Failure of Success of EU Development Accords: From Yaoundé, through Lomé and Cotonou, to Samoa
Bola A. Akinterinwa
What is failure and what is success? Failure is often considered as lack of success or the neglect or omission of an expectation. Success is the achievement of an aim. It is about victory or triumph. In this regard, what is failure of success? When does success fail? Can it fail? Yes it can. Grosso modo, success is an objective, a set goal towards which one has to work. The efforts deployed to attain success must be successful in its tactic to begin with. This is the tactical success without which the ultimate success cannot be attained. By way of illustration, an undergraduate must pass certain courses in his three- or four- or five-year course before the ultimate B Sc. Degree is awarded. In other words, there can be a failure and success at the tactical effort before getting to the ultimate required level of success.
In the context of the relationship between the ACP (Africa, Caribbean, and Pacific) countries, on the one hand, and the EU (European Union), on the other, all EU efforts made to negotiate and conclude agreements with the ACP have been successful. Tactically, the success has been commendable. However, in achieving the well-known long term objective, which is not always documented, success has been more of a myth. The long-term EU objective is to sustain the dependency of the ACP countries on Europe, and sustain European influence, particularly in Africa. This has always been fraught with many challenges. When the ECOWAS governments are talking about zero tolerance for unconstitutional change of government, the people in the ECOWAS region are talking about enough is enough with neo-colonialism in whatever ramifications. Hence, the tactical success of the EU development agreements has not enabled the permanent subjugation of Africa without opposition.
EU Development Agreements with Africa
European agenda for Africa’s development dates back to the 25 March 1957 Rome Treaty which created the European Economic Community (EEC) of six countries (Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands). The EU (European Union), right from its inception as EEC in 1957 and through the restructuring of the EEC into European Community and to the European Union, thanks to the 1993 Maastricht Treaty, has always been signing development agreements purportedly aimed at fighting under-development in Africa and the Caribbean. However, the more the new agreements and renewal of old agreements, the more the poverty and underdevelopment of Africa. In other words, the agreements have always been successfully and flamboyantly negotiated, but the more the failure of efforts at development. Consequently, there is the need to address the failure of success of the EU development agreements since the signing of Yaoundé 1 and Yaoundé 11, through the Lomé I-IV, and Cotonou accords to the Samoa agreements.
When the 25 March 1957 Rome Treaty was done, it was concluded for an unlimited time (vide Article 240). By implication, the EEC was designed to exist permanently, for reasons that cannot be far-fetched: Franco-German relations was predicated on mutual hostility. There was the Franco-Prussian war of 1870-1871 which served as one of the pillars of contemporary international relations. World War I left millions of French soldiers dead. The same was true of World War II. These factors prompted the reasoning of the Foreign Minister of France, Jean Monnet and the Foreign Minister of Germany, Robert Schumann, to decide on the need to put a stop to the mutual hostility and annihilation. It was in compliance with this long-term objective that the first two European Communities were established and that they led to the adoption of the 1957 Rome Treaty. Thus, the immediate long-term objective was not really the quest for economic cooperation, promotion of prosperity, but the need to ensure bilateral peace and security. It was because of the need to stop Franco-German military hostilities that both countries even put in place a quarterly Franco-German Summit in 1963 to address and nip in the bud whatever bilateral misunderstanding that arose.
Additionally, probably in appreciation of this point, other European countries were attracted to join. For instance, then came Europe of Nine, with the inclusion of Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom in 1973, but following the death in 1969 of General Charles de Gaulle who had hitherto opposed the admission of the United Kingdom before then. There was the EEC of Ten with the accession of Greece in 1981, and the EEC of Twelve with the accession of Portugal and Spain in 1986. Membership of the EEC continued to increase thereafter to 28 until 1991 when the EEC as a name was changed to European Community. The Maastricht Treaty was done in 1991 and came into force on November 1, 1993. With the adoption of the treaty, the EEC was not only incorporated, but also renamed the European Community. However, in 2009, the European Community’s institutions were absorbed into a wider framework of the European Union, which was predicated on three pillars: European Communities; the Common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and cooperation in the field of justice; and home affairs. By so doing, the notion of European Economic Community was thrown into désuétude, and paving the way for the existence of the European Union.
What is noteworthy here is that France not only ensured the non-admission of Britain, but also ensured the inclusion of her dependent colonial territories as Associate Members. The dependent territories were accommodated under Articles 131-136 of the Rome Treaty. By so doing, France has always presented herself as a special advocate and solicitor for Africa in the conduct and management of international politics. In fact, all the NATO and allies conceded the role of protecting Western interests to France, bearing in mind her special and privileged ties with her former colonies.
It is against this background that various agreements were done by the European Union, including the EU agreement of 24 November 1969 with Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, the making of the 20 July 1963 Yaoundé 1 and the 1969 Yaoundé II, the Cotonou Agreement of June 2000 by 78 ACP countries with the exception of Cuba. The Cotonou accord, done in the aftermath of the Lomé Conventions, entered into force in 2003, and revised in 2005 and 2010.
