Unconstitutional Government or Unconstitutional Elections: ECOWAS Sanctions Miss the Points
Bola A. Akinterinwa
Again, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu (PBAT) must thread more cautiously and make haste slowly in the conduct and management of Nigeria’s defence and security strategy, as well as in the management of ECOWAS diplomacy of regional peace and security, especially as it relates to the coup d’état in the Republic of Niger. We have noted several times in this column that there is the need to differentiate between military-sponsored coups d’état and coups initiated or aided and abetted by non-military actors. The Malian coup was more or less a civilian coup which started with the people’s protest, the June 5 Movement (Rally of Patriotic Forces, M5-RFP). More disturbingly are the messages from the coups in Burkina Faso, Guinea Conakry, and currently from the Republic of Niger.
In this regard, Malians made it clear that they were not against France as a people, but against French Government’s alleged exploitative policies. Malians complained about the long stay of French troops in Mali without being able to contain the Tuareg insurgency and terrorism. They also complained about the elected government of Mali, led by President Bah N’daw who had French support. Most note-worthily here is the fact of the leader of the coupists, Assimi Goïta, who was the Vice President. The second coup was a palace coup.
Even when the African Union (AU), the ECOWAS, and the international community condemned the coupists, and threatening hellish sanctions, Malians came out, demonstrating on the streets in support of the coup. Questions were then asked as to where the international community and the ECOWAS leaders were, when complaints about bad governance of the country under President Boubacar Keïta were raised. The issue therefore is whether the Malian question is unconstitutional change of government or democratic elections that produced misgoverning presidents that always align with foreign powers to which the people are opposed. This is the problem in Burkina Faso and currently in Niger Republic.
What really are the profound causal and ultimate factors of coups d’état in Francophone Africa? Many factors can be identified as responsible for coup-making, especially poor governance as manifested in corruption, bad development policies, ethnic jingoism, nepotism and other manifestations of political chicanery. We strongly believe that a unRepublic. It is against this background that ECOWAS sanctions cannot be meaningful.
Meaninglessness of ECOWAS Sanctions
A cursory look at the many sanctions taken by the ECOWAS and the African Union (AU) against unconstitutional governments in Africa, and particularly in the West African region, clearly shows that the sanctions are, at best, very meaningless because they do not address the untold more critical problems: quest for reaffirmation of national sovereignty in which French influence will be reduced to its barest minimum and the stoppage of foreign exploitation of Nigerien mineral resources for the development of Europe but to the detriment of growth and development of Niger.
Besides, all the ECOWAS and AU sanctions have followed the same logic, the same pattern, the same outcome, and most unfortunately, they have also been predicated by strategic miscalculations in Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso, Guinea Conakry, and Sudan. The sanctions have generally been closure of land and air borders, ban on flights to and fro, travel bans on coupists and their relations and officials involved directly in coups, suspension of commercial activities, etc.
In the context of the coup in Niger Republic, the ECOWAS closed the land and air borders between it and Niger. This type of sanction cannot be effective. Niger’s 1500 km of international borders with Nigeria are porous. The same ethnic communities live on both sides of the Niger-Nigeria borders. The communities are only separated by colonial frontiers. Immigration formalities hardly apply, as people walk to and from one country to the other. This means that military intervention by ECOWAS, chaired by Nigeria, cannot but be a self-attack and self-killing exercise.
For example, Nigeria is supplying electricity to Niger under a specially negotiated agreement aimed at preventing the Republic of Niger from building a dam on the River Niger the way Cameroon built the Lagdam on River Niger. Whenever Cameroon opens the dam, Nigerians are ways at the mercy of God as their lives are always threatened by death. This is not the situation with Niger Republic. The Niger-Nigerian understanding is that Niger will not build any dam and Niger has always remained faithful to the spirit of the agreement on the Nigeria-Niger Joint Commission for Cooperation.
Put differently, attacking the people of Niger Republic is also attacking the people of Nigeria. The ECOWAS military intervention can prompt Niger to strain ties with Nigeria and begin the construction of a dam on the River Niger in protest against the role of Nigeria in the coup plot saga. And true enough, PBAT cannot be said to be acting as Nigeria’s president in the conduct and management of the coup crisis. He spoke and threatened the use of military force in restoring the administration of President Mohammed Bazoum. The challenge here is that it is difficult to differentiate when ECOWAS and Nigeria’s policy interest are the same and not the same. ECOWAS military intervention in Niger is not and cannot be in Nigeria’s national interest at this critical material time but PBAT’s election as ECOWAS chairperson at this same critical time compels the application of ECOWAS policy decisions on non-acceptance of unconstitutional changes of government in the region.
