The Gowon Legacy
Femi Okunnu
At the end of the 43rd meeting of the Federal Executive Council held on 30 December 1974, the President of the Council, General Gowon delivered a valecdictory speech to the out-going Civil Commissioners.
He observed that the life of the Council would come to an end at the conclusion of the meeting. As recorded by the Official Recorder: “He expressed the nation’s gratitude and his government’s appreciation for the services of the out-going civil commissioners” while recalling “the difficult times and anxious moments of the National Crisis and the Civil War during which they served loyally. He recalled that well over 3,000 memoranda were considered during the life of the present Council (which) dealt with high policy matters and issues of vital importance to the life of the nation. “It was now in the national interest that there should be a change”, he said.
I left the Federal Government on 30 December 1974, having served in the same post as the Federal Commissioner for Works and Housing from 27 May 1967. In January 1975, General Gowon appointed Brigadier Olu Obasanjo to succeed me. It was time for change! Looking back over the years, what was the legacy of the Gowon Governemnt? What were our triumphs and our disasters?
I have already discussed the following major triumphs or achievements by the Ministry of Works and Housing during the Gowon Era:
North-South
1. New two-lane dual carriage highways to make four. The two additional North- South Highways are: Warri – Sapele – Benin – Auchi – Koton Karfi – Abuja – Kaduna Highway; and Calabar -Yola – Maiduguri Highway. The existing two North-South roads (Lagos – Ibadan – Jebba – Kaduna – Kano – Daura; and Port Harcourt – Enugu – Makurdi – Jos) two-lane carriageways were to be reconstructed into two-lane dual carriageways to complement the two new highways.
2. The construction of two-lane dual carriageways of Lagos – Ibadan section of the Lagos – Ibadan – Jebba – Kaduna – Kano – Daura highway was well under way before I left office. So was the Shagamu – Benin section of Shagamu – Benin – Asaba – Onitsha two-lane dual carriageway.
3. Works on the construction of a great number of roads – North-South or West-East in the 20,000 miles (from under 7,000 in 1967) of federal roads were either completed, or the works were in progress or planned by December, 1974.
4. Huge investment in public buildings, including the Federal Secretariat in Lagos and a federal secretariat in each state capital.
5. Huge investment in housing for civil servants especially the high-rise towers in Lagos to provide housing initally to host the All Africa Festival of Arts and Culture in 1976.
6. The National Housing Authority was set up under the Cabinet Office to provide housing units to the public after the festival. Festac Town was created in Lagos.
7. The establishment of the Federal Mortgage Bank, which took over the assets of the Nigerian Building Society after nationalising the Bntish interests in the latter.
8. Settlement of a well defined and permanent Nigeria/Dahomey (Benin) boundary. There has been no boundary dispute between our two countries ever since.
9. Charter for each of the professions of architecture, engineering, estate Surveying, building technology and land surveys.
10. Change over from Left-hand to Right-Hand Traffic.
11. Regional Centre for Training in Aerospace Survey at the Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife. It admits students from several African countries. Other major projects or achievements initiated by the other ministries, or the Cabinet Office (which include Fetac Town) during the Gowon Era were:
12. Nigerian National Oil Corporation, now Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation.
13. Decimalization. Decimal currency – the introduction of the Naira.
14. The Metric System, or Metrication initiated by the Ministry of Works and Housing, but executed by the Ministry of Trade.
15. Universal Free Primary Education throughout Nigeria, 1974.
16. Membership of OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Producing Countries).
17. National Youth Service Corps (NYSC).
18. Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Act (Indigenisation Decree), 1972 which opened up commerce and industry to Nigerians.
19. Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
20. Motor Assembly Plants: – (a) Volkswagen in Lagos; (b) Leylands in Ibadan; (c) Peugeot in Kaduna; (d) DaimlerBenz in Enugu.
21. Agro – allied industries: (a) Edible salt; (b) Sugar plant at Jebba (c) Super phosphate fertilizer project.
22. Agricultural Research Institute – assumption of full funding for the Cocoa Research Institute of Nigeria (CRIN), the Nigeria Institute for Oil Palm Research, the Institute of Agricultural Research at Samaru and the Rubber Research Institute at lyanomo and Akwette.
23. Establishment of the International Institute of Tropical Agriculture, Ibadan. 24. Pulp and Paper Mills at Iwopin, Western State, and another in South Eastern State.
