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A Stronger Nigeria Needs an Integrated Navy, Not a Separate Coastguard
Rear Admiral K Bolanle Ati-John (rtd)
As a retired senior naval officer with decades of experience in Nigeria’s maritime security operations and indeed the Region, I applaud the Senate’s commitment to strengthening our country’s coastal defences. The recent advancement of a bill proposing the establishment of a separate Nigerian coastguard is well-intentioned and aimed at enhancing our maritime security. However, I believe this approach might not address all the complexities involved. While the desire to bolster our maritime capabilities is valid, creating a standalone coastguard may inadvertently weaken our overall security strategy by introducing costly redundancies, fragmenting command structures, and diluting Nigeria’s longstanding influence in the Gulf of Guinea.
Nigeria’s waters face complex challenges ranging from piracy and oil theft to illegal fishing and environmental degradation. These diverse threats demand a flexible, unified response capable of seamlessly addressing both defence and civilian responsibilities. Based on my experience and the success of integrated navy models worldwide, I am convinced that Nigeria’s security goals are best served by enhancing our existing navy’s capacity rather than dividing it. Countries facing similar challenges, such as Brazil and Indonesia, have demonstrated that a unified maritime force can effectively safeguard national and regional interests without the financial and operational costs associated with establishing a separate agency.
Our maritime security infrastructure must be efficient, adaptable, and cost-effective, especially in today’s economic climate. Creating a new coastguard would strain our budget and spread our resources thin at a time when our existing navy, strengthened through targeted investments, can continue to fulfil both military and civilian roles. An integrated navy ensures that Nigeria maintains a strong, cohesive presence in West Africa, able to respond quickly to threats at home and uphold our commitments within ECOWAS.
Why Integration Outweighs Separation
Nigeria’s maritime security is not only a matter of national defence but also an economic imperative. Our waters hold vital resources (oil, gas, and fisheries etc) that contribute significantly to the national economy and local livelihoods. With piracy, oil theft, and illegal fishing posing daily threats, Nigerian Navy has developed the expertise needed to tackle both defence and civilian maritime challenges. The current integrated model allows us to deploy a unified force that can respond flexibly to diverse threats. Splitting this capability between two agencies would only create costly redundancies, operational inefficiencies, and bureaucratic delays, which are challenges Nigeria’s security budget cannot sustain.
Setting up a separate coastguard would require an enormous financial investment to establish new infrastructure, train personnel, and acquire an entirely new fleet. This would replicate much of the Nigerian Navy’s existing capacity and add administrative overhead, all of which would ultimately siphon funds from critical defence priorities. Creating a parallel agency to do what our navy already does, with expertise developed over decades, is not only impractical but fiscally unsound.
Consider the integrated models of Brazil and Indonesia, both of which manage vast maritime territories. Brazil’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) spans approximately 3.5 million square kilometres (just over 1 million square nautical miles), over 12 times the size of Nigeria’s EEZ, which covers around 84,000 square nautical miles; this area is slightly grown in size now because of the adjustments occasioned by the recent extended EEZ approval by UNCLOS. Indonesia’s EEZ is even larger, encompassing roughly 6.2 million square kilometres (about 1.8 million square nautical miles), making it more than 22 times the size of Nigeria’s maritime domain. Despite these extensive territories, both Brazil and Indonesia have chosen integrated naval models, recognising the cost efficiencies and operational advantages of a unified structure. Brazil’s navy, for example, manages not only national defence but also environmental protection and fisheries enforcement, streamlining its response across multiple roles without the financial and operational burden of a separate agency.
Indonesia with its extensive maritime challenges, also faces constant threats from illegal fishing, smuggling, and regional tensions in the South China Sea. Indonesia’s navy has successfully adapted to handle these diverse security needs under a single command, demonstrating that an integrated structure can provide flexibility and efficiency. With an EEZ that is a fraction of the size of either Brazil or Indonesia’s (8.2% and 4.6% respectively), Nigeria can achieve effective maritime security without the added costs and complexity of establishing a new agency.
