assets are being expressed, especially in the event of insolvency and inability to meet other international financial obligations. As reported in The Punch of 6th December 2021, Uganda has been ‘forced to surrender its only international airport to China for failing to pay back the loan it had taken in 2015. It had borrowed USD 207 million from the Export-Import Bank of China. Now, the country is set to lose the strategic Entebbe International Airport to China, thus losing a vital component of its sovereignty.’

Most unfortunately, African leaders do not look at the problem from the perspective of a loss of sovereignty. While the Westerners see the Chinese funding of development projects as a debt-trap diplomacy by giving loans to African countries that the Chinese know very well are not redeemable, African leaders consider the development loans as a needed help to eliminate pot-hole studded roads that are impassable during rainy season. The implication of this thinking is that, for a longer time to come, Chinese influence has the potential to continue to wax stronger to the detriment of the Western powers for various other reasons.

As Kang-Chun Cheng noted in the Africa Report of 16th March, 2022 ‘despite the publicised issue of debt trap diplomacy, when China lends more than what the recipient can pay back, the style of non-political interference is preferable in African countries.’ Besides, ‘even though the funding may be impressive, a gap between public-private investment and the infrastructure finance needs of sub-Saharan Africa still persists.’ And more significantly, Kang-Chun Cheng said, ‘since China has always been hands off, recipients countries believe that it is better to stay with China.’ This largely reflects the thinking of African leaders. 

A second serious impact is the implication for the New World Order in the making. Currently it is observed that China has already invested about $23 billion in Africa and also accounts for more than 30% of Africa’s big construction projects. Speaking individually, Angola alone accounts for about one-third of China’s loans to Africa in the period from 2000 to 2019 and settles the loans with oil shipments. More important, while South Africa is the African biggest trading partner of, and exporter of goods to, China, Nigeria is the biggest importer of Chinese goods in Africa. And most significantly, China is expected internationally to overtake the European Union as Africa’s biggest trading partner by 2030. The implications of these observations are far-reaching and cannot be far-fetched, especially when considered in light of the post-Russo-Ukrainian war.

The Russo-Ukrainian war has the potential to create a new Cold War rivalry which will require struggling for alliance support. In Africa, the ECOWAS is the most advanced of the economic regional groupings. Who will the ECOWAS support? The ECOWAS is most likely to be sharply divided. The Francophone will be divided with Mali, Burkina Faso and  French military presence in West Africa and their invitation to Russians to replace the French in the fight against terrorism. As the making of the New World Order is also likely to have Russia and China on the same side, there is the likelihood for majority of African States to support Russia. For China, South Africa, Nigeria and Angola are most likely to have their policy stand moderated by where China stands. This cannot but be in disregard of US policy threat of sanctioning any African country that supports Russia against Ukraine. Consequently, Chinese offer of help to build an ultra-modern and integrated new secretariat will undoubtedly strengthen her influence to the detriment of the westerners. The offers of help constitute a solidification of the foundation of future Chinese presence during the next Cold War.

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