AES and One Year of Anti-French and  ECOWAS Politics: Tout Empire Périra

Bola A. Akinterinwa 

There is currently a cold war between the Alliance des États du Sahel (AES), that is, Alliance of Sahel States (ASS), on the one hand, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), on the other. In reality, the cold war is also a colder war between France and the United States, on the one hand, and Russia and China, on the other hand. Franco-American relations is partly, if not largely, fraught with mutual suspicion. For example, France and the United States are original signatories to the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). 

The NATO was initially headquartered in Paris 10è. When France realised that she could no longer withstand the US mania of military directives to Member States, that is, France’s non-preparedness to accept American hegemonic control of the NATO, France opted out of the military integration membership of the organisation. France wanted to be consulted in all decision-making processes concerning deployment of troops in the context of Article 5 of the NATO Charter. This disagreement prompted the transfer of the NATO headquarters from Paris to Brussels and the turning of the headquarters into University of Paris-Dauphine (Paris 10è). Thus, France-US relationship has always been that of a friendly enmity. They compete for influence in Africa, where they readily unite against Russia in various ramifications. However, Franco-American military presence and bases have been declared unwanted by the AES. Russia has become the new beautiful damsel that is being courted in replacement of France and the United States. And more interestingly, China has displaced all of them as the new biggest supplier of arms to Africa as at today. It is against this background that we discuss one year of the AES and raise Professor Jean-Baptiste Duroselle of the University of Paris Sorbonne’s theory of Tout Empire Périra.’

One Year of Anti-France and Beyond

Tout Empire Périra means ‘Every Empire Shall Perish.’ The implication of this is that the replacement of France’s empire status with that of Russia cannot but have the potential to also perish one day.  But when will it come to an end? Without doubt, the AES is a resultant from the mutual defence pact done on 16 September 2023, meaning that it is not yet one year of its existence. It will be one year old on 15 September, 2024. 

However, there is no disputing the fact that the coups d’état in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger largely prompted the unity of purpose of the three countries in the struggle to resist the mainmise of the ECOWAS which had sanctioned them for acquiring state power through unconstitutional means, coup d’état. It was the July 26, 2023 coup d’état in Niger Republic that brought the intolerance of the ECOWAS to its crescendo. It was the intolerance or the zero tolerance for unconstitutional change of government that prompted the ECOWAS’ threat of use of force on the Abdourahamane Tchiani junta in order to compel the return to civilian in the country. But in reaction to the ECOWAS threat, the consideration of establishing the AES became a desideratum. Thus, analysing one year of the AES cannot but reckon with the background to the formation of the AES.

The background is explainable at three complementary levels. First is the belief in the failure of France’s Operation Barkhane in its fight against the jihadist insurgency. The second is the unnecessary French exploitation of Nigerien mineral resources. Third is General Abdourahamane Tchiani military experience and feats, and fourth is the emergence of a deepening Francophobia in contrast to the increasing Russophilia in the Sahel sub-region. 

As regards the failure of France’s Operation Barkhane, it is largely one of the two rationales for the weakening Francophile spirit in the Sahel. The peoples of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger are frequently harassed and killed by the insurgents. The Operation Barkhane is a French counter-insurgency operation initiated by France. It lasted from 1 August 2014 to 9 November, 2022. France is unhappy with the military junta in Mali, the Malians are unhappy with the French. This enabled the military junta to challenge both France and the ECOWAS by disregarding their threats of sanctions. 

As explained by the Harvard International Review (30 January. 2023, hir.harvard.edu) the real reason for France’s withdrawal from Mali is ‘the junta’s unwillingness to solve its growing security issues. Conversely, the junta blamed France for its failure to keep its promise in their partnership. They then reported that Mali had no choice but to seek other partners, referring to their hiring Russian mercenaries from the Wagner Group.’ The two arguments are quite interesting. First, if the French are saying that Malians are not willing to address their security concerns, how do we explain the fact of the Malians accepting Operation Barkhane which was specifically set up to help fight terrorism and the Tuareg insurrection? The French arguments clearly suggests that France and Mali do not agree on the methodological approach to solving the problem. In other words, at what juncture did Mali refuse to dance to the security tunes of the French? Secondly, Mali posited that France had not respected the principle of sanctity of the partnership agreement. Can it not be rightly argued that it was because France acted contrarily to the obligations provided in the partnership agreement that Mali also decided to take the bad end of the stick?