25. Development of Specialist Hospitals in the States which would also cater for development of and increase in medical manpower
26. Nigerian Bank for Commerce and Industry.
27. National Insurance Corporation.
28. Nigerian National Supply Company 29. The 2nd and 3rd Oil Refineries at Warri and Kaduna. There has been no new ones ever since.
30: Federal Revenue Court (now Federal High Court).
31. Federal Court of Appeal (now Court of Appeal).
32. The Industrial Court.
33. Settlement of Nigeria/Cameroon Boundary.
The judgment of the International Court of Justice at the Hague in the matter of subsequent boundary dispute between Nigeria and the Cameroon 30 years later confirmed largely the legal position taken by the Gowon Government.
I propose to discuss briefly other achievements of Gowon’s Government, the policies leading to winch were fully discussed in Council before gestation and decisions taken.
I took part in the process.
Closing the Educational Gap : Universal Free Primary Education
The Federal Commissioner for Education, Chief A.Y. Eke, identified some educational gaps in the field of education. In a memorandum entitled “Closing the Education Gap” presented to Council at its 37th meeting in 1972, he urged the Council to pay attention to the areas of need and come to the rescue of the states.
He referred to the “gross uneven educational development”, especially between the northern and southern states. Although he conceded that there were gaps between Rivers and South Eastern states on the one hand and the Western and Mid-Western states on the other, he nonetheless produced figures to show the division between the north and the south in the field of education: “In the primary schools, for every child in the northern states, there were four children in the southern states; for every student in the secondary school in the northern states there were five students in the southern states. And for every undergraduate in higher institutions in the northern states, there were six students in the southern States.”
Chief Eke’s solution for primary education was a federal government policy “to extend free primary education to all children all over the federation”. With regard to secondary education, Chief Eke “recommended the building of twelve girls’ secondary schools, one in each of the twelve states of the federation and the provision of funds for the expansion of existing secondary schools in the less developed areas as well as the provision of funds for the building of eight new secondary schools in those areas.”
For university education, Chief Eke recommended building “Schools of Basic Studies to enable students from backward areas of the country to have opportunity of higher education”. During discussion, the view was expressed that polarisation of educational development between the north and the south was untenable as there were also educationally backward southern states. Some members recalled that the Council had in 1969 commissioned the Shomade Committee to study the issue of primary education in Nigena and that the committee’s report submitted in 1970 recommended the introduction of Free Primary Education for all. The members of the committee included Chief Tayo Akpata, Dr. Mahmoud Tukur, and Professor Otonto (as he then was) Nduka Otonto. The Executice Council was yet to examine its recommendations. The proposals in Chief Eke’s memorandum were however approved by the Council.
I was in full support of the memorandum on closing the educational gap. A policy of Free Primary Education throughout Nigeria would not only extend to the northern states a scheme initiated 20 years earlier by Chief Awolowo in the West but which failed due to inadequate funding in the East, the policy would also provide adequate funding for the scheme in the southern states. The proposal on establishing eight secondary schools in the less developed areas of the country and provision of funds for the expansion of existing schools in such areas was the answer to the Quota System of Admission of students to King’s College, Lagos, which the King’s College Old Boys Association had always opposed as it seemingly discriminated against merit. The new proposal by the federal ministry would in my view go a long way to bridge the educational gap and eliminate the discrimination and injustice embedded in the quota system of admission to King’s College and Queen’s College, Lagos, as well as the federal government other colleges.
Formal Launching of the Universal Primary Education Scheme
I had just returned from Mecca and I found my name in the list of Federal Commissioners and officials to accompany the Head of State on his visit to the North-Western State. Another punishing tour, setting out at times at 8.00 a.m. in one part of the vast state like North-West and ending up in another part at 8.00 or 9.00p.m, with little time for lunch. There were receptions and cultural shows at provisional headquarters, visits to schools and army formations, and courtesy calls on the Sultan of Sokoto, Emir of Argungu and other Emirs. The convoy of cars ran at breath-taking speed. And I was yet to recover from the hectic schedule of the Holy Pilgrimage as Amir-ul-Hajj for Nigeria. There was, however, one event which made the North-West tour memorable: the declaration by General Gowon on 20 January 1974 at the Race Course, Sokoto of his Government’s intention to introduce Universal Free Primary Education throughout Nigeria in September 1976. The projection was to enrol 2.2 million children aged 5-6 years in 1976, rising to 2.6 million in 1981
In the words of Chief A.Y. Eke, the Federal Commissioner for Education, in his memorandum presented to Council on 16 January 1974: “The Universal Primary Education would provide an opportunity for the harmonisation of the content of the educational programme throughout the Federation and facilitate the task of relating the content and direction of education to the social-economic needs of the various communities in the country and superimpose a national purpose on our educational endeavours. Ultimately, it would help to bridge the educational gap between the various states and between the sexes and make it possible to adapt our educational policies to suit our manpower development needs. It would also help to bridge the gap between the rich and the poo± and give democracy a fair chance of success in the country. It would become possible to set unified moral, cultural and spiritual values throughout the country and the task of eradicating corruption would become much easier.”