One major issue in the Cotonou agreement was the question of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) which requires a reciprocal liberalisation of trade through elimination of tariffs. Again, the objectives of the EPA have not been easy to achieve, for example, at the level of the ECOWAS region. European Union has specifically been targeting the Nigerian market because products originating from the ECOWAS region are devoid of tariffs if the products originate from within and EU wants to take advantage of it in reaching out to Nigeria. Most unfortunately, Nigeria, with the Gambian support, did not sign the EPA. Even though the number of ratifications required for entry into force had been met, the European Union opted to delay the implementation of the agreement. Thus, the selfishness that has come to characterise the advancement of the national interest can no longer be overemphasised.
Again, at the level of the four Lomé Conventions, which preceded the Lomé Conventions, the EPA was also an issue. It was an agreement between the EU and the ACP countries. The declared objective was to establish a comprehensive new framework for bilateral economic relations. In truth, Lomé Convention I, done on 28 February 1975, and covering 1975 to 1980, entered into force on 01 April 1976, and allowed the free access of ACP goods into the EU in unlimited quantities and duty-free. The free access was granted on a unilateral, preferential, and non-reciprocal basis. The declared objective was to stabilise the export earnings of the ACP countries, as well as transform their economies into at least quasi-industrial ones.
While Lomé I was about association, Lomé II, covering the period 1980-1985, was about partnership. Even though both were built on the same pillars, they were both driven by insincerity and disgruntlement. The observation of Carol Cosgrove Twitchett is quite apt here: ‘Michael O’Kennedy, Ireland’s Foreign Minister representing the EEC, invited the assembled company to welcome Lomé II as a constructive initiative in North-South relations.’ More importantly, Twitchett said, ‘the ACP representatives, doubtless bemused by Mr O’Kennedy’s use of Irish as well as English, were less euphoric. They were acutely aware of Lomé II’s deficiencies judged in the light of their own negotiating demands. Throughout the 1978-1979 negotiations to renew the 1975 Lomé Convention, they rejected the notion of a purely cosmetic exercise and pursued a maximalist negotiating strategy.’ In fact, ‘they pointed to their rapidly deteriorating trade balance with the EEC, passing from surplus to deficit under the first Lomé regime, the stultifying impact of the rules of origin and the cumbersome aid procedures’ (vide The World Today, Vol. 36, No. 3 March 1980, pp. 113-120). Twitchett’s observation simply shows that Lomé I and II were not in favour of the ACP countries.
Lomé III covered 1985-1990 while Lomé IV covered 1990-1995. Lomé III was designed to be an improvement on Lomé II. Even though Article 16 of the Lomé III requires the contracting parties to deploy ‘instruments that correspond to the principles of solidarity and mutual interest’ and to strengthen the ‘established mechanisms and systems at increasing trade between the parties, supporting the ACP States’ efforts to achieve self-reliant development by stepping up their capacity to innovate and to adapt and transform technology.’ It enables helping ‘the ACP states to gain access to the capital markets and encouraging direct private European investment to contribute towards the development of the ACP States.’ It also provides for the remedy of ‘the instability of export earnings from the ACP States’ agricultural commodities and helping those countries to cope with serious disruptions affecting their mining industries.’ At the expiration of Lomé I, II, and III the objective of a self-reliant development was still a dream. The same was true of Lomé IV.
EU’s Failure of Success
Lomé IV stipulates again in its Article 4 that ‘support shall be provided in ACP-EEC cooperation for the ACP States’ to achieve comprehensive self-reliant and self-sustained development based on their cultural and social values, their human capacities, their natural resources and economic potential in order to promote the ACP States’ social, cultural and economic progress and the well-being of their populations through the satisfaction of their basic needs, the recognition of the role of women and the enhancement of people’s capacities, with respect to their dignity.
In this convention, the factor of women was introduced. Besides, emphasis was placed again on self-sustained development, and development of human capacities. As at today, there is not much to say about developed human capacities. There is nothing like transfer of technology. What is obvious and omnipresent in the nooks and crannies of Africa is exploitation and continued imposition of one conditionality after one another just to sustain Africa’s setbacks by particularly using surrogates.
In fact, there was also the more disturbing Lomé IV bis covering 1995-2000 which introduced human rights, democratic principles and rule of law as essential constituents of the partnership, underscoring that any violation of the provision can warrant the suspension of aid. Without jot of doubt, this democratic clause is an apparent resultant of the 1990 La Baule Franco-African summit in France. The summit made democratisation a conditionality for the provision of development aid to African countries. This conditionality has entered, without resistance, into the blood capillaries of African political leaders and into political governance to the extent that, in the political lexicon of the ECOWAS, there is now ‘zero tolerance for unconstitutional change of government in Africa.’ And yet, the root causal factors for coup making in Africa is largely a resultant from bad governance, deepening institutional corruption, and self-enslavement. All these force many intolerant Africans to seek migration to Europe where again they are not only unwanted but mistreated in some places. What prevents Africa from similarly developing itself?
