Why Nigeria Must Secure its Borders

by Johnson Olawumi

In Washington DC on Monday, 30 April 2018, then President Muhammadu Buhari and his host, then United States President Donald Trump, addressed a joint press conference to mark the end of the two-day visit of the Nigerian leader.  Buhari made some requests, among which was the US assistance in getting weapons and equipment to support Nigeria’s fight against the deadly Boko Haram terrorists that were rampaging the Northeast zone of the country. Interestingly, it was not President Trump’s promise to assist Nigeria that caught my attention, but his response to an unrelated question posed by one of the White House correspondents, Cecilia Vega of ABC News. She veered off to the turbulent issue of the Mexico border closure which was top on Trump’s political agenda.

True to his style, Trump took his time to explain to the audience the imperative of strong border security.  He described the proposed wall as a critical measure to enhance national security, arguing that it was essential to stop illegal immigration as well as drug and human trafficking. The closing statement by Trump was instructive. He emphasised that ‘any country that cannot secure its borders cannot control its own territory or ensure the safety of its citizens’. For the visiting Nigerian president, that message was either lost or not properly assimilated.  

Many factors have been attributed to the spate of insecurity in Nigeria over the past decades. Some of these are the rise of extremist groups, ethnic and religious tensions, economic disparities and poverty, weak governance and corruption, armed banditry and criminal gangs, as well as the effects of climate change that is fuelling farmer-herder clashes. In recent times, people have also referred to the activities of illegal miners in collaboration with some foreign groups. These factors have given rise to the activities of several non-state actors with unrestricted access to sophisticated weapons and ammunition used to regularly perpetrate violence against innocent people and members of the security forces and agencies.  In dealing with the threats, the country must be able to analyse the strategic centre of gravity of the violent non-state actors to enable it to provide appropriate response in both kinetic and non-kinetic forms.  

In military strategy, strategic centre of gravity refers to the primary source of power that provides the violent non-state actors their strength, freedom of action or will to fight. It is a concept propagated by the renown Prussian military theorist Carl Von Clausewitz in his seminal work ‘On War’ published posthumously in 1832. In its broad outline, the term is used to describe the focal point in an adversary power and strength which, if targeted would lead to its collapse.  The centre of gravity could be tangible or intangible and the focal point could be the leadership, economy, capability, popular support or suitable alliances. The accepted norm is that once a centre of gravity is identified, the state must deploy the appropriate organ as the main effort, and this organ must be well resourced to unhinge the centre of gravity.

  In tackling the spate of insecurity especially across Northern Nigeria, it appears that there has been no specific consensus, careful analysis and identification at the political level of what the strategic centre of gravity of the threat is, or it is simply overwhelmed with the intricacies of dealing with centres of gravity that could trigger political complexities and dimensions. The reason is obvious; anyone schooled in the business of crisis and violence management would understand without equivocation that in Nigeria today, what gives the various armed groups their strength is the unrestricted access to weapons and ammunition.  This is the centre of gravity of the armed groups and bandits, which the government must focus and direct its attention.  This can fundamentally be achieved by addressing the issue of our porous borders and the several swathes of unoccupied spaces across the country.  
On record, Nigeria has a total of 84 crossing points along the borders, many of which are unmanned. The terrain along the borders facilitates unofficial crossings in several areas apart from the official crossing points. Since the emergence of Boko Haram Terrorist activities with their firepower, many of the crossing points along the Northeast borders have been abandoned with the insurgent group enjoying freedom of action. Only recently, the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael Institute’, a leading think tank and academy on international affairs raised an alert on the increasing presence of violent extremists in the Kainji Lake National Park, many of whom infiltrated through Benin Republic. It further observed the re-emergence of the extremist groups with Nigerian connections in some parts of Benin Republic.  

The report also observed a strong increase in the movement of unidentified armed groups along the Borgu border with Niger State, with evidence suggesting a direct link with those operating in Kainji Lake National Park.  It analysed the dynamic factors in the cultural relationship between Northeast of Benin Republic and Northwest Nigeria and the activities of extremists and non-violent reformist movements such as the Yan Izala movement and the Jama’at Tabligh and drew a scary deduction that a very problematic situation is emerging along the Nigeria-Benin border.  The picture is not different from what obtains in many parts along our Northern borders.  The free movement of armed extremist groups is compounded by the large swathes of unoccupied spaces spreading from the western corridor of the Southwest and Northwest, across the Northern and Northeast borders and down along the Eastern corridor of the Northeast and Southeast of Nigeria.  