The memorandum was generally well received, though the dangers of higher level of youth unemployment was noted. It was generally agreed that the scheme would be fully financed by the federal government, even though primary education was a state function under the Constitution. In approving the scheme, Council also took note of the need for expansion of secondary education. A special meeting of Council devoted to the Universal Free Primary Education Scheme was held on 7 June 1974.
Three memoranda on the following subjects were considered:
(1) Universal Primary Education Staff Recruitment Development in Teacher Training College.
(2) Universal Primary Education Scheme: Teacher Training.
(3) Universal Primary Education Scheme: Recruitment, Recurrent Expenditure.
During discussion, Chief Eke disclosed that at a meeting of the National Council on Education comprising all the state commissioners in the federation under his chairmanship, the scheme was fully examined and approved. The commissioner, however, advised that while the scheme could commence in 1976, “It should not be made compulsory until 1979”. The Council accepted that recommendation. The Council also approved other proposals, including: (1) That the federal government should bear financial responsibility for UPE Scheme throughout the country. (2) That a cabinet committee under the chairmanship of the federal commissioner for education and comprising the federal commisioners for finance, economic development and reconciliation, agriculture and natural resources, babour, and works and housing should be set up under the following terms of reference:
(i) To identify the critical sectors in the implementation of the UPE Scheme such as planning, management, financing and supervision.
(ii) To articulate the main steps to be taken to implement each of the sectors in (i) above.
(iii) To solve a timetable of action for each step in (ii) above.
(iv) To monitor the implementation of the UPE Scheme.
(v) To carry out all other assignments that would ensure the successful implementation of the UPE Scheme.
(vi) To submit report periodically for the consideration of the Council.
The Cabinet Committee’s first meeting was held on 25 June 1974 when an outline of its work was discussed.
At its second meeting on 29 July 1974, we considered six papers, largely on teacher training, expansion of existing buildings and construction of new ones including classrooms, halls, laboratories and staff quarters, recurrent expenditure and funding and provision for teacher trainers.
The third meeting of the Cabinet Committee took place on 13 August 1974.The three papers considered included Revised 1974/75 Recurrent Estimate for Teacher Training College, Disbursement of Recurrent Funds and siting and building of 62 new Teacher Training Colleges for 1975/76 academic year.
The Council considered the First Progress Report of the Cabinet Committee at its meeting on 21 August 1974 during which the Council among other decisions: (a) Approved an expenditure of N51.046m expansion and provision of additional facilities for the existing 156 Teacher Training Colleges.
(b) Noted the need for 62 Teacher Training Colleges at an estimated cost of N162.75m.
(c) Approved the recruitment of 1,200 Teacher Educators in addition to 1,000 members of the National Youth Service Corps to be deployed to the Teacher Training Colleges.
Such was the tempo of General Gowon’s Government preparation for the commencement of the UPE Scheme by the Council and the Cabinet Comniittee till 30 December 1974 when I left the Federal Executive Council.
Such was the enthusiasm for laying a solid foundation for the future of Nigeria in the education sector.
It was the lot of the Murtala Mohammed/ Obasanjo regime to implement the Free Primary Education Scheme initiated by the Gowon regime as best as it could.
It is a sad commentary on the quality of political class and its leadership that fifty years after independence, there stifi exists educational gap between the north and the south, or one state and the other. Lack of consistency in pplicy is part of the problem.
Economic Community of West African States
The establishment of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was another feather in General Yakubu Gowon’s cap.