Our navy has already proven its capacity to address both defence and civilian functions, from anti-piracy missions to environmental enforcement. With targeted investments, Nigeria can strengthen this capacity, creating specialised units within the navy to handle civilian tasks without duplicating infrastructure. Why invest millions in a separate agency when the Nigerian Navy can, and already does, serve both military and civilian needs effectively?
Regional Leadership
Nigeria is not just a nation with vital maritime interests; it is also a regional leader within West Africa. Through ECOWAS, Nigeria has committed to a collective security framework, actively participating in joint anti-piracy missions, intelligence-sharing, and capacity-building exercises with its neighbours. Establishing a separate coastguard, however, risks fragmenting these efforts at a time when Nigeria’s strong, unified navy presence is needed to foster stability and trust in the Gulf of Guinea.
The Gulf of Guinea is one of the world’s most challenging maritime regions, with piracy, smuggling, human trafficking, and illegal fishing threatening both local economies and international shipping routes. Nigeria’s integrated navy model has allowed us to respond decisively to these issues, presenting a single, cohesive force that allies and ECOWAS member states can rely on. A separate coastguard, with a distinct command structure and operational mandate, could slow Nigeria’s response in critical joint operations, adding layers of communication and coordination that undermine our regional partnerships.
Nigerian Navy has long proven its value as a regional security leader. In the 1990s, Nigerian naval forces were instrumental in supporting ECOMOG operations, which helped stabilise multiple West African countries through coordinated military and humanitarian efforts. More recently, Nigeria led a joint anti-piracy task force with the Benin Republic in Cotonou, tackling piracy head-on and demonstrating the power of cross-border security collaboration. These initiatives underscore Nigeria’s commitment to regional security and the trust our neighbours place in us as a stabilising force.
An integrated navy enhances our leadership by maintaining a streamlined, efficient command that ECOWAS partners know they can depend on. With a unified command structure, Nigerian Navy is equipped to participate in joint exercises, intelligence-sharing, and rapid-response operations that bolster security across the Gulf of Guinea. Fragmenting our maritime forces by establishing a separate coastguard would weaken this cohesion, risking communication breakdowns and delays that could prove costly in critical operations.
Beyond operational effectiveness, an integrated navy allows Nigeria to act as a role model for regional security. As the largest economy in West Africa, Nigeria is expected to lead by example. By consolidating our resources within a single navy command structure, we can support ECOWAS’s collective security goals more effectively, projecting a cohesive and capable force that reinforces stability throughout the Gulf of Guinea.
With an integrated navy, Nigeria’s allies and regional partners know that they are dealing with a singular, well-coordinated entity that can be mobilised quickly for both military and civilian purposes. This model strengthens Nigeria’s standing as a unifying force within ECOWAS, ensuring that we remain a reliable partner in securing our shared maritime region against threats that transcend national borders.
Rethinking the Call for a Separate Coastguard
Supporters of a separate coastguard often argue that creating a new agency dedicated to civilian maritime tasks would bring valuable specialisation, improve responsiveness, reduce militarisation, and even save costs. While these points may appear logical on the surface, each argument reveals significant flaws when viewed through the lens of practical experience and strategic insight. An integrated navy remains Nigeria’s best option for effective, unified maritime security. Here’s why:
The Promise of Specialisation in Civilian Roles
Proponents of a separate coastguard suggest that Nigeria’s maritime security would benefit from a dedicated focus on civilian tasks such as fisheries enforcement, environmental protection, and search and rescue, while allowing the navy to concentrate purely on defence. This argument, though reasonable at first glance, overlooks an essential truth that specialisation does not require separation.
Nigeria’s naval forces, within a unified structure, can establish specialised civilian divisions to handle these non-combat tasks, without creating an entirely new agency. Nations like Brazil and Indonesia, each managing far larger maritime areas than Nigeria, have successfully demonstrated this approach. Their integrated navies have dedicated divisions focused on civilian responsibilities thus achieving the advantages of specialisation while avoiding costly redundancies. Within an integrated navy, Nigeria could develop civilian units trained in fisheries enforcement, environmental monitoring, and humanitarian aid, achieving expertise without fragmenting resources or command.
