NIGER AND THE SENATE RESOLUTION  

ECOWAS should prioritise diplomatic and economic measures in the resolution of the problem

Ahead of today’s expiration of the seven-day deadline given by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to the coup leaders in Niger Republic, President Bola Tinubu on Friday wrote the Senate about current developments in the country. But after an extraordinary executive session yesterday, the Senate voted for a political rather than military solution to the problem. The resolution affirmed the sentiment earlier expressed by Northern Senators who favour a restoration of democracy in Niger but with the goal pursued through political and diplomatic means. 

The demand last Sunday by ECOWAS is that President Mohamed Bazoum, who remains in captivity, should be restored back to power by head of the presidential guard, General Abdourahmane Tchiani who has already declared himself the new leader of the country. If this demand is not met, other necessary measures including the use of force would be taken, ECOWAS warned at their meeting in Abuja under the chairmanship of President Tinubu.  

We restate our position that unlawful takeover of governments in our neighbourhood is not something we should condone, as we are being increasingly encircled by rogue regimes. Way back in 1991 when military adventurers held most of Africa by the jugular, the Commonwealth laid down the principles of democracy, rule of law, and human rights in its Harare declaration as the minimum requirements for good governance, and members were obligated to defend those principles. At that time, Nigeria was one of the targets of that declaration as it was then under the military. The attainment of the current democracy in 1999 was therefore not cheap. To the extent that many paid the supreme sacrifice for it, Nigeria cannot afford to fold its arms when it comes to the defence of democracy and the rule of law. 

Following his election as ECOWAS chairman last month, President Tinubu had urged his colleagues to “stand firm on democracy,” declaring that, “We will not accept coup after coup in West Africa again. Democracy is very difficult to manage, but it is the best form of government.” But there are so many variables that make the intervention of Nigeria in Niger, even if under the auspices of ECOWAS, quite tricky. 

 One, there is a growing alliance among and between former French colonies within the continent which perhaps explains why the coupists have played on the anti-France resentment to mobilise support for their action. Two, we cannot take for granted the morale of our own troops and the challenge of managing insecurity within. It is on record that a significant percentage of them have had more than one tour of duty to the Northeast. Three, with the battle-tested mercenary paramilitary Wagner Group ready to be enlisted by Niger, we cannot afford to create a crisis in that country, although Nigeria can also leverage on the fact that Russia has already condemned the coup, especially considering that ECOWAS, like the African Union (AU), has refused to join the gang-up against the country in their war with Ukraine.

From the Nigerian military standpoint, there are fears that we risk a complete isolation of the units/subunits in Malam Fatori where the only access road is through Bosso in the Diffa Region of Niger. The connecting bridge was constructed by Nigerian army engineers. The risk of losing already captured and stabilised areas in Northern Borno is also very high. Besides, the solidarity of Francophone countries with one of their own may weaken the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC) programmes. These are strong considerations in our nation security calculations. 

Meanwhile, there is no doubt that ECOWAS has a strong sense of regional identity and a track record of political co-operation in times of crisis. The deployment of regional intervention forces in Liberia and Sierra Leone are prime examples, even when Nigeria bore the brunt of the military interventions in the two countries. The decision by ECOWAS and Nigeria to take a firm stand against a return to military rule in the subregion is therefore commendable. The picture showing the band of countries where military coups has taken place in the last three years is worrying. We also understand the argument that drastic actions, including a swift military intervention to restore democracy in Niger, would serve as a deterrent to future coupists. 

However, as much as we identify with the concerns raised by ECOWAS leaders, we agree with the Senate that a military option is not necessary. A decision to commit troops to war is not a light one. People will die. Huge sums of money will be spent. Alliances and allegiances will shift, even within the subregion. And the outcome is not predictable. Despite all this, Nigeria still has many cards to play in a bid to squeeze the junta in Niger. Aside cutting electricity to the landlocked country, we can get neighbouring countries to join us in applying severe political and economic sanctions against the coupists. 

As we stated last week, the more frightening feature of recent political disruptions in West Africa is the recurrence of Jihadist insurgency in the Sahel and the instability that could easily be exploited by ambitious soldiers. That the putsch in Niger is coming on the heels of similar military coups in Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea, Chad, and Sudan is disturbing. So, we understand all the arguments for a military option. But it is not the preferred option by most Nigerians. 

 While ECOWAS should maintain the resolve to stifle the military junta in Niger out of power with a combination of economic sanctions and political/diplomatic arm-twisting, we endorse the position of the Senate that going to war with the country should not be an option.