PBAT’s ECOWAS Threats and the Failed Coup in Niger Republic:Facing the Situational Reality

Bola A. Akinterinwa 

The  coup d’état in the Republic of Niger, Nigeria’s immediate northern neighbour with which Nigeria does not have border conflict but warmest relationships when compared with other immediate neighbours, came on the heels of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s (PBAT’s) statement on unconstitutional changes of government in Africa. PBAT made the statement in his capacity as the newly elected Chairman of the Authority of Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) on Sunday, 9th July, 2023 in Guinea Bissau. He succeeded President Umaro Embalo of Guinea Bissau at the 63rd Ordinary Session of the Authority.

PBAT made a number of significant points in his statement, one of which is relevant to the discussion of the military coup in Niamey. PBAT called for regional security and   vehemently opposed unconstitutional changes of government especially in the ECOWAS region. As he put it and reported by The Street Journal, ‘democracy and good governance remains the abiding cornerstone of peace and sustainable development. We must stand firm on democracy. There is no governance, freedom, and rule of law without democracy. We will not accept coup after coup in West Africa again. Democracy is very difficult to manage but it is the best form of government.’

More importantly, PBAT noted further that ‘there is no one here among us who did not campaign to be a leader. We didn’t give our soldiers resources. We didn’t invest in them, in their boots, in their training to violate the freedom of the people. To turn their guns against civil authorities is a violation of the principles upon which they were hired which is to defend the sovereignty of their nations. We must not sit in ECOWAS as toothless bulldogs.’

Without any jot of doubt, democracy has been the preferred form of government in political governance. However, how is democracy conducted and managed in such a way that it has not served as a good method of preventing coup-making? Why is it that many countries adopt democracy as their first choice and yet it is not well defended? More inquisitively, how do we explain PBAT’s position that the ECOWAS cannot afford the luxury of sitting as toothless bulldogs? PBAT says ‘we will not accept coup after coup.’ Who are the ‘we’ that will not accept coup after coup? Is it the ECOWAS of governments or ECOWAS of people? If we consider the situational reality of political governance in the Republic of Niger, it can be gleaned that PBAT’s non-preparedness to accept coup after coup is at best a meaningless threat.

 Dynamics of Coups d’État in Niger Republic

Niger Republic is a terra cognita for coup-making and coup d’état. The country has played host to more than eight successful and attempted coups over which much has not been said deliberately. Successful coups d’état took place in Niger in 1974, 1996, 1999, 2010, 2021, and most recently, in 2023. In the same vein, it is on record that, in August 1975, Major Sani Souna Sido attempted a coup against Seyni Kountché and was executed. This development prompted President Kountché to appoint a majority of civilians to his cabinet.

On 15 March, 1976 and 5 October 1983 there were also failed coups. Governments of the day often quickly suppressed the coups. What is noteworthy here is that Niger Republic is not yet seriously a country of democratic culture simply because democracy has not been allowed to grow. One endemic agent of coup d’état in Niger is the poor management of poverty in the country. As noted in 2019 by the World Bank, more than 40% of the people of Niger lived in extreme poverty. Under normal circumstance, poverty in itself should not be a good reason for engagement in coup-making. The truth, however, is that extreme poverty has remained a major dynamic of coup-making, especially in terms of political and ethnic calculations. For instance, Olayinka Ajala of the Leeds Beckett University has it in his “Botched Coup in Niger Points to Deep Fissures in the Country,” on April 2, 2021 that ‘successive military governments in Niger have taken various steps to stifle discussion about ethnicity in a bid to prevent it from dominating the polity. But this has not stopped tensions. Smaller ethnic groups, such as the Tuareg, have as far as threatening to secede from the State… Ethnicity nonetheless remains a polarising issue in Niger.’ In other words, the tensions created have always impeded the development of democratic culture.

In fact, the first presidential elections in the country only took place in 1993, that is, 33 years after independence of the country in 1960. Additionally, the first municipal elections did not take place until 2007. Why? It is useful at this juncture to compare and contrast the causes of the first coup in 1974 and the dynamics of the latest coup in 2023 in order to underscore the point that many, if not most, of the coups d’état in Africa, are warranted by ethno-politics, nepotism, greediness, and bad governance of political leaders. Consequently, when military coupists oust incumbent governments, either elected or not, the people often came out to support the coupists. This was the situational reality in Niger Republic.

First, in 1974, it was the Republican Guard that was responsible for the ousting of President Hamani Diori, who is on record to have called on France to come to the aid of Niger to avoid Nigeria’s mainmise of Niger Republic or Nigerian domination of Niger Republic. In other words, Hamani Diori was more favourably disposed towards France than to Nigeria, even though Nigeria and Niger are also on record to have put in place on 3rd March,1971 a bilateral Nigeria-Niger Joint Commission for Cooperation.

