KAMALA HARRIS AND WEST AFRICA

If she wins, Kamala Harris and the U.S. Democratic Party will need to offer strategic support to ECOWAS, writes CHUKWUEMEKA UWANAKA     

As the United States (U.S.) presidential elections of November 5, 2024, draws nearer, rising geopolitical tensions and conflicts across the Middle East, Europe, Africa, and other parts of the world suggest that whoever emerges U.S. President from January 20, 2025, will have a lot of international activities to manage – given the somewhat role of the U.S. as the ‘World’s Policeman’.  This has increased analysis in what either Vice President  Kamala Harris will mean as Democratic President, or what former President Donald Trump will mean as Republican President, in the foreign policy sphere. For Trump, his time in office from 2017 to 2021 means that his policies can be more easily forecasted, than Harris, who emerged as nominee, after President Biden suddenly withdrew his second term candidacy of the U.S Democratic Party on July 21, 2024. Therefore, not much is known about her foreign policy, especially as it concerns Africa. However, given that the global exertions of the Peoples Republic of China and Russian Federation rank highly in U.S. geopolitical concerns and foreign policy responses, the recent comments by United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) Commander, U.S. Marine Corps General Michael Langley, about destabilizing activities of Russia and China in West Africa, necessitate some strategic policy response from Kamala Harris for West Africa.

What then were the contents of General Langley’s comments about West Africa, and how does it necessitate U.S. foreign policy interest?

Proper understanding of General Langley’s comments requires some background on recent geopolitical events in West Africa. Following an increasing number of military coups against democratically elected governments in recent years, the last being the July 26, 2023 coup in Niger Republic, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which is the African Union (AU) recognized agency and regional economic community for West Africa, decided to take more punitive actions against Niger Republic, as a means of deterring further undemocratic coups across the region. In response to the sanctions imposed during the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government Extraordinary Summit on the political situation in Niger on July 30, 2023, the military governments of Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger decided to exit ECOWAS from January 2025. They established the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in September 2023, as an alternate multilateral and defense organization. The AES countries have also severed military links with the U.S., leading to the closure of the U.S. military presence in Niger Republic on September 15, 2024, following the withdrawal of U.S. forces and assets from Air Base 101 in Niamey on July 7, 2024, and Air Base 201 in Agadez on Aug. 5, 2024.

In addition to ECOWAS and the U.S., the francophone AES countries have further severed links with France, their former colonial country. The severing of links has however been replaced by closer ties to Russia and China. Russia’s Wagner Group has had increased military activities in the countries, alongside increased Chinese cooperation. The Chinese tech firm Emptech, has been producing the new biometric passport of Burkina Faso, which no longer has the ECOWAS logo.

These events provide some background to the comments by AFRICOM’s General Langley on September 12, 2024, during a press briefing at the Department of State on the new AFRICOM Strategy and U.S. military commitment on the African continent. During the briefing, he highlighted the evolving dynamics that the establishment of the AES poses to security cooperation for AFRICOM, as well as the destabilizing role of Russia and China in not only West Africa, but also extending to other parts of the continent. This coming together of Russian and Chinese defense and strategic interests in a manner that the top U.S. military commander on the continent describes as ‘been destabilizing’ across West Africa and some parts of the continent, therefore requires a foreign policy response from Kamala Harris.

What then can be done by the U.S. and Kamala Harris to strategically address these destabilizing geopolitical concerns in West Africa?

By way of some coincidence, the briefing General Langley had at the U.S. Department of State was centered on the ‘United States Africa Command Theater Strategy 2024-2033: Africa Partner Led, U.S & Ally Enabled’, which is the new AFRICOM strategy unveiled in August 2024. It is within this strategic framework that some nexus can be created to strategically address the destabilizing geopolitical concerns, in an approach that is ‘Africa Led’- in this case ‘ECOWAS Led’, but U.S. enabled.

But what will an ‘ECOWAS Led’ approach for AFRICOM look like?  

The ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF), which consists of troops from all ECOWAS member states, presents a strategic opportunity for U.S. and AFRICOM engagement with West Africa. The ESF, which operates within the framework of the Africa Standby Force (ASF) of the AU African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) of 2001, has its legal basis from Article 21 of the ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security of December 1999. Declared operational in 2016, the ESF was instrumental in ensuring that democracy was restored to The Gambia in 2017, via the ECOWAS Mission to The Gambia (ECOMIG).

As the situation in The Gambia showed, the ESF has some latent ability in democracy promotion and security objectives. This ability has, however, been hampered by the fiscal and economic constraints of many ECOWAS member states, which has made it challenging for the ESF to remain sustainably functional. In line with these recent security challenges, Defense Chiefs from ECOWAS countries met in Abuja on July 26, 2024, where they estimated that $2.6 billion will be required annually for a 5,000 strong ESF, that will effectively contain terrorism and unconstitutional change of government across West Africa.  