The essential point is the belief that since 2014 to date, the French have not been able to neutralise the jihadist insurgency. What Malians have been faced with the unending killings by the Tuareg insurgents It is against this background the third complaint, mineral resources exploitation by France, is raised in the three ASS countries. The peoples cannot easily see much benefit in terms of better standard of living as a result of gains from the exploitation of their resources by France. They frequently argue that their uranium is exploited to provide stable electricity in metropolitan France while the sources of the uranium is without electricity. This was the genesis of the immediate and growing animosity vis-à-vis France began.

At the third level, General Abdourahamane Tchiani’s military experience and feats, he was the first officer to be at the site of the crash of the UTA Flight 772 that crashed in 1989. His prompt arrival was much appreciated and was decorated militarily as a result. He also took active part in the fight against drug trafficking in Zinder, Agadez, Agadez and Diffa regions. He led the forces and also actively participated in the UN peacekeeping missions in the Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, and the Democratic Republic of Congo, as well as in the Multinational Joint Task Force set up by Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria.

Apart from being accused in 2015 of involvement in a coup plot against Mahamadou Issoufou, an accusation he denied in the law court and was discharged, he was on record to have also led the unit that thwarted an attempted coup to seize the Presidential Palace two days before Mahamadou Issoufou stepped to allow for the election of Mohammed Bazoum. And perhaps most importantly, his appointment in 2011 as the Commandant of the Presidential Guards and his promotion to the grade of a General in 2018 by President Issoufou, brought Tchiani closer to the presidency and to have much influence. It cannot therefore be surprising that, when he probably learnt that he might be removed from his position as the presidential commandant on July 28 or 29, he quickly organised the July 26, 2023 coup. The point is that if he had not been planning a coup, it might have not have been possible within 48 hours to detain President Bazoum with much success and support.  

Finally, on the emergence of a deepening Francophobia in contrast to the increasing Russophilia in the Sahel sub-region, Francophone Africa’s honeymoon with France appears to be coming to an end while the honeymoon with Russia is being given a new foundation. Will the honeymoon bring terrorism and insurrection in the Sahel to an end? Will the ASS countries have known and shown readiness to solve their security problems? In other words, is it not because Malians, Burkina Faso, and Niger have shown willingness to solve their security problems by opting to change alliance and move in the direction of Russia? The choice of changing alliance is loaded with many consequential implications: first, it is essentially about sustaining foreign dependency but changing the tactics of the dependency. The policy of changing within continuity cannot be expected to have any constructive and meaningful changed outcome. Secondly, as theorised by Professor Duroselle, the new Russian influence cannot but come to an end one day. The question to still address remains whether a strengthened Russian presence can put an end to the sub-regional insecurity in the Sahel in the immediate and long run. Thirdly, the choice gives a wrong impression that a fresh rapprochement with France is no longer possible. Does it mean that the junta leaders cannot be removed in another coup or gunned down by sponsored by their foreign enemies, and by so doing, prompting another change of government?

It should be recalled that, in Ukraine, it was initially a pro-Russia leader that was elected before he was removed in controversial circumstance. It is against this background that the replacement of the pro-Russian leader seriously irked Russia and that Russia’s special military intervention in Ukraine took place. In this context, the intervention is quite far from resolving the dispute with Ukrainian. Neither Russia nor Ukraine, not to mention the Western supporters of Ukraine, has known peace. The war in Ukraine is still deepening with threats of possible use of nuclear weapons. In the Sahelian sub-region, can Russian and Franco-American proxy war be ruled out in West Africa? Time and future will tell.