Secondly, the alleged and reported causes of the 1974 coup clearly showed very bad governance, especially in terms of governmental reaction to the Sahel drought of 1968-1972, as the critical dynamics. For instance, there was a general civil disorder as a result of public allegations that some government ministers were misappropriating stocks of food aid. President Hamani Diori was specifically accused of consolidating power ‘by limiting cabinet appointments to fellow Djerma, family members, and close friends. More disturbingly, Hamani Diori, in addition to being the President or Head of Government, also declared himself as Minister of Foreign and Defense Affairs.

Besides, the Nigérien Army kicked against being used for tax collection and other political activities. As told by Seyni Kountché, more than 3000 tons of grains were warehoused waiting for prices to rise. Kountché drew the attention of President Hamani Diori to it but he reportedly did nothing about it. This cannot but be another major rationale for the Seyni Kountché coup against Hamani Diori who was jailed until 1984 and remained under house arrest.

When Kountché took over power, he not only suspended the Constitution, dissolved the National Assembly, banned all political parties, released the political prisoners and put in place a Supreme Military Council on 17 April, 1974, but also came up with food policies that endeared him to the public. Kountché put in place a Consultative National Council for Development in replacement of the National Assembly. He established four grain distribution centres in Zinder, Maradi, Birni-N’Konni, and N’guigmi. He also made available important drought relief goods to the people. In fact, he not only pledged to honour Niger’s international agreements, but also distributed groundnuts to farmers for hunger relief and not for agriculture. As a result, a supposedly unconstitutional change of government was greeted with public endorsement. This was the situational reality of democracy in Niger in 1974.

In the evening of July 26-27, 2023 Amadou Abdramane, an Airforce Colonel Major, announced on the State Television that President Mohammed Bazoum had been ousted and that a National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland had been formed. Like in 1974, it was the Presidential Guards that originated the coup. Also like in 1974, state institutions and the country’s Constitution were suspended. Niger’s international borders have been closed. A curfew beginning from 10pm to 5.00 am local time was also imposed until further notice. And more interestingly, the coupists warned against any foreign intervention in the domestic affairs of the country. 

Thus the Commander of the Presidential Guards had led a coup d’état against the incumbent president, Mohammed Bazoum. He was detained with his son, Salem, at the presidential palace by the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland. He was told to resign but he refused to. Like in 1974, President Bazoum enjoys a modicum of support from the military. Some loyalists from Niger’s Armed Forces surrounded the presidential palace in support of the incumbent President, Bazoum.

What is noteworthy here is that incumbent President Bazoum reportedly tweeted that lovers of democracy should ensure the protection of hard-won gains of democracy, while his Foreign Minister, Hassoumi Massoudou, advised the people of Niger to remain calm as the country’s ‘legal and legitimate power’ still remains with President Bazoum. Based on this, Foreign Minister Massoudou declared himself the Acting President of Niger Republic. But in reaction to this, the Army Chief of staff, General Abdou Sidikou Issa, declared support for the coup because of the need to ‘preserve the physical integrity’ of his family and avoid a deadly confrontation that could create a bloodbath and affect the security of the population.’

And perhaps more disturbingly, the junta accused France of violating the airspace closure after a military plane landed at an air base. Most disturbing has been the coup supporters flying Russian flags and voicing support for the Wagner Group and throwing rocks at the passing vehicles of politicians. It is against this background that African leaders are now compelled to engage in re-strategy. 

PBAT and Situational Reality

The dynamics of coups d’état in Niger Republic since 1974 has been largely as a result of bad governance and power rivalry. Ethnic chauvinism and insensitivity to the impact of the 1968-1972 Drought in the Sahel and leadership style of President Hamani Diori were  responsible for the 1974 coup. In 1996, the major causal factor for the coup was power rivalry. It should be recalled here that the first democratic presidential elections in Niger took place on 27 March, 1993 and Mr Mahamane Ousmane was elected President of Niger Republic. He won with 55.42% of the vote, thus defeating Mamadou Tandja, the leader of the National Movement for the Development of Society (MNSD), the main opposition party.

The presidency of Mahamane Ousmane was seriously confronted by several socio-economic problems, especially the Tuareg rebellion which prompted Ousmane to sign a peace treaty with the Tuaregs on 24 April 1995. The alliance did not last and President Ousmane found himself in a minority position in the National Parliament. In responding to this development, President Ousmane therefore organised early legislative elections in February 1995. The MNSD won the legislative elections and Hama Amadou, a confidant of Mamadou Tandja was appointed the Prime Minister within the framework of co-habitation and cooperation with President Ousmane. The cohabitation did not work well to the extent that it seriously weakened political governance for about one year in the country. The reasons for this are not far-fetched: 1995 meningitis, the falling prices of uranium, disagreement with Niger’s financial backers, and political instability.

More of concern was the threat of military intervention by Ibrahim Baré Mainassara, who was the Head of the Niger Armed Forces General Staff and a former military attaché and Ambassador of Niger to France. President Ousmane reacted by threatening to also dissolve the National Assembly while the Assembly men similarly responded by threatening to impeach the President, Mahamane Ousmane. This was the immediate background to the 1993 coup d’état. And true enough, President Ousmane was removed in the process. The Constitution had to be revised as a result this political imbroglio in order to strengthen presidential powers. Fresh presidential elections were held in July 1996. 