Besides, ECOWAS military intervention in Niger can also lead to an expanded war in other Francophone countries in light of the positions already taken by Mali and Burkina Faso on the Nigerien coup. Both countries have openly made it clear that an attack on the coupists in Niger necessarily constitutes an attack on them, and thus warranting collective defense. They have also warned that any foreign military intervention in Niger will be strongly resisted. By so doing, the West African region has the potential to be destabilised. Already, Niger is contemplating straining diplomatic ties with Nigeria whereas PBAT is acting primarily as ECOWAS chairman and stricto sensu as Nigerian leader.
Apart from closure of land and air borders, the ECOWAS has not only placed a ban on commercial flights to and from Niger, but has also suspended all commercial and financial transactions between ECOWAS Member States and Niger. In this regard, are the sanctions really a big deal? What really is the extent of volume of trade between the ECOWAS and any Member State? At best, it is insignificant. More significantly, can the ECOWAS sanctions stop countries like Mali, Algeria, Guinea and Burkina Faso from relating with Niger in all ramifications and from supporting the intransigent efforts of the coupists in Niger?
And more disturbingly, the ECOWAS has imposed travel bans on Niger’s military officials and their families involved in the coup, including any person who accepts to join the military government, and has also frozen all service transactions, including energy transactions and the assets of Niger Republic in all ECOWAS Central Bank, as well as all Niger’s state enterprises and parastatals in commercial banks. And true enough, ECOWAS has also suspended Niger Republic from all financial assistance and transactions with all financial institutions.
When these sanctions are taken together, one can still ask the quantum of development aid coming from the ECOWAS to Niger Republic. If the people of Niger Republic are increasingly becoming hostile to France and PBAT is becoming the new darling of France, one cannot but therefore expect damages in Nigeria’s bilateral relationship with Niger in the foreseeable future. ECOWAS military intervention in Niger is really not a war between the organisation and Niger but in reality a war between Niger and Nigeria. In other words, it is not the coupists that will mostly suffer from the war but Nigerians. It is not the ECOWAS troops and the coupists that will suffer from PBAT’s power cut to Niger but the very people who do not want the ousted president in Niger. These are some of the reasons why PBAT must learn how to exercise patience in engaging in a war that is not truly provoked and aimed at Nigeria.
We are not unaware of the fact that the making of the ECOWAS was at the instance of Nigeria and later Togo. We know that the responsibility of any ECOWAS chairperson requires making Member States of the ECOWAS to comply with the supranational instructions to Niger as a member State of the organisation. This is precisely what PBAT is doing. However, there is nothing to suggest that ECOWAS will come out stronger after the war successfully or not. Many protesting countries are likely to withdraw their membership. Nigeriens are united against the ECOWAS.
At the Nigerian domestic level where PBAT’s national image is already tainted by his public statement that he would continue where the immediate past president, Muhammadu Buhari (PMB), stopped. PBAT’s public image in the West African region and particularly in Nigeria’s immediate sub-region comprising the immediate neighbours, also has the potential to be damaged as he is being seen to be playing the colonial card or the extra-West African card.
For instance, a seven-member Supreme Court, in its judgment on the suit filed by some state governors who challenged PMB’s ‘demonetisation policy’ has unanimously described President Buhari as a violator of court order in Nigeria. In the words of the Supreme Court, ‘the disobedience of orders of courts by the President in a constitutional democracy as ours is a sign of the failure of the Constitution and that of democratic governance (which) has become a mere pretension and is now replaced by autocracy or dictatorship.’ If this is what PBAT wants to sustain as a legacy, the future will be extremely difficult to manage as an individual, as Nigeria’s president, and as ECOWAS chairperson.
Nigeria–Niger Relations: Making Haste Slowly
Without any whiff of doubt, what will the future of Niger-Nigeria relationship be after an eventual ECOWAS military intervention? To what extent can the ECOWAS survive if more than three members withdraw their membership of the organisation? How will the Niger-Nigerian ties be defined in the event of war against the people of Niger? Already Niger has strained diplomatic ties with Nigeria, France, United States and Nigeria. The strained relationship with France and the United States can be well understood from the perspective of their being seen as imperialists. Straining ties is more of anti-imperialism than the taking of sides in the coup controversy.
In the context of Nigeria and Togo, it can be explained from two angles: Togo and Nigeria are original sponsors of the ECOWAS in 1975 and both are also proponents of military intervention in Niger. Since Niger Republic is now anti-ECOWAS, there is no way Togo and Nigeria will not be targeted for counter-sanction. The issue now whether Nigeria will join the other three countries –Togo, France, and the United States – to fight the coupists in Niger?
In fighting Niger, we still insist that PBAT must first reconcile ECOWAS and Nigeria’s strategic interests before going to the battle field to restore President Mohammed Bazoum. It is not and cannot be in Nigeria’s national interest to encourage or engage in military intervention simply because Nigeria cannot but be the first victim in the event of a protracted war that is most likely to follow and over which PBAT is not likely to have control.