Challenges beyond One Year

As a former doctoral student of Professor Jean-Baptiste Duroselle at the University of Paris 1, Panthéon Sorbonne, I am more than convinced that it is still early to see the extent to which the replacement of France with Russia can last. I do agree with the astute diplomatic historian that every empire, no matter for how long it exists, always has the potential to come to an end. True, it is consistent with the common saying that whatever has a beginning cannot but have an end. And true enough again, France was more of an emperor in Africa with special privileges conceded in her ties with Francophone Africa. Today, the beginning of the end to the privileged relationship enjoyed by France is what is being witnessed in the relationship between France and the AES countries. This clearly illustrates Professor Duroselle’s argument that every empire shall perish.

And perhaps more concerning is the replacement of the French empire with a Russian empire in the making in West Africa. The whole world is currently witnessing the making of a Russian empire in West Africa but without knowing for how long it will last. In the same vein, the likelihood of a major rivalry between Russia and China in Africa, and particularly in the West African region, cannot be ruled out. As noted earlier, China has become the biggest arms supplier to Africa. The implication of this is that Chinese military cooperation with Africa cannot but be on its ascendancy. 

Besides, Africa is being supplied arms by Asia, Europe and America to kill themselves in defence of Western values. By not only opening the door, but also widening it for the Russians to come in, the AES is simply changing the incumbent empire. A new foundation is not only being laid for re-colonisation in a new format, but also turning the West African region into a future battle field. Already, reports had it about three weeks ago that the Ukrainian battle fields have been extended to Mali. The Ukrainian agents attacked the Wagner Group in Mali and killing many Russians in the country. By further implications, Russia cannot but be expected to also reciprocate, not necessarily in Mali but possibly in ASS and other countries. This is the first challenge to be reckoned with in the immediacy. We do know that, sooner or later, the current Russianisation shall also belong to the garbage of history. But before then, there is the need to address some other foreseeable critical scenarios.

First, the 5-point agenda set by the ASS for itself is education and youth employment; agricultural development; food security, rural development; and energy and climate. To an extent, the aspect of development of agriculture and food security is receiving attention to the delight of the peoples. As revealed by Inter Vlog, 400 tractors and 239 tillers (manual tractors that can be pushed like wheelbarrows), 710 motor pumps for irrigation, 714 motorcycles for agricultural agents, 10,000 tonnes of fish feed, 68,964 tonnes of fertilisers, 10,000 litres of sanitary products, 18,000 tonnes of plant seeds, 2003 tonnes of seeds, 10,000 tonnes of concentrated products and other agricultural equipment, have been acquired by Ibrahim Traoré of Burkina Faso either for itself or for the ASS in the spirit of the Alliance. Thus, in essence, the objective is to boost agricultural productivity in the rural areas, boost employment, and boost economic development in general.

As Captain Traoré explained it to the people, whoever has land in Burkina Faso should simply provide it to be given mechanised assistance: heavy working tractors and tillers are bought to assist farming without any payment of service charges by the people. For these reasons, most Burkinabé are said to be deeply in love with their leader. In terms of future challenges, it cannot be easily expected that the Burkinabé would prefer the Nigerian or ECOWAS leader to Ibrahim Traoré. In other words, the likelihood of Burkina Faso wanting to return to the ECOWAS is more of a dream than likelihood. Unlike other ECOWAS leaders, the Burkinabé leader is using an old jeep, 2001 model, and does not engage in vehicle convoy diplomacy. In fact, if there were to be any democratic election today, Captain Traoré will not have any opposition to contest against.

Perhaps more admirably, on July 25, 2024 Captain Traoré again handed over mobile hospital clinics that are well equipped and given to the Ministry of Health. As explained by the leader, there is no need waiting until Government would be able to build hospitals everywhere. There is the need to take hospitals or healthcare to the door steps of everyone, especially where there are no hospitals. The people were provided 15 mobile clinics, 36 vehicles, including 11 pick-ups, for mammography, ultra-son, echography, etc. The immediate objective is to destroy the malaria-breeding areas. If the ASS countries are all thinking along this new direction, the policy option for the ECOWAS is to acquiesce to the existence of the ASS as an integrating partner. 