When the political parties were re-authorised to continue to function in May 1996, they presented four candidates, including the deposed Mahamane Ousmane and Mamadou Tandja. Baré Mainassara reportedly ‘declared himself general at the request of the chiefdom’ and therefore became the fifth presidential candidate. The legitimacy of the candidates was raised. Besides, Baré Mainassara dissolved the independent National Electoral Commission to ensure his own victory. True enough, legislative elections were held in November 1996 but generally boycotted by the opposition parties because of the alleged fraudulent character of the July 1996 elections. Baré Mainassara simply took advantage of it to hold on to power until April 1999 rather than returning power to civilians as he initially promised. Unfortunately, he was killed in the 1999 coup d’état. This is the situational reality of political governance in Niger Republic. It is also against this background that discussions on unconstitutional changes of government in Africa should be placed. Why should an elected government become a source of difficulties for the people? Why should the regional organisations keep quiet about bad governance by elected presidents and be underscoring non-acceptance of people coming to power by unconstitutional methods, especially when elected presidents remain dogmatic?

The 2010 Nigerien coup d’état was botched. It was largely informed by controversies over the announcement of the results of the run-off presidential elections on 23rd February 2010. In this regard, Mohammed Bazoum, a former Interior Minister reportedly scored 55.75% of the votes as against the score of 44.25% for Mahamane Ousmane, who argued that he actually won the election with 50.3%, and therefore that the election had been rigged in favour of Mohammed Bazoum. Since the announcement of the election results, Niger Republic has not known peace and the country played host to increasing tension which led to the March 31, 2010 attempted coup. The whole exercise is also an expression of power play.

The story is not different in 2021 and 2023. President Bazoum, who is from Niger’s ethnic Arab minority, has always been accused of having ‘foreign origins’ and the President Bazouma has also been responding that his rival’s father is from Chad. The Nigerien army is sharply divided on many national questions: appointments are made along ethnic lines rather than for professional reasons. President Issoufu tried to unify the military by increasing the number of minority groups in government, but it has been to no avail. It is on record that some armed gunmen raided on 21st of March, 2021 several villages in South western Niger killing 137 people and injuring many others. 

In this regard, what is it that PBAT intend to do in order to nip in the bud unconstitutional change of Government? For sure, he has convened an extraordinary summit of the ECOWAS to discuss the way forward in Niger. As PBAT has put it, he is ‘in close consultation with other leaders in our region and we shall protect our hard-earned democracy in line with the universally acceptable principle of constitutionalism. As the Chairperson of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government, I state without equivocation that Nigeria’s stand firmly with the elected government in Niger and equally conveys the absolute resolve of leaders in our sub-region that we shall not waiver or flinch on our stand to defend and preserve constitutional order.’

The emphasis here is the non-preparedness of both PBAT in his capacity as the Nigerian leader and the Chairperson of the ECOWAS, not to waiver and to stand firmly with the elected Government of Niger. The issues to address here include determining the extent to which this ECOWAS’ non-preparedness will be different from the approaches adopted in Mali, Burkina Faso, Guinea Conakry, and Chad. In Mali, for instance, The ECOWAS, with the concurrent support of the African Union, tactically endorsed the coupists by allowing them to stay in power, but with assurances by the coupists that power would be returned to civilians within a certain acceptable period. This has been the general pattern in countries where there have been coups in the past. Now in the context of Niger Republic, and with the tough attitudinal disposition that PBAT is currently showing, it can be posited that the use of armed force to restore democratic rule is most likely.

In this regard, will the coupists accept the supranational authority of the ECOWAS? Will Russia not support the coupists? The coup in Niger is not simply an issue between the Nigerien military or people. It is indirectly a cold war between Russia and the West. The West is likely to give active and sustainable support to President Bazouma as the considered most reliable ally of the West in the country. Protecting access to Niger’s uranium is another desideratum. More importantly, the West cannot but seek to prevent the Russianisation of Niger. Regardless of the coup attempt by the Wagner group in Russia, the group is likely to seek expansion of Russian influence in Niger. In fact, the forgiveness of Africa’s debts which run into twenty billions of dollars three days ago at the Russo-African summit in St. Petersburg is a pointer. This cannot but begin to impact on Africa’s strategic calculations. Consequently, Niger, being the considered friendliest neighbour of Nigeria, PBAT must carefully make haste slowly. If war breaks out in Niger, neither the ECOWAS nor the African Union will be able to handle it. Terrorism cannot but be heightened, Nigeria may play host to IDPs for whom there is currently no agenda. Anti-PBAT sentiments will increase. The ultimate challenge for PBAT is to address how to stop and prevent presidential guards from arresting, detaining and compelling elected presidents from signing letters of resignation. Palace coup is the issue. It should be dealt with.