As Niger Junta Embraces Dialogue

After 25 days of diplomatic stand-off, the resolve of Niger’s military regime to embrace dialogue and negotiation apparently signals a renewed hope for West Africa’s troubled, but promising democracies, Gboyega Akinsanmi  writes

For the first time since July 26, the diplomatic standoff between the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the junta in Niger Republic significantly eased off last week. This became public knowledge last Sunday, about 24 hours after some Nigerian Islamic scholars held a meeting with Niger’s coup leaders in Niamey.

The leader of the Islamic leaders, Sheik Abdullahi Bala Lau attested to the disposition of Niger’s coup leader and President of the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland, General Abdourahmane Tchiani to put an end to resistance and embrace détente to resolve the country’s political crisis. The stance largely raised optimism among key actors globally.

Likewise, Niger’s Prime Minister, Mr. Ali Lamine Zeine, reinforced Lau’s attestation on Wednesday at a session with the President of Chad Republic, General Mahamat Deby, who also usurped political power through coup d’etat that took place in April 2021. Zeine, appointed by the country’s military regime, emphasised the willingness of the junta “to talk to all parties.”

However, the junta came up with a plan to prosecute Niger’s deposed leader, President Mohammed Bazoum for treasons just after it opted for diplomacy. The plan fuelled scepticism among key actors, especially the UN, about the junta’s commitment to honour the resolutions of the ECOWAS Authority after its two extra-ordinary summits on Niger’s political instability.

All these developments coincided with the second extraordinary summit of the ECOWAS Authority. Beyond diverse economic and political sanctions already imposed on the Sahel country, the summit unanimously ordered the deployment of the ECOWAS Standby Force to restore constitutional order in Niger. Again, this resolution further delineated members’ collective action against unconstitutional regimes whether in Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali or anywhere within the bloc.

Now that the military regime is willing to negotiate and has also apologised to the Chairman of the ECOWAS Authority, President Bola Tinubu for snubbing his delegations, the global community, especially the AU, ECOWAS, EU) and the UN, are optimistic about the prompt management of Niger’s escalating internal instability. As shown in diverse reports, its escalation has compounded the sub-region’s hydra-headed crises.

Before the key actors sit at the negotiation table hopefully this week, the junta’s rapprochement no doubt calls for proper understanding of internal and external dynamics that triggered the suspension of the Constitution of the Republic of Niger, 2010 (as amended). Experts in international affairs are divergent on the drivers of the coup. The junta itself did not clearly pinpoint the core catalysts that propelled its rebellion against the constitutionally established government, even though it alluded to the deterioration of the country’s internal security.

As diplomacy is now being ramped up on all sides to restore constitutional order in the Sahel country, all actors, first and foremost, need to appreciate Nigeriens’ thirst for true freedom, not just political independence, but also economic liberty that grants them absolute rights to their human, mineral and natural resources. At the meeting with the Chadian leader last week, Zeine emphasised the need for Niger “to be truly independent.”

This quest is rooted in an agreement France brokered with all its colonies worldwide on December 26, 1945, just few months after the end of World War II. Under this agreement, France created CFA for all its colonies. The pact, as archival records have shown, mandated French colonies to maintain 85 per cent of their foreign reserves with the Banque de France.

In aggregate, as former AU Representative to the US, Dr. Arikana Chihombori-Quao recently revealed, African francophone countries have for 78 years saved over $500 billion in foreign reserves with the Banque de France. And this agreement remains in force; even after they became independent with four stringent conditions, which foremost economists argued, have only benefitted France and its allies. 

As indicated in the agreement, the first condition relates to the fixed exchange rate, which the French authorities set at one Euro to 655.957 CFA. Also, the agreement requires France to always guarantee unlimited convertibility of CFA into Euros. It further requires that foreign exchange reserves must exceed money in circulation by a margin of 20 per cent. It lastly emphasises the principle of free capital transfer within the franc zone. With these agreements, experts in economic and monetary sovereignty largely agree that France’s former colonies only exist as mere independent political entities, but largely lack control over their economies.

For analysts, these conditions have not only constituted barriers to development in most African francophone countries. They are equally responsible for economic stagnation. As a result, eight of these countries, including Niger, proposed to withdraw from France’s foreign reserve system in November 2019. The proposal became urgent after the establishment of the West African Economic and Monetary Union, which requires signatories to maintain a certain percentage of their foreign with the regional bank. 

It was sequel to a 2017 agreement, which President Emmanuel Macron signed with French colonies during his official visit to Africa. Under this pact, Macron agreed to allow France’s ex-colonies access to at least 50 per cent of their foreign reserves in the Banque de France. Till date, however, France has not honoured this pact, a breach of understanding that Benin’s President Patrice Talon has challenged at different times.

As the key actors converge in the coming weeks to resolve the Niger crisis, the ECOWAS Authority, irrespective of their leanings, needs to collectively share this sentiment, though insufficient to trigger internal rebellion against a duly constituted regime. From this perspective, according to diverse reports, Niger’s putschists did not in reality revolt against democracy, but against French imperialists out of their quest for true freedom. 

For decades, also, Niger, like its counterparts in Central and West Africa, has been a victim of resource exploitation, which most of its nationals believed, has only profited France at their expense. Despite being Africa’s largest producer of uranium ores, diverse socio-economic indicators consistently ranked Niger among the world’s least developed countries.

As shown in the 2023 World Population Review, Niger prides itself as the world’s sixth poorest country. Also, Global Hunger Index ranked it 115th of the 122 countries afflicted with chronic hunger in 2022. In the 2022 Corruption Perception Index, Niger is simply an infectious kleptomaniac state, which has compounded its extreme poverty index, currently standing at over 41.8 per cent of its population.

Besides, the key actors must approach the negotiation table with a clearer understanding that Niger’s ethnic politics triggered rebellion against Bazoum’s government. Conventionally, as diverse documents have shown, Hausa, Zarma, Fulani and Kanuri, which collectively constitute about 90 per cent of its population, dominate Niger’s domestic politics to the detriment of Arabs, which only accounts for 0.4 per cent.

In practice, therefore, Nigeriens from the majority ethnic groups are always appointed to occupy strategic positions in the Presidency and Armed Forces, among others. But Bazoum, a Nigerien of Arabian stock, attempted at altering this arrangement, hence stoking rebellion that the country’s democratically constituted government.

Each of these dynamics suggests that the Niger crisis takes root in its chronic development crises, though with its internal and external complexities. Consequently, key actors must properly appreciate the divergent contexts to the crisis to enable them develop strategies for effective engagement and management. 

But compelling the putschists to restore Bazoum, whom they perceive as a purveyor of French imperialism, might dim the hope of speedy resolution of the crisis.