In the run-up to political independence, West Africa was dominated by two colonial powers: Great Britain and France. For some years after dependence, West Africa remained polarised: Anglophone and Francophone.
The economies of the Francophone countries were tied to France much more than the economies of British West Africa to Britain’s economy. Several initiatives were made at forging one large grouping or the other: Lagos in 1963, the Niamey Conference in 1966, and Accra in 1967. The Senegal River States Conference of all states along the Senegal River, also in 1967 led to the first serious attempt at regional grouping in Monrovia in 1968. The Monrovia conference failed to germinate; even the protocol on customs was never signed. In April 1972 however, General Gowon and General Eyadema of Togo 1974 met to revive the effort at a regional economic grouping, cutting across linguistic lines. Following joint delegations of Nigeria and Togo to all the West African States, the Ministry of External Affairs conducted a discreet exploration through our missions in West Africa to find out which countries would be interested in the proposed West African Economic Community. As a result of the investigation, seven out of eleven replies received in August 1972 were referred back to the Mimstry for further clarification There was the problem of France which had been campaigning vigourously for closer economic ties between French-speaking West African countries and the European Economic Commumty, and did everythmg possible to subvert the creation of the proposed West Africa Economic Community. A meeting of officials was scheduled for January 1973 in Lome. Due to various obstacles, the ministerial meeting which was to follow did not hold until 10 to 15 December, 1973 in Lome to consider the proposal to establish the community submitted jointly by the sponsors, Nigeria and Togo. All the fifteen countries in the West African sub-region (including the newly independent Guinea-Bissan) were represented at the meeting.
The report to Council noted the enthusiasm of member-countries of CEAO – a grouping of French-speaking states, some of whom had earlier on shown a great deal of antipathy towards the proposed community. They not only sent strong delegations but took active part in the deliberation throughout. That bore an eloquent testimony to the quiet diplomacy of the Nigerian and Togolese Governments. The next ministerial meeting was held in Niamey in March 1974 and the final draft Treaty establishing the Economic Community of West African States (ECO WAS) was approved by the Heads of State of all the countries in the West African region later in the year. Under the Treaty, decisions are based on the principle of unanimity of member-countries present at the meetings. Other major decisions taken at the inaugural conference were the establishment of a secretariat based in Lagos and an annual budget and creation of specialised commissions in the following areas:
(i)Trade, Customs, Immigration, Monetary and Payments;
(ii) Industry and Natural esources;
(iii) Transport, Communications and Energy;
(iv) Social and CulturalAffairs.
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Act
Soon after the end of the 2nd World War (1939-1945), the Socialist Government in Britain extended socialism to the colonies. As a result, the colonial government in Lagos assumed total control of certain sectors of the economy like power generation and distribution (Electricity Corporation of Nigeria, later NEPA), airways and the major ports. The private ports at Sapele and Burutu were taken over by the Gowon Administration.
Commerce was largely dominated by foreign firms from Britain and some European countries Wholesale trade, super markets, sale of equipment and machinery and the like were handled largely by these firms. Only petty trading was in indigenous hands.
It was this situation – the need “to raise the proportion of indigenous ownership of mdustnal and commercial mvestment I m Nigena” – that led to the promulgation of Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree 1972.
It was one of the primary objectives of the Admmistration in its 1970-74 National Development Plan.
Accordingly, the Federal Commissioner for Industries, Dr Tayo Adetoro brought two memoranda to the draft decree council for approval.
The Supreme Military Council made some minor amendments to the draft decree.
The highlights of the decree were the reservation of certain enterprises like advertising agencies, road haulage, newspaper publishing and printing exclusively for Nigerians, listed as schedule I.
Those enterprises listed in schedule ll like beer brewing, soft drinks manufacture, construction industry. sundry manufacturing industries – were reserved for Nigerians (including non Nigerian Africans) exclusively where the paid-up share capital was 200,000 pounds or less or the annual turnover was 500,000 pounds or less.
Any enterprise in schedule II with more than 200,000 pounds share capital or 500,000 in turnover but with less than 40% equity participation by Nigenans was also barred to aliens.