In short, our navy does not need a separate entity to enhance specialisation. Instead, we need focused investments to expand our capabilities within the existing structure, allowing us to benefit from specialisation without the pitfalls of organisational division.
The Assumption of Faster Response to Civilian Incidents
Another common argument suggests that a separate coastguard, focusing exclusively on civilian responsibilities, would respond more swiftly to non-military incidents like oil spills or environmental crises. This assumption, however, overlooks the realities of maritime operations, where responsiveness hinges more on effective communication, coordination, and adaptability than on structural separation.
An integrated navy equipped with multi-role vessels and adaptable units can be just as responsive to civilian incidents as a dedicated coastguard, if not more so. With one cohesive command structure, the navy can mobilise resources swiftly and deploy them where needed without the delays that separate agencies often encounter. In an emergency, be it an oil spill, a piracy threat, or a natural disaster; a single, unified command enables rapid response, while two separate agencies may create bottlenecks as they coordinate across divided responsibilities.
The priority should be to improve response capabilities within the navy through better training and resource allocation. Splitting civilian and military roles could, in fact, slow down our ability to act in critical moments, where seamless communication and immediate action are paramount.
The Desire to Reduce Militarisation of Civilian Engagements
Supporters of a coastguard sometimes argue that civilian functions like fisheries enforcement and environmental protection should be demilitarised, suggesting that a separate coastguard would create a friendlier, more community-focused presence in Nigeria’s waters. While this may seem an appealing prospect, it is entirely achievable within an integrated navy.
Brazil’s navy, for example, conducts environmental protection and fisheries enforcement in a way that prioritises community engagement, demonstrating that non-combat units within an integrated structure can build trust and rapport with local populations. Nigeria’s navy, with dedicated training and community-focused protocols, could perform these civilian tasks sensitively and effectively. By cultivating a skilled, adaptable force, our navy can engage in civilian roles without the intimidating image associated with militarisation.
Creating an entirely new agency is not necessary to humanise civilian functions more so we are trained and equipped with the skills to win hearts and minds. Instead, we can empower specific divisions within the navy to handle these roles thoughtfully and compassionately, all while benefiting from the unity and efficiency of an integrated structure.
The Myth of Cost Savings through a Separate Coastguard
Perhaps the most counterintuitive argument in favour of a separate coastguard is that it would somehow be more cost-effective. Establishing a new agency, with its own fleet, infrastructure, personnel, and operational budget, is a costly undertaking. Each component like administration, training, equipment, and facilities would add significant financial demands, which our security budget is already overstretched to meet.
In countries like Brazil and Indonesia, the decision to maintain an integrated navy is, in part, driven by economic pragmatism. Brazil’s integrated navy manages an EEZ that is over 12 times the size of Nigeria’s, while Indonesia’s maritime responsibilities span waters more than 22 times larger than ours. Both countries face complex security challenges, yet they achieve robust protection of their waters without taking on the additional costs of a separate coastguard. If nations with such vast maritime areas and constrained budgets can manage through integration, why should Nigeria with its comparatively smaller EEZ bear the financial strain of creating a second agency?
Why the U.S. Model Doesn’t Fit Nigeria’s Needs
The Senate’s proposal to establish a separate coastguard appears to draw inspiration from the United States’ approach to maritime security, where the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard operate as distinct entities with separate mandates, substantial budgets, and specific roles within a global security framework. However, applying the U.S. model to Nigeria overlooks fundamental differences in strategic priorities, available resources, and regional obligations. Here’s why Nigeria’s maritime security demands a different approach.