Again, in the event of military intervention in Niger Republic, and without any jot of exaggeration, PBAT’s presidency has the potential to be seriously destabilised because of his controversial election which is still being looked into in the law court in Nigeria. PBAT will be more in the glare of the world the moments the war begins. If the same name is raised at the Nigerian level, there is no way there will not be linkage to the international image of PBAT. Additionally, if the prosecution of the war in Niger does not go in the direction desired by the ECOWAS, hostility towards PBAT may increase and be hostile to his presidency. He may not be allowed to continue to serve as president at the societal level even though the court may have different legal considerations to sustain his presidency.
One observation might be the consideration that there is none of the leading presidential candidates that can be adjudged to have fully fulfilled the electoral requirements for election, including PBAT. This means that if PBAT is to have the opportunity of continuing to serve as President of Nigeria, it cannot but be sustained under the guise of doctrine of necessity. Law courts are not only required to ensure fairness and justice based on law, but are also required to ensure national stability in all its ramifications through law.
Consequently, if PBAT, who told Nigerians that he would continue from where President Muhammadu Buhari (PMB) had stopped and if PMB was described in March 2023 by the Supreme Court of the land as a flagrant ‘disobeyer of court Order,’ PBAT’s national and international image cannot but have been tainted ab initio. PBAT will be seen as another disobeyer of rule of all. Belligerents in the Niger war are likely to see PBAT from this prism. This should not be so. And if PBAT is preoccupied with the war in Niger and the military intervention in Niger begins to strengthen boko haramism in Nigeria, PBAT may regret his military intervention policy in an uncomfortable manner, because, as we have noted earlier, Nigeria’s international borders with Niger Republic are, at best porous. The closure of borders with Niger is most unfortunate because it is not likely to be impactful. In fact, Nigeria’s policy stand has prompted the coupists to open the borders with Algeria and Burkina Faso. This development partly neutralises the impact of Nigeria’s closure of her borders with Niger. There should be no military intervention because the same ethnic group lives on both sides of the borders.
Viewed holistically, attacks on the coupists may not truly reflect a true sense of quest for collective security in the spirit of Article 51 of the UN Charter. Some Francophone countries are not part of the ECOWAS intervention decision process. Most disturbingly now, many Francophone countries are pointing to their likely withdrawal from the ECOWAS in the mania of Mauritania. Is dismemberment part of the agenda of military intervention in Niger? Has the ECOWAS fully weighed the consequences beyond unconstitutional change of government? Has the ECOWAS considered the likely duration of the war to be started? Has the support of the United Nations been secured for the purposes of possible international funding? How are the ECOWAS troops preparing to face the Wagner mercenaries and Russia?
Indeed, the Chinese are seriously engaged in critical development projects in Niger and have opted for a diplomacy of not being the friend of one and the enemy of another. The Chinese have simply suggested that Nigériens should be allowed to solve their own problem in the best way they deem fit. China has not condemned or condoned the coup. They are only actively engaged in their economic activities without interferences in the political domain. In the same vein, how do we begin to see the ECOWAS post-military intervention foreign policy in Niger? Will there be more collaboration? Will the future be bright for the ECOWAS? In the event of any military intervention in Niger, the foundation of ECOWAS as the leading Regional Economic Community, and as the leader of regional integration in Africa cannot but belong to the garbage of history in the future. Consequently, PBAT must make haste slowly. He must not start a war whose final outcome he cannot predict well. The coup in Niger Republic is a struggle between Nigériens and the colonial cum great powers. PBAT must act in the national interest and not be simply seen as only executing the supranational instructions of the ECOWAS in the spirit of pacta sunt servanda. Fostering policies of good neighbourliness is also another desideratum that should not be taken lightly.
Nigeria’s or ECOWAS closure of land borders with the Niger Republic has not prevented the opening or re-opening of the borders with Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Libya and Mali. Whenever a vacuum is created in international relations, many countries are always ready to take advantage and fill the vacuum. This is why PBAT must always thread more carefully so that he does not become the first instrument of disintegration of the ECOWAS. PBAT may fraternise with Emmanuel Macron, but the Francophone West Africans are increasingly moving away from France. Hobnobbing with France may be seen as anti-Francophone Africa. Thus, Niger may become another Ukraine for Russo-NATO confrontation with Nigeria being an extended theatre of war against. The mutual distrust in the ECOWAS between the Anglophone and Francophone can only be strengthened as a result. This will undermine regional integration efforts. In fact, ECOWAS military intervention will create greater opportunities for the great powers who do not want Nigeria to be powerful enough to challenge them in international politics. They prefer cutting Nigeria to size. PBAT must therefore not allow Nigeria to be cut to size and Nigeria’s good image to be tainted in Niger. National self-preservation must come before regional preservation. Tinubuplomacy and Nigeria’s foreign policy must go parri passu and beyond political sentiments.