I participated fully in the Council debates leading to the promulgation of the decree, and in support of it. Total domination of our commerce and industry by non-Nigerians, especially in areas where the government could not intervene, was intolerable. But I did intervene in a public speech to denounce the attempt by Nigerian capitalists who planned to concentrate ownership of the enterprises in schedules land II in the hands of a few captains of industry and commerce. This was my reaction to a statement made by Chief Henry Fajemirokun, the President of the West African Chamber of Commerce, who was in support of concentration of shares in the enterprises in a few hands. My stand was this: indigenisation for the benefit of many, not monopoly by the new Nigerian capitalists, the “nouveau riche”, the captains of commerce. There was an upper limit to the number of shares available to Nigerians in order to have a better spread of the neocapitalists.
National Youth Service Corps
One of the lessons of the Civil War was the need to build a nation of Nigerians whose devotion and loyalty to the nation would transcend ethnic and social barriers There was the need also to encourage free movement of people and mobility of labour within the country. For these and other reasons, the Federal Govermnent promulgated the National Youth Service Corps Decree 1973. The objectives of the Corps, as stated in the Decree, are:
(a) “to inculcate discipline in Nigerian youths by instilling in them a tradition of industry at work, and of patriotic and loyal service to the nation in any situation they may find themselves;
(b) to raise their moral tone by giving them the opportunity to learn about higher ideals of national achievement and social and cultural improvement;
(c) to develop in them attitudes of mind, acquired through shared experience and suitable training, which will make them more amenable to mobilization in the national interest;
(d) to develop common ties among them and promote national unity by ensuring that – (i) as far as possible, youths are assigned to jobs in states other than their States of origin; (ii) each group, assigned to work together, is as representative of the country as possible; (iii) the youths are exposed to the modes of living of the people in different parts of the country with a view to removing prejudices, eliminating ignorance, and confirming at first hand the many similarities among Nigerians of all ethnic groups;
(e) to encourage members of the service corps to seek, at the end of their corps service, career employment all over the country thus promoting the free movement of labour;
(f) to induce employers, partly through their experience with members of the service corps, to employ more readily qualified Nigerians irrespective of their States of origin; and
(g) to enable Nigerian youths to acquire the spirit of self-reliance”. The youth corps has helped to bridge the graduate employment gap in certain states in need of such employment, and has over the years given the opportunity to many young Nigerians to know and respect people from other parts of Nigeria, their culture and traditions.
In order to ensure the enduring nature of this institution in the polity, the National Youth Service Corps Act (or Decree No.24 of 1973) is the first of four Acts of the National Assembly preserved and protected under the Constitution of 1979 and of 1999. Its provisions “shall continue to apply and have full effect” like any other provision of the constitution, and “shall not be altered or repealed” except with a two-thirds majority vote of the members of the National Assembly and a similar two-thirds majority vote in eaèh of al least two-thirds of the State Assemblies.
Location of the Second Petroleum Refinery
This was one of the most controversial issues discussed by Council the Gowon regime.
In his memorandum brought to Council in November 1970, Dr. R.A.T Dikko, the Commissioner for Mines and Power admitted that all the serious proposals received named Lagos as the best location.
The Finance at Economic Committee of officials of Government had recommended the appointment of consultants to examine the proposals and made recommendation to the Government. He rejected both proposals. Without any technical advice, he recommended a location in the northern states. This led to a lengthy debate in Council. The Federal Government policy of dispersal of industiies, and avoidance of too many industries in Lagos for strategic and security reasons was strong argument for a site in the northern part of Nigeria. A refinery in the north would entail the construction of an oil pipe – line from the south to the north for transportation of crude oil, but the possibility of sabotage would draw caution, just as a pipeline for transportation of refined oil from the south to the north. A strong security measure would be needed either way.
The view was strongly expressed that members should avoid planning down economic realities in favour of political expediency. The pattern in consumption had a great bearing on the location of the refinery. At this stage it was also recalled that Council had appointed a committee of officials to examine the possibility of uniform prices for petroleum products throughout the country. This. would of necessity invite the government to subsidise the industry.
The Federal Executive Council agreed that independent consultants be appointed to undertake techincal and economic studies on the second refinery, including its location. Early in 1973, the Commissioner for Mines and Power submitted another nemorandum on the subject matter. Members were given only a précis of the consultant’s report, not the report itself. I felt uncomfortable with the refusal to give us the consultant’s report. So did Prof. Bayo Adedeji. It was decided that the report should be circulated to members, and consideration for the memorandum was therefore deferred.