Over time, the battle against insurgents and bandits has assumed a relentless cat-and-mouse game, heavily complicated by the porous borders and extensive unoccupied spaces.  This provides numerous hideouts and escape routes from which bandits can easily slip through and flee to other unoccupied areas and sometimes across the porous borders when faced with intense pressure from the military.  The ease with which bandits cross into neighbouring countries not only exacerbates the challenge, but also provides them opportunity to regroup and rearm to launch new attacks once the military’s focus and attention shifts elsewhere.  This vicious cycle of violence and evasion makes it difficult for security forces to establish long term stability in most of the affected areas.  

It is preposterous to believe that Nigeria has absolute control of activities along its vast borders.  It is the lack of presence that is exploited by the various armed groups to freely smuggle in weapons and ammunition and use the unoccupied spaces as staging areas to perpetrate violence in Nigeria.  Nigeria’s porous borders contribute largely to the proliferation of small arms and light weapons across the country.  In its report for the year 2020, the Small Arms Survey, a Swiss based non-profit organisation, estimated about 6.2 million assorted arms illegally held in Nigeria, which is far beyond those in the custody of security and law enforcement agencies.  The fact remains that Mr President and all those in charge of Nigeria’s security architecture must realise that insecurity in the country cannot abate until deliberate and conscious efforts are made to secure Nigeria’s borders.  

In his book ‘When States Fail: Causes and Consequences’ published in 2004, Robert Rotberg examined the multifaceted phenomenon of state failure, identifying its root causes among which is the inability of the state to control its borders.  Porous and unprotected borders exacerbate internal security threats which lead to unregulated flow of weapons, insurgents and contraband. Rotberg’s analysis underscores the diverse perspective that the failure to secure borders is both a symptom and a cause of state collapse. Nigeria is obviously not a failed state; the latter is, however, the fear and reason why conscientious and timely efforts are necessary to rejig our border security arrangement so that the effects of the porous borders do not allow the country to degenerate into a failed state.
 Nigeria’s current border security arrangement leaves much to be desired.  It is grossly inadequate to secure the country from threats and intruders especially around the Northern borders. The Minister of Interior, Olubunmi Tunji-Ojo acquiesced to this while inaugurating a 13-man Integrated Border Governance Committee in September 2023, to develop a plan to adequately secure Nigeria’s borders. The violence often unleashed on the citizens by well-armed extremist groups and bandits who infiltrate the borders has shown that the nation can no longer rely on the Nigerian immigration and Customs Service alone for the security of the borders.  Those criminal groups who violate the borders and fizzle into the adjoining unoccupied spaces within Nigeria to take abode have shown overwhelming capability that the two agencies cannot match.  

So far, the strategy employed by the military in the past 15 years, though offering some momentary relief, is nonetheless insufficient to achieve the security the nation deserves.  The military has shown much tenacity and resilience even under conditions that are invariably not conducive.  How can one describe a situation where the military is confronting bandits and extremists’ groups, and yet the borders are wide open providing supply routes for the adversary?  Perhaps this factor, among some others prompted the former Chief of Army Staff, Lieutenant General TY Buratai, to note upon his retirement in February 2021 that ‘insurgency in Nigeria might not end for another 20 years’.  His experience based on our inability to effectively control our borders underscores a significant gap in our national approach.  

To address the gap, Nigeria must develop an integrated border security system that would combine physical security measures with modern technology, like strategies used in the US, Turkey and India.  It must consider the use of ditches, walls, wire barriers, surveillance devices and armed drones where necessary.  Nigeria could also emulate India and the US, where border security force is established to deal with infiltration of terrorists, arms smuggling and illegal trafficking of people along the borders.  Now is the time to build a credible, robust and bellicose border security guard force that will be well equipped to serve as the primary focus in the overall integrated border security arrangement. In addition to its primary task of securing the borders, the border guard force would also provide security and protection to the existing border control agencies and enable them to perform their duties without hindrance.  The border security guard force which must be well resourced could be placed directly under the Nigerian Army or the Defence Headquarters to prevent issue of rivalry and enhance coordination.

 As part of the much talked about rejig of the nation’s security architecture, the military high command may consider a strategic initiative to relocate some of its military formations and units proximate to our vulnerable borders and areas of high threat intensity. By this, a pre-emptive strategy to deal with the threats far away would be established, and the bandits would be denied the oxygen required to breath violence hinterland.  As it stands today, the forests adjoining our borders which provide haven to bandits and criminal gangs must be secured and failure to do this will perpetuate this cyclical conflict for years to come, as already predicted.

•Olawumi, a retired Major General of the Nigerian Army and former NYSC Director General is a member of THISDAY editorial board