ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGE OF INSECURITY

Government’s peace agency should drive the non-kinetic strategy, argues

Olalekan A. Babatunde

It is fascinating to hear that the government of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu has resolved to adopt non-kinetic approach (non-lethal force or soft approach) in addition to kinetic, to address the perennial insecurity in Nigeria. While responding to newsmen in Kano last week, the Vice President Kashim Shettima explained that military solution could not end insecurity and insurgency in the country, especially in the north. According to Shettima “Unless we want to engage in an endless war of attrition, there cannot be a military solution to the crises in the North-west.”

In another forum, he disclosed that the government would soon unveil an initiative – “Pulaku” solution to address insurgency and poverty. This is another official confirmation of the inadequacy in military force (kinetic) that has been adopted especially since 1999 to fight terrorism, banditry, “unknown gunmen” phenomenon, and other perpetrations of violence.

This is not the first time the Nigerian government is renewing its resolve to adopt non-kinetics. For example, Lt. General Tukur Buratai (rtd) unveiled a plan he called “non-kinetic approach” in northeast in 2018.  Also the former National Security Adviser to the President, Major General Babagana Monguno (rtd) disclosed in the same Kano in February 2022 of the government’s intention to use soft approach to eradicate violent extremism. The approach was encapsulated in the Policy Framework and National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE), which was developed in 2017.

But given the nature and scope of the peace and security challenges, the global framework focuses only on violent extremism and therefore short of the deeper principles, tools and strategies desirable to effectively mitigate the broad range of intractable conflicts bedevilling the country. Likewise, the causative drivers of violent extremism are becoming more challenging and complex.

Also, the past informs us of government’s stance on counter-insurgency, which has had implications on how non-kinetic has been driven in the country. Huge money and resources have been pumped into kinetic initiatives since 1999, but the security problems did not only persist, but also increased in scope and changed in dynamics. For instance, almost every week, we hear of certain numbers of militants killed or repented, and arms recovered, but killings, destructions and displacements from communal crises and armed attacks are rapidly escalating and transforming. The harsh reality is that with the launches of Operation this, and Operation that campaigns, cessation of hostilities remain elusive as ever. The inter-communal crises, armed attacks and the so-called unknown gunmen that began in 2000 are still ravaging. Plateau, Benue, Kaduna, Katsina, and the southeast states are currently reeling from the menace.

But while there is still more to be done to win the trust of people and address the underlying causes and drivers of violent conflict in Nigeria, one cannot discredit the role the military has played in the counter-insurgency and combating violent perpetrators. The armed forces have been engaging in non-kinetic to improve the civil-military relationships. They dialogue with warring communities, build infrastructure and provide amenities such as medical supplies and water to win the confidence of belligerent parties. Nevertheless, the civilians do see them as military men.

But more importantly, we must remember that the militarization of the Nigerian society has indeed contributed to the insecurity we are confronting. The dynamics of conflict in Nigeria amplified with the incursion of military in power in 1966. The country witnessed serious mistrust among the ethnic nationalities; injustice in the federating units, resource control, political appointments; and abuse of rights especially incarceration and extra-judicial killings of activists during the prolonged military dictatorship. Unfortunately, the inability of the Olusegun Obasanjo administration to release the report of the Human Rights Violations Investigation Commission (Oputa Panel) he set up in June 1999, and address the anomalies, and to heal the wounds of the past, reconcile the disaffected and rebuild relationships fuelled the ugly situations.

Obasanjo had observed that the long years of the military rule had “stifled the opposition and affected the psychic of the people.” Almost every ethnic group had some grievances or the other. That provoked drivers of violent conflict and reprisals, which became entrenched in the systems. Injustice, corruption, illiteracy, poverty and exclusion provided recruits for the ethnic militias, and violent extremist groups. A group of three to four boys, bold enough to obtain arms may block any road in the country and foment violence. Instead of peace, the democracy began to generate conflict and violence. So addressing this legacy of injustice and other drivers of violence through non-kinetic means is a welcome one.

So it is within this renewed strategy that I strongly advise the government to look inward and take opportunity of its peace agency, the Institute for Peace and Conflict Resolution (IPCR), established by former President Olusegun Obasanjo in 2000 as his administration transitioned into democratic governance. As a civil institution and the non-kinetic tool of the government, the institute is well poised to drive the proposed non-kinetic initiatives. The IPCR’s Establishment Act of 2007 mandated it to identify the root causes of violent conflict in Nigeria through research and provide possible solutions through evidence-informed policy options, and engage in peacebuilding, advocacy and education strategies to mitigate the so-called intractable conflicts.  The Guardian of 4 September 2001:2 describes the agency as “Nigeria’s foremost and indigenous civilian peace and conflict resolution institute.” At inception until 2007, the agency was under the Presidency (Vice President Office), and has engaged with national and international stakeholders to help mitigate the insecurity problems.

If what VP Shettima said that “The president is determined to redefine the meaning and concept of modern governance…” to address the root causes of the recurring banditry and insurgency, then his government should take advantage of its potential agency and make it more visible in the discharge of its functions. The first step should be to return the agency back to The Presidency where it will be more capacitated and provided with the much-expected non-kinetic needs to deliver on its mandate.

As part of its strategic response, IPCR has worked extensively in the northwest and the rest of the northern and southern Nigeria on a wide range of peacebuilding, conflict resolution and management activities that have fostered good governance with accountability and respect for human rights, social justice, interfaith cordiality and rule of law. It hosts one of the most functional early warning systems, which data can be harnessed when it comes to the use of non-kinetic resources. Its mandate, structure, capacity and values are in tandem with the awaiting non-kinetic strategy. IPCR is a better platform to address the root causes driving banditry and insurgency. What it only needs is the direct political support just like the one it enjoyed in its early years. Non-kinetic work for peace in communities is far beyond the ambit of one agency, and due to the prevalence and complexities of the factors driving violence in the country, more cooperation and partnership is needed by IPCR.

So as the nation eagerly anticipates the unveiling of the Pulaku solution, it is credibly important for the government to learn that the potential of its peace institute is relevant to its plan and can systematically drive the process of de-radicalization and engage in education and peacebuilding activities that will not only change mindset of the people but also deliver coherent and effective peaceful outcomes.

Therefore, to deliver the FG’s non-kinetic outcome, and build safer and more resilient communities in Nigeria, IPCR should be saddled with its implementation. As a democratic institution, it will also deepen the roots of democracy and rule of law. The central issue is to make it better and more expanded in order to make rapid progress on the soft approach and indeed the Pulaku and other non-kinetic solutions more effective and promote Nigeria’s peace in the long term. Babatunde, a part-time Professor at the Zhejiang Normal University China, writes via austinebabatunde@yahoo.com