In his memorandum, the Commissioner for Mines and Power had shifted grounds on location. He no longer insisted on the location in the northern parts of the country. He was now in favour of Warri for the second refinery, and Kaduna for the third refinery.
In support of Warri instead of Lagos which was recommended by the consultants as the location for the second refinery, Dr. Dikko argued that a refinery should be more of a raw-material oriented industry rather than a market-oriented industry. He stressed the need to decongest Lagos and for even distribution of industries. His support for Kaduna as the location for the third refinery was merely in support of the consultant’s recommendation.
In their report, the consultants considered five major towns and cities – Lagos, Warri, Jebba, Kaduna and Kafanchan as possible locations, and gave a fairly detailed comparison of costs for the various sites. As Lagos consumed about 33% of the petroleum products in the country, and the combined Lagos, West and Mid-Western States consumed in total about 60% of those products, Lagos had a much greater cost advantage over Warri or any other location in the country.
Still on the issue of cost advantage, a refinery in Lagos would be able to produce up to 70,000 barrels of petroleum products per day, enough to meet our immediate domestic needs and also be able to export some quantity as recommended by the consultants. The Ministry of Mines and Power on the other hand recommended smaller refineries in Warri and Kaduna with capacities of 42,000 barrels per day in Warri and between 20,000 and 30,000 barrels per day in Kaduna.
Finally on the issue of costs, Lagos had a clear advantage over Warri as Warri would require an enlarged port and other infrastructure to accommodate large shipping The view was expressed that if the Ministry of Mines and Power had made up its mind all along that the second and third refineries should be in Warri and Kaduna respectively (and its memorandum made a case for both, and almost ignored the consultants’ case for Lagos), why appoint the consultants at all?
I was in full support of the consultants’ recommendation of Lagos, and I said so in very clear terms. So did Prof Bayo Adedeji. The Head of State and President of Council, General Gowon, accused the consultants of thinking in terms of what would be in the ultimate advantage of their own country which had lost grip of oil exploitation in Nigeria. He counselled that Government decision should not be based on economic factors alone, we should bear in mind social and political factors as well. He was in full support of the memorandum
The Council approved Warri as the location of the second refinery, with increased capacity as the first refinery in Port Harcourt that is about 3,000,000 tons per annum. It further decided that a lube oil and asphalt plant should be built and integrated with Warri refinery, but incorporated with Port Harcourt Refinery if based on imported crude oil. The Council also approved that the third refinery should be built in Kaduna, but the capacity was to be determined by market research in 1976/77. The atmosphere was tense and almost throughout the debate, with a little humour interspersed occasionally.
Whatever the argument in Council, the Gowon’s regime gave Nigeria two more refineries. And he did not have to import petroleum products in the life of that administration as it is today the norm. Thirty-four years since the termination of that regime, the oil-rich Nigeria is yet to establish new refineries.
She survives on imported oil products.
Development of Liquefied Natural Gas LNG) Projects
The Federal Commissioner for Mines and Power, Dr. Dilcko, presented four memoranda to Council between 1972 and 1974 on the subject. The last memorandum was the most contentious, and one of the most controversial in the Gowon administration. Dr. Dikko explained that pressures had been exerted on him, his officials and on Council members by “highly placed individuals” and that he had been offered money by lobbyists. One highly respected Nigerian who exerted tremendous pressure, but not money, Dr. Dikko emphasised, was Chief Obafemi Awolowo who presented “a very good case for a client which he (Chief Obafem Awolowo) represented as “the legal and economic adviser, consultant and representative. Chief Awolowo presented a proposal to the Ministry on LNG but declared that he was neither a shareholder nor a director in the company. What worried Dr. Dikko was that Chief Awolowo “extended his network of correspondence to his colleagues, some permanent secretaries and to members on the Petroleun Advisory Board, declaring his interest in the venture and soliciting their co-operation, Undoubtedly, Chief Awolowo was very much informed on every stage of the processing of the various bids, and he attacked the bid of a rival company well established in Nigeria”.
Dr. Dikko joined issues with Prof. Bayo Adedeji, the Federal Commissioner for Economic Development and Reconstruction, the contents of whose counter memorandum were “similar to the proposals” of Chief Awolowo. He felt his colleagues should have discussed his own proposals with him before resorting to the unusual action issuing a counter memorandum. In his defence, Prof Adedeji said that Dr. Dikko did not wait for “clearance of his memorandum with his ministry” under the rules before forwarding it to the Cabinet Office for circulation; hence his counter memorandum (which was non-circulated). He assured his colleagues that he had not been offered any reward, monetary or otherwise, by any company as he had no direct dealing with any.