The inability of ECOWAS member states to provide $2.6bn annually for ESF, however provides the U.S. a strategic opportunity to address the destabilizing activities and influence of its earlier mentioned geopolitical rivals, not just in West Africa, but also across other parts of the continent. This opportunity can be harnessed by providing a significant part of the required $2.6bn annually, while the other countries also contribute. At present, U.S. military presence has been limited to piecemeal approaches across Cote d’Ivoire, Benin Republic and probably Ghana, after being asked to vacate its base in Niger Republic. Investing in the ESF will however provide the U.S. with expansive presence across all ECOWAS states, which is more comprehensive than its current approach with just three countries. Increased funding of ESF should lead to the establishment of ESF military bases across the region, which will also have significantly embedded AFRICOM presence.

From an efficiency perspective, strategic financial and training support to the ESF, which routed through the ECOWAS Peace Fund (EPF), can begin with a consolidation of AFRICOM training activities and programs in West Africa such as the ‘Exercise Obangame Express’, a maritime exercise around West Africa’s maritime coast conducted by U.S. Naval Forces Africa; ‘Exercise Flintlock 24’, which is the AFRICOM’s premier and largest annual special operations forces exercise, that aims to strengthen combined partner force collaboration in Africa alongside international and NATO international special operations forces. There are also Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative, facilitated by the United States, which aims to develop an interoperable peacekeeping capacity among African nations; the Africa Partnership Station; and the U.S. Southern European Task Force, Africa (SETAF-AF) which is a dedicated headquarters under U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Army Europe & Africa, coordinating Army activities across Africa to provide scalable crisis response options.

Consolidating these programs with the ESF and increasing defense funding towards meeting the annual $2.6bn required through the EPF, provides more comprehensive defense, geopolitical and democracy promoting results across West Africa, than the current ‘outside-in approach’ which focuses on just three countries, as explained by Maj. Gen. Kenneth Ekman, AFRICOM Department of Defense West Africa Coordination Element Lead in August 2024. Beyond ECOMIG of 2017, such support has worked in the past, with ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) of 1990-2000, restoring peace and security to Liberia and Sierra Leone. Though largely funded by Nigeria, and costing over $8bn, Nigeria’s current fiscal position makes it unable to provide such level of support. The U.S. stepping in with commensurate support therefore provides it with increased geopolitical leverage in the region, which also meets its strategic objectives, in a part of Africa that has Africa’s most populous countries and one of largest economies.  Allowing its geopolitical rivals to operate such a destructive approach in West Africa, could lead to a spread such a ‘model’ to other parts of Africa, at higher mitigation cost. This further justifies the need for increased funding, as AFRICOM currently has fewer than 7,000 troops, and receives less than 0.3 percent of U.S. military and Department of Defense budget, for an area 3.5 times the size of the U.S.

With increased U.S. investment support and defense footprints embedded across West Africa through the EPF and ESF, there is less suspicion and nationalist sentiments that sometimes derail U.S. military presence. And there is justification for such suspicion, as U.S. led NATO interventions in Libya in 2011, which led to the downfall of Muammar Gaddafi, also led to the expansion of terrorism and insecurity across West Africa, through groups such as Boko Haram and ISWAP. But if people can witness reduced insecurity and military coups through the ESF from increased U.S. and AFRICOM support, then such suspicions are dispelled, leading to enhanced cooperation for ‘Africa Led, U.S. Enabled’ strategy.  

There will also be need for better publicity across the region on how U.S. military presence in countries such as Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Turkey, South Korea, Germany, Saudi Arabia, Japan, Italy and Bahrain have not undermined the political independence or socioeconomic development of each country. Also, military and security officials from ECOWAS states have in the past decades attended training in USA military organizations, without losing sovereignty. And ECOWAS, ECOWAS Peace Fund and ESF have received support from other external partners such as the European Union (EU), with the EU Support Project to ECOWAS Regional Peace, Security and Stability Mandate (EU-ECOWAS PSS), without losing sovereignty.

On the economic front, the enhanced peace and security for ECOWAS countries from this strengthened partnership should in turn lead to an increase in foreign investment from the U.S. to West Africa, where manufacturing and services for global U.S. firms will be more cost effective and competitive. U.S. investors will feel more assured in the security of their investments, while West African countries harness such investments for much desired socioeconomic development.

As Americans elect their 47th President on November 5, 2024, the somewhat disrupting nature of geopolitical events and conflicts across the world, makes foreign policy and external affairs a major task for whoever emerges as President. The concerns raised by General Langley, Commander of U.S. Africa Command in September 2024 about the destabilizing role of Russia and China in West Africa, is therefore a geopolitical issue that requires adequate foreign policy response from both major presidential candidates. Trump, in his time as 45th U.S. President never visited Africa, so his foreign policy inclinations can largely be forecasted. For Kamala Harris and the U.S. Democratic Party, strategically increasing partnership support to ECOWAS, the West African regional organization, and the ECOWAS Standy Force, may be the most feasible strategic approach towards addressing this geopolitical concern that has wider regional implications. Contributing through the ECOWAS Peace Fund towards the $2.6 billion required annually for a more effective and efficient standby force that works closely with AFRICOM, is a cost-effective way of enhancing the U.S.’s leverage in the region, while also combating global terrorism and promoting democracy in a manner that is ‘Africa Led, and U.S. Enabled’.

Dr. Uwanaka writes from African University of Science and Technology, Abuja. chukweks@yahoo.com