Put differently, there is one thing to sign an agreement and pledge to provide assistance to the African signatories, it is another thing for Africa to have the capacity to carry the burden of undeclared exploitative agenda of the donors. Europe has not been able, for whatever reason, to fulfil its commitments and Africa is said not to have the bargaining skills to negotiate well with Europe. Why is it difficult for Africa not to know where it is coming from if it does not know where it is moving forward to?
More questionably, what is the hulla balloo about the Samoa agreement that has generated much controversy? The Daily Trust newspaper claimed that Nigeria had signed the Samoa agreement and that it has LGBT provisions. The Federal Government has vehemently denied. Nairametrics reported that “FG vows to invalidate LGBT provisions from €150 billion SAMOA deal signed by Nigeria.’ Probably influenced by the wrong belief that the deal contains an LGBT provision, the Catholic Bishops have also asked the FG to amend or reject the SAMOA Agreement. The Ulama similarly rejected the agreement. The mere fact that the FG has reported the Daily Trust appropriately to the ombudsman temporarily clears the tainted image of the Federal Government.
But what is the SAMOA agreement about? Is it really Nigeria’s or Africa’s problem? Samoa, an island in the Oceania was the venue of the signing of a new partnership agreement done by the EU and 79 member states of the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific States, which is an institutionalised successor to the ACP. Besides, the partnership agreement is coming on the heels of the Lomé Conventions. Although the agreement was done in Apia, Samoa on 15 November 2023, it was only on June 28, 2024 that Nigeria acceded to it when Ambassador Obinna Chiedu Onowu signed it on behalf of Nigeria.
As at today, the question of what the status of African economies is all about can be raised in spite of the EU’s concerns about human rights, sustainable economic growth, international migration, socio-human development in Africa. The concerns have not removed the impediments to sustainable self-reliance and economic growth. Vie internationale observes that, for as long as Africa continues to depend on foreign aid and foreign partnerships, the objective of self-reliance may never be achieved. Partnership is meaningful if parties already possess a working or a partnership capacity.
Put differently, in any agreement done bilaterally or plurilaterally, there is always a declared objective that can be called an intended objective. There is also an undeclared, an intrinsic objective which often guides the attitudinal disposition of the parties, and which is generally driven by national interest that might have not been expressly mentioned in the agreement. More important, there is not only a giver and a taker, but also a senior and a junior partner, regardless of the pretence of sovereign equality and mutuality of benefits. For instance, while the EEC granted a unilateral and preferential access of ACP products to the EEC market, it also pledged European aid and investment funding to the participating signatories. However this has not significantly impacted economic growth and development
One manifest objective of the many agreements signed by the EEC, the EC, and the EU has been to preserve Africa as a source of raw materials and European sphere of influence to the detriment of any other major power in international relations. By implication, this means dependency by manu militari on the Europeans more often than not. The aim of whatever agreement signed is always reportedly to be in furtherance of promotion of economic development and strengthened cooperation. The provisions on implementation processes necessarily underscore openly or indiscreetly dependency. Put differently, dependency is often presented as interdependence in the agreements. But most unfortunately, the various European agreements with Africa and the Caribbean are presented as agreement fostering interdependence or mutual self-reliance. This is far from what obtains in practice.
Yaoundé I was done for five years by the EEC and the 18 Member States of the Associated African States and Madagascar (AASM) on 20 July 1963. The agreement was to foster trade and aid. Yaoundé II followed on 24 November 1969. The efforts at cooperation were mainly to preserve the participating countries as main sources of raw materials for the development of Europe and to the detriment of other powers. It is important to recall here that France, under President Charles de Gaulle, prevented the United Kingdom from joining the EEC. In spite of the strenuous efforts of Britain to join the EEC in the early 1960s, and in spite of the fact that five of the six member countries of the EEC supported the accession of Britain to the 1957 Rome Treaty, Britain was only accommodated in January 1973 after the death of General Charles de Gaulle in 1969. What about France’s frustration of Nigeria’s application for Associate Membership of the EEC in the early 1960s? Nigeria should open her eyes widely in order to see more clearly.
Africa is a problem and will continue to remain a problem unto itself simply because its leaders are not only myopically fraudulent in the conduct and management of African affairs but also carelessly forgetting that the original name of Africa was Alkebu-lan, meaning ‘mother of mankind’ or ‘garden of Eden’ and not Africa as given by the ancient Greeks and Romans. The Africa of today has become the mother of bad governance driven by political chicanery, and is now the garden of violent extremism, error of terror and horror, and crises of legitimacy at various levels. Even Nigeria that made Africa the cornerstone of her foreign policy from 1960 to 1976 and centrepiece as from 1976 to date, has several competent diplomatists, even good Foreign Ministers. And yet, foreign policy direction is problematic. Nigeria is more concerned about a Samoa agreement that does not contain LGBTQ clauses. Pan Africanists should be more concerned with self-liberation from the mainmise of the European Union, the mother of Africa’s development problems. Even if the Samoa accord contains provisions on LGBTQ, it cannot thrive because Nigeria is not a Monist, but a Dualist, country in international law and relations. The ratification of the agreement by the executive arm of government is still subject to the domestication requirement of the National Assembly.
