The Niger Coup: What are the Challenges for President Tinubu and ECOWAS? 

Introduction 

Whether we admit it or not, democracy appears to be on the wane in West Africa due to the fact that in recent years, various military junta have successfully toppled four elected governments over a period of three years. The 48 year old sub-regional bloc known as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is now under pressure to stop this trend, but this could prove not only tricky but dangerous. There have been successful military coups in Mali, Chad, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Sudan and Niger from 2020 to date. Even last week Tuesday, the Police in Sierra Leone arrested several persons, including some senior military officers, in connection with a suspected coup plot. President Julius Bio, was himself a former coup leader, who was only re-elected for a second term in June this year. As is now usual, the coup plotters keep citing the harsh economic conditions of citizens in their respective countries, to justify these coups and their decision to seize power.

Regardless, this latest development in Niger is an opportunity for ECOWAS to not only demonstrate its credentials in peacekeeping, but also in promoting regional stability, humanitarian support and peace building. President Bola Tinubu, who is currently the Chairman of the body, is under pressure from western leaders to rally other ECOWAS leaders into action, in opposing the Niger military junta. ECOWAS has threatened to use force to reinstate the deposed Niger President, Mohamed Bazoum, if the coup plotters refuse to accede to their demand  to reinstate the deposed Nigeriene President within seven days. However their fellow coup plotters who now run the governments of  Burkina Faso and Mali, have warned against the use of force to reinstate the ousted Nigeriene President, and have pledged their solidarity instead with the Niger coup plotters. 

Niger is one of the largest countries in the Sahel, and plays a vital role in the fight against militia and jihadists in the region. Its fall under military rule could have significant implications in the fight against terrorism and insurgency in the region, including for us here in Nigeria. What then are the legal and constitutional issues at stake ? 

Deployment of troops under the 1999 Constitution. 

Under Section 5(4) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), the President 

(a) shall not declare a state of war between the Federation and another country except with the sanction of a resolution of both Houses of the National Assembly, sitting in a joint session; and

(b) except with the prior approval of the Senate, no member of the armed forces of the Federation shall be deployed on combat duty outside Nigeria.

(5) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (4) of this section, the President, in consultation with the National Defence Council, may deploy members of the armed forces of the Federation on a limited combat duty outside Nigeria if he is satisfied that the national security is under imminent threat or danger:

Provided that the President shall, within seven days of actual combat engagement, seek the consent of the Senate and the Senate shall thereafter give or refuse the said consent within 14 days. 

Do the above provisions apply where Nigeria has an existing obligation under a Treaty, Charter or Convention ? 

Chapter 1 Part 2 Section 12 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) states that ;

1) No treaty between the Federation and any other country shall have the force of law except to the extent to which any such treaty has been enacted into law by the National Assembly.

(2) The National Assembly may make laws for the Federation or any part thereof with respect to matters not included in the Exclusive Legislative List for the purpose of implementing a treaty.

(3) A bill for an Act of the National Assembly passed pursuant to the provisions of subsection (2) of this section shall not be presented to the President for assent, and shall not be enacted unless it is ratified by a majority of all the Houses of Assembly in the Federation.

The initial ECOWAS treaty was signed by the Heads of States and Governments of the then 16 member States in 1975 in Lagos, Nigeria. With new developments and mandates for the Community, a revised treaty was signed in Cotonou, Benin Republic in July, 1993 by the Heads of States and Governments of the now 15 member States.

Under the said ECOWAS treaty, Nigeria is mandated to honour the charter signed on the 6th of July, 1993, to promote and protect democracy in member States. ECOWAS member States also adopted a Supplementary Protocol on democracy and good governance in 2001 as an instrument to promote peace and security in West Africa. This in effect means that this is NOT about Nigeria alone or indeed about President Tinubu and the National Assembly as many have erroneously been led to believe. Secondly Nigeria’s obligations to ECOWAS have already been ratified by a previous government and presumably sufficiently modified under Section 315 of the 1999 Constitution ( as amended).