I was a recipient of Chief Awolowo’s proposal. We put the incident behind us, and proceeded to consider Dr, Dikko’s memorandum. On the main issue, there were twelve offers received from companies in Nigeria and abroad on the development of a viable LNG project in Nigeria. Comparative studies of the various proposals had been made by officials of the Ministry of Mines and Power, and were presented to Council. After an exhaustive debate on the ownership of gas, gas gathering system, the scope of the project, shipping of liquefied gas and selection of technical partners, the Council took a number of decisions, which included:
1. Re-affirmation that the Federal Government should own 55% to 60% equity in any gas-utilising project.
2. Agreement in principle to establish two LNG projects of 1,000 million cubic feet per day capacity.
3. Agreement that the Government should participate in the liquefaction phase in the Gas Gathering System on the basis of 60% ownership.
4. Agreement to take 50% ownership in shipping business.
5. Agreed to invite separately four companies already operating in Nigeria for detailed negotiations for the construction of the LNG plant and LNG tanker.
6. Appointment of consultants.
At a time when our only rival in Africa and Asia was Algeria with two LNG plants and plans to build more, with an advantage of direct shipping to Europe by pipeline across the Mediterranean Sea, it was our hope that Nigeria’s LNG project would take off by 1976. Indonesia (now with eight) a Malaysia (five) had not yet come to the stage.
That was forward planning the Gowon Administration for a great industrial power for Africa of today. It was not to be. Gowon’s government was toppled the following year, a that apparently ended the plan for Nigeria’s first LNG plant.
It took almost thirty years of dithering thereafter for Nigeria’s first LNG plant to take off.
Accountability
The issue of accountability has been discussed elsewhere in this book. We just give a further example of Chief Awolowo ‘s tight hold on our finance.
In 1968, he brought a Council memorandum on Allocation of Funds for Commissioners stating that Commissioners should be able to serve, matter of courtesy, only light refreshments like coffee, tea, biscuits and soft drinks to their visitors and no more. It was subject to budgetery control. The point was stressed that even that facility should not be abused! Expenses for overseas official tours by federal commissioners and their officials were matters for debate in Council by way of memoranda from the relevant ministry. There were several occasions memorandum on such expenses were brought to Council for approval where there were no provisions or sufficient provisions for the purpose in a ministry’s budget.
The Promise of Return to Civilian Rule and the July 1975 Coup
It has been suggested that a recent administration had an all-star cast of economic managers, perhaps, the best the country had ever seen: economic managers who failed to fix or provide power, telephones, railways or restore the old value of the naira. General Gowon had the best team of economic managers Nigeria has ever had in its almost 50 years history, led by Chief Obafemi Awolowo who did not borrow during the war years. There were Abdul Attah, Allison Ayida, Phillip Asiodu, assisted by Prof. Tunji Aboyade and Prof Bola Onitiri. That was Nigeria’s finest hour.
Impressive as General Gowon’s record of governance was: successful battle for One Nigeria; Rehabilitation and Reconstruction after the Civil War; a new economic and social order and educational foundation for a New Nigeria, a new network of roads and other infrastructures, one element was lacking: a new political order.
A number of us, in the early 1972, held meetings in Lagos and Kaduna, to the knowledge of the military authorities, in preparation for return to civilian rule. Our membership included Civil Commissioners (Federal and State) across the old political spectrum, political leaders across the nation. Chief Awolowo and some of his close associates were not invited to the meeting. But Chief Anthony Enahoro and Mr. J. S. Tarka, Aihaji Aminu Kano and Alhaji Shehu Shagari were in attendance. But the military had other ideas. There was a deep division among the leadership of the armed forces. There were the few on the one hand who were appointed into political offices since the July 1966 coup as military governors of the states and whose colleagues perceived as enjoying the pomp of political power. Those happy, few, hardly visited the war front, Iet alone to be directly involved in the civil war. There were on the other hand the war heroes and veterans of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Divisions of the Nigeria Armed Forces who prosecuted the Civil War and bore the brunt of war. Four years after the war, the political officers remained in their posts, in the gilted cages, their political postings. General Gowon hesitated to redeploy them to strictly military duties. This situation caused a great deal of resentment among the officers on military duties. There was some unease in the army.