Above all, Captain Traoré has also acquired massive weapons which many people believe he may not be able to manage. Questions have also been raised about who the enemy targets are? Who is funding the acquisition? Can the ECOWAS still afford the luxury of using force to compel the three junta regimes to return to civilian rule? In fact, what is the future of unconstitutional change of government in the ECOWAS region? Can the ECOWAS fight Russia directly or indirectly in the ECOWAS region?

Although the ASS countries are still members of the ECOWAS, and therefore are still obligated by ECOWAS rules until December 2024, there is no disputing the fact that, as from January 1, 2025, the situation has the potential to be more difficult for the ASS citizens who will no longer be Community Citizens. As we have previously noted in this column, the ASS citizens are most likely to suffer from the non-application of the ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of People and from the Protocol on the Right of Establishment. Nigeria has generally been the pole of attraction for Community Citizens because of Nigeria’s market economy. The first challenge here is what to do with the ASS citizens that are already settled in Nigeria. Will they have to be asked to return home? Will they prefer to remain Nigerian by seeking to change their status through acquisition of Nigerian citizenship by marriage, naturalisation, etc.?

Francophone West Africa is a major market for Nigeria’s industrial products, especially plastics. Mali has a population of about 22.59 million as at 2022. Burkina Faso had 22.67 million, just slightly more than that of Mali in 2022, while Niger had 26.21 million people in 2022. This means that the three countries have a total estimated population of 71.47 million. The entire ECOWAS region has an area of 5,114,162 square kilometres and an estimated current population of 424.34 million. Interpreted otherwise, the ASS countries account for 16.84 of ECOWAS population and, territorially, they account for the lion share of ECOWAS land space. Apart from Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger are bigger than Nigeria even though Nigeria still has the biggest arable land in Africa. These are some of the issues that cannot but be reckoned with after the eventual, effective withdrawal from the ECOWAS. Nigeria’s relationship with the Republic of Niger is the most difficult as at today, and most unfortunately, it is also the most populous amongst them. It is the country with which Nigeria had the warmest ties before the coup imbroglio. Even if the Côte d’Ivoire and the ASS countries play host to substantial Nigerian goods, relationship with Niger cannot but require a special attention.

In seeking a possible return of the ASS, the strategy should be to accept the ASS as a sub-region and give it an observer status in ECOWAS if not full membership as a body corporate. In this regard, the ASS cannot but be required to pay taxes. Its citizens will require visas to ECOWAS countries. Though the ECOWAS may be weakened in the immediate, membership of the ASS as a corporate member has the potential to strengthen the ECOWAS in the long run. However, the strengthening of economic and security interests with Russia cannot be undermined.

Imagine a military coup in Nigeria and President Bola Ahmed Tinubu (PBAT) is still the Chair of ECOWAS Authority. Who will sanction Nigeria? What about the trinity of conflicting interests? First is Franco-Nigerian interests. Are they common? PBAT-Emmanuel Macron rapprochement would want to ride on the back of PBAT to fight the ASS, and particularly Niger Republic. At the level of Nigeria-Niger, can Nigeria afford the luxury of fraternising with France and at the same time seek a meaningful reconciliation with Niamey? What about the ASS countries’ perception of PBAT as a stooge of the West, and particularly of France? Is Niger-Nigerian relations more important than Franco-Nigerian relations? Put differently again, should Nigeria promote ECOWAS interests to the detriment of Nigeria’s interest? Nigeria initiated the idea of ECOWAS in 1972 and in collaboration with Togo, actualised it in 1975. Can Nigeria afford the luxury of supporting the disintegration of the ECOWAS which she initiated and co-founded? More interestingly, at the level of Russia and the United States, there is no way Russia would not want to sanction Ukraine for killing many Russians on the soil of Mali a fortnight ago. This situation is globalising the war and hardening the animosity vis-à-vis France. Quo vadis for Nigeria?