It is important to note that, the ECOWAS principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member States included in its Charter, was in line with the sovereignty of States in the international system. This principle, has been kept by ECOWAS to some extent, but the growing insecurity arising from internal conflicts in the West African regional belt motivated the adoption of The  Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Observer Group ( ECOMOG). This, in essence, became the military arm of ECOWAS and acted as a mechanism for peace and security in the region. However, the level of conflicts seen in these States rendered peacekeeping operations inadequate, leading instead to the adoption of peace enforcement as a new mechanism for mitigating intractable conflicts in West Africa.

In the past ECOWAS has militarily intervened in:

1. Liberia in 1990

2. Sierra Leone in 1997

3. Guinea Bissau in 1999

4. Côte d’Ivoire in 2003

5. Liberia in 2003

6. Mali in 2013

7. The Gambia in 2017.

Although all the above interventions were successful and led to democracy being restored, Niger could prove to be a lot more complicated from a peacekeeping and military perspective, in that the size of Niger with its scattered population and land mass could make a military campaign both onerous and challenging. 

East vs West Tensions 

The trouble for Nigeria and ECOWAS, is that they both risk being labeled as puppets of the West. This stems from the fact that, many are of the view that the West are merely pushing them to attack Niger in the pursuit of its own interest. The French are being forced to withdraw from many of its former french colonial territories, and although the US and France despite evacuating their citizens from Niger and restricting aid to them, still have some semblance of military bases in Niger, they are not likely to be there for much longer in that their military equipment will in all likelihood be acquired by other Forces. 

On the flip side the entire Sahel belt from Burkina Faso, Mali Chad, Niger to Sudan have Military junta in place. Sanctions are being imposed on many of them. They however, need military aid and equipment to survive in government and as such, have now reached out to the Russians. The Russians on their part sense an opportunity to fill the void left by the West. They are also interested in the Uranium in Niger ( we have a bit here in Nigeria as well). The Russians will gladly give them arms just to get a foothold  in  this region. Uranium is used for nuclear enrichment and this is also attracting the Iranians who we know have already partnered with Russia in the war in Ukraine. The danger from our perspective is that once arms start pouring in , they could easily spill over into the reaches of insurgents such as Boko Haram and other militia. Some of these groups may even negotiate directly with military brokers and mercenaries such as the Wagner Group. In short the stability of Nigeria will be affected down the line even if not necessarily immediately. Some are concerned that if the Russians gain that foothold in our region which they missed out on in the past, they will kick start the new Scramble for the Partition of Africa. Both Nigeria and ECOWAS can therefore not afford to be complacent. 

Conclusion

Nigeria is the dominant political and economic power in West Africa. It borders Niger, and the two countries share a common language, Hausa, which is spoken by 80 million people in northern Nigeria and Niger. Since President Bola Tinubu came to power on 29th May, he has been heading ECOWAS. Indeed, his  inaugural speech as  the head of the regional organisation focused in particular, on the need to put an end to military coups in the region.

President Tinubu’s credibility, even from a domestic political view point, will depend on what he manages to do in wake of the coup in Niger. He has been under a great deal of pressure here at home, since the end of fuel subsidy and the two tier foreign exchange mechanism in the country in June. So far, the President has taken a very firm stance, against the coup leaders. Drastic economic sanctions have been put in place; but, if the junta in Niamey, the capital of Niger, call his bluff and he is forced to give up the military option, this would leave him with little or nothing to help redeem his image from a defensive point of view, especially after years of Boko Haram harassment under President Buhari. The West will equally feel disappointed from an international view point, and Russia and Iran may end up dealing directly with insurgents. This could pose a threat, to Nigeria’s territorial integrity. These are clearly not decisions for the President to muse over alone, and it’s advisable that he summons a meeting of the National Defence Council without further delay to discuss all the viable options, even though it must be emphasised that it is still essentially an ECOWAS matter.