Earlier, towards the end of 1970, General Gowon launched his 9-point political programme which included return to civilian rule in 1976 and a review of the constitution. The constitutional review hardly surfaced thereafter.
In his broadcast to the nation, however, on October 1 1974, General Gowon said that the political leaders had not learnt their lessons, and therefore civil in rule in 1976 was no longer realistic.
It has been alleged by many people that this new position of General Gowon was on the advice of the “Super Permanent Secretaries” who advised the Head of State on assumption of power in 1966 on political issues as well as performing their traditional duties in public administration This practice continued after the appointment of civilian Federal Commissioners in May 1967 until Mr. C. 0. Lawson became the Secretary to the Government on the death of Mr. Abdul Attah in 1972. Mr. Lawson in his attempt to restore the civil service to its traditional role told his colleagues that he would lead them to General Gowon outside official duties only on the invitation of Head of State.
The senior officers in the armed forces held a meeting in 1974, and by majority vote decided to rescind the decision to return to civilian rule in 1976. It was not General Gowon’s decision alone to reverse the policy, but he had to carry the can as the Commander-in-Chief.
The general public received General Gowon’s announcement in silence, and the political leaders in astonishment and with great disquiet. There was muted criticism in the press. The state of emergency proclaimed in January 1966 and renewed in August 1966, remained in force. So too, as a consequence, was the ban on political parties as well as on political activities. But the strain in the armed forces remained. Police intelligence gave General Gowon warnings of the planned putsch. So did other intelligence agencies. Colonel Joseph Garba, the Commander of the Brigade of Guards and a Gowon loyalist, assured General Gowon that there was no truth in the rumour of a planned coup. Some close public service aides of General Gowon urged him to announce the deployment of some of the long serving Military Governors back to the barracks and appoint new ones, but he dithered. If only he carried out the deployment. If only!
General Gowon left Lagos to attend an OAU Heads of State Conference in Uganda late in July 1975. On 29 July 1975, Colonel Garba, announced in a dawn broadcast: “In view of what has been happening in the past few months, the Nigeria Armed Forces have decided to effect a change in the leadership of the Federal Military Government.” Later in the day, Brigadier Murtala Muhammed emerged as the new Head of State. Brigadier Olusegun Obasanjo became the Chief of Staff, Supreme Headquarters, and Colonel Theophilus Danjuma was named the Chief of Staff, Army. Both Colonel Danjuma and Colonel Garba who later became the Federal Cormmissioner for External Affairs were very close to General Gowon. It was a palace coup, a bloodless coup. General Gowon flew from Uganda to Togo where his friend and cofounder of ECOWAS, General Eyadema, offered him an asylum. He soon after left Togo for Britain where he later entered Warwick University to study for his first degree, followed by a doctorate course.
This amiable man, who had no taint of corruption while in office, with some of the best of Nigeria’s political brains in his government, and some of Nigeria’s finest crop of civil servants around him, left a legacy of public service delivery never witnessed in Nigeria, and is yet to be surpassed. Some of government’s policies are still being executed by successive governments till today. Thirty years on, for an example, the Federal Ministry of Works and Housing’s plan in his time for a coastal road from the Lagos Bar Beach to Calabar is still being talked about in political circles as well as government circles. It may yet come to pass.
In his time, especially in the early 1970s, General Gowon used to be greeted by the crowds while on his tours of the country with the slogan “Go On With One Nigeria.” For two decades after the 29 July 1975 coup, his political rating was so low that he was badly defeated in a primary election somewhere in Kaduna State during General Babangida’s tenure. He is now regaining his gait as an elder statesman. He has enjoyed triumph and suffered one major disaster, not heeding his own 1970 warning of a change. But General Gowon had a fine innings, and left his imprints on the sands of time. He was, in cricket parlance, bowled out, middle stump. And his economic legacy lives on. General Gowon learnt the bitter lesson too late: Do not overstay God’s appointed time. When it is time to go, ‘Go’. Do not overstrain God’s generosity. But his record in good governance is yet to be surpassed.
• Above are excerpts from the memoir of Alhaji Okunnu, federal commissioner for Works Housing in the government of Gowon, entitled “In the Service of the Nation.”