The U.S. model is rooted in geopolitical realities vastly different from those facing Nigeria. The United States, with its global military commitments and vast resources, is uniquely positioned to project power far beyond its shores. The U.S. Navy is designed to secure international sea lanes, deter threats across multiple regions, and respond to crises worldwide. Meanwhile, the U.S. Coast Guard backed by dedicated budget, fleet, and personnel serves primarily as a civilian-oriented force focused on domestic responsibilities, including search and rescue, environmental protection, and coastal law enforcement. This clear division of roles allows the United States to sustain a robust global military presence while managing domestic security through a separate, specialised agency.
Nigeria’s maritime demands are distinct. Our priorities lie in securing the Gulf of Guinea, safeguarding vital economic resources, and maintaining leadership within ECOWAS. The Nigerian Navy operates within a regional scope where versatility, cost-efficiency, and rapid response are paramount. Adopting the U.S. dual-agency model would impose significant financial and operational burdens on Nigeria, without delivering the same strategic advantages.
Nigeria’s path forward must be shaped by our unique context, not by models designed for countries with vastly different geopolitical interests. An integrated navy is the most fiscally responsible choice, allowing Nigeria to focus its resources on improving existing assets and training personnel rather than funding a duplicative structure. This approach ensures that every Naira invested in maritime security has a direct impact on our ability to protect Nigeria’s waters, uphold our commitments within ECOWAS, and safeguard the nation’s economic interests.
Conclusion
As Nigeria contemplates the future of its maritime security, we must make a choice not only grounded in strategic wisdom but also in a commitment to national strength and resilience. Creating a separate coastguard, however well-intended, would introduce division where unity is essential, redundancy where efficiency is paramount, and fragmentation where cohesion is our greatest asset. A split structure would undermine the very objectives it aims to achieve, adding layers of bureaucracy, straining our budget, and diluting our capability to respond to threats with the speed and coordination that only an integrated navy can offer.
Nigerian Navy already possesses the expertise, adaptability, and versatility to handle the dual roles of defence and civilian protection. For decades, our navy has protected our waters, our people, and our resources, proving time and again that it is equal to the task. By investing in this integrated structure and enhancing its capabilities, we build on a foundation of proven success, rather than risking our security on an untested and costly new institution. This is not just a matter of logistics or cost, it is a matter of trust, responsibility, and national pride.
Consider Brazil and Indonesia, two countries with expansive maritime territories, diverse threats, and budgetary constraints not unlike our own. These nations have chosen integration over separation, not just because it is practical, but because it reinforces their sovereignty and regional influence. For Nigeria, whose EEZ is comparatively modest, the case for integration is even stronger. If these nations can secure their waters within a unified navy structure, surely Nigeria can do the same, standing firm on a model that is both fiscally responsible and operationally resilient.
Our path forward should not be to create yet another agency, but to strengthen the cohesive force we already have. An integrated navy does more than protect our borders, it embodies Nigeria’s commitment to unity, our resolve in the face of shared threats, and our leadership within ECOWAS and across West Africa. It allows us to act as one, to respond as one, and to lead as one. The decision to enhance this unified navy is not merely a policy choice; it is a statement of who we are as a nation and what we stand for in the world.
Let us not dilute our strengths by fragmenting our resources. Instead, let us focus on empowering the Nigerian Navy, refining its capabilities, and building a force that embodies the spirit of Nigeria – resilient, united, and strong. An integrated navy is not just a smart, strategic decision; it is the only decision that honours our past successes, meets our present challenges, and safeguards our future as a maritime leader in Africa.
In these times of fiscal constraint and regional instability, we must make choices that reflect wisdom, unity, and strength. By reaffirming our commitment to an integrated navy, we are choosing the path that best serves Nigeria’s national interests, protects our economic future, and reinforces our position as a stabilising force in the Gulf of Guinea. Now is the time to build on our strengths, not to divide them. Let us unite behind a navy that can carry Nigeria forward – secure, cohesive, and ready to meet the challenges of tomorrow. As we say in the Nigerian Navy: Onward Together
• Admiral Ati-John, who retired from the Nigerian Navy September 2017, is CEO Advantec Marine Services Limited