Ukraine’s Use of ATACMS: The Challenge of Russia’s New Nuclear Doctrine and Oreshnik Missile

Bola A. Akinterinwa 

Crises and conflicts exist in international relations because it is always fraught with order and counter-order which often amount to an encounter, and if not quickly and carefully managed, always result in disorder. There is nothing wrong in introducing an order. However, it is when an order is perceived not to be fair or just, or discriminatingly implemented that room for a counter-order arises. A counter-order necessarily raises an encounter which is either peacefully negotiated or resolved by manu militari or by outright use of force. 

For example, the 100-year war in Europe, which actually lasted for about 116 years, considering that the fighting was not continuous, was basically about a rift between the French and English crowns. The war lasted from 1337 to 1453. The main causal factor was that the English King, Edward III, grandson of Phillip IV of France, was denied access to the French throne, and therefore, he opted to retaliate. The denial to the claim of French throne was the order. The retaliation was the counter-order. The discontinuous battles for over a century constituted the encounter. The poor management of the battles led to the disorderly world. 

Additionally, there was also the 30-year old war which was prompted by Emperor Ferdinand II’s decision to compel Protestants to accept Catholicism, especially in light of the weakening power of the Holy Roman Emperor and the need for religious uniformity. It was resisted by the Protestants. Eventually, the conflict culminated into the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia which introduced the state system in international relations. In the same vein, World War 1 and II had the same factors of order and counter orders as dynamics. It is against this background that the deployment of US ARACMS by Ukraine into Russian territory and Russian reprisal of deploying Oreshnik in Dnipro, Ukraine should be explained and understood. 

Ukraine’s Use of ATACMS and Russia

ATACMS means ‘Army Tactical Missile Systems.’ It was a rocket artillery tactical ballistic missile developed in 1991 in the United States. Many countries – Australia, South Korea, Morocco, Greece, Turkey, Poland, Ukraine and United Arab Emirates – have acquired the system. It was designed in 1986 by Ling-Temco-Vought. About 50 ATACMS reportedly had been acquired by Ukraine apparently to be used in self-defence. Eight of the 3,700-pound, precision-guided rockets were launched against Russia’s munitions depot in Bryansk in self-defence against Russian Special Military Intervention in Ukraine. Its use has been largely restricted by the United States until of recent when authorisation of the United States was given by President Joe Biden for its use. The restriction placed on any country in possession of the ATACMS is to ensure cautious use and apparently to prevent unnecessary aggravation of conflict between the United States and Russia, two major nuclear powers.

However, The New York Times had it that President Joe Biden ‘had authorised Ukraine to fire American-made ATACMS at targets inside Russia’ on Tuesday, 19 November 2024. The firing is restricted to Kursk Oblast in Western Russia ‘where an approximately 20,000 strong Ukrainian force is defending a 250-square mile salient against a Russian-led corps with more than 50,000 Russian and North Korean troops. The target of the Tuesday ATACMS raid, the 67th Main Missile and Artillery Directorate Arsenal, is just west of Kursk.’ As told by the CNN, ‘the White House publicly authorised Ukraine, Sunday (17 November) to fire missiles it supplied into Russia proper, which it swiftly did Monday (18 November). Moscow responded by using an experimental medium-range missile, with hypersonic speeds and a multiple warhead system usually reserved for nuclear payloads, to strike Dnipro.’

And true enough, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs admitted that five of the GPS-guided rockets, which were packs of about 1000 grenades-sized bomblets, were shot down. This development has prompted Russian reactions. First, there was a review of the Russian nuclear defence doctrine. Second, Russia hit Ukraine with a new missile nicknamed Oresknit. Third, Russia opted to violate the oil sanctions against North Korea as reportedly revealed by satellite images. Without doubt, the more important aspect is the new nuclear doctrine. 

The new doctrine is that ‘an aggression against Russia by any non-nuclear State, but with the participation or support of a nuclear State’ is ‘a joint attack on Russia.’ This is a new development involving the movement from an attack by one country on another country, compelling a collective defence. Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is one good illustration of this point. Put differently, an attack by a non-member of the NATO is considered an attack on all other members of the NATO, and therefore, requiring collective defence. Several alliances have this type of collective defence provisions.

In the context of the Russian new nuclear doctrine, an attack is not only direct, it can also be by complicity. If a non-nuclear State attacks Russia with the support of a nuclear State, such a support given to the non-nuclear States is considered a direct attack on Russia and this warrants a reciprocal attack on such a supporter. In this context of the use of the ATACMS by Ukraine, Russia not only holds the United States and the United Kingdom responsible for the attack, but also members of the NATO that are particular neighbours of Russia.

What is noteworthy about the reciprocal attack on the supporters of Ukraine is the threat of use of nuclear weapons. Many interesting issues are raised at this juncture. First, there are varying views on the likelihood of use of nuclear arms by Russia. More notable is the view that Russia is only bluffing. As noted by Professor Steve Fetter, a University of Maryland Public Policy expert in nuclear weapons policy and a former White House member of staff, ‘Ukraine’s Firing of United States Long-Range Missiles (is) Unlikely to Prompt Escalation in War.’ 

One major rationale for this thinking is that Russia is on record to have been threatening to use nuclear weapons in self-defence if necessary and in response to the Western support for Ukraine. As further observed by Professor Fetter, ‘some people have concluded that these are all bluffs, and so far, they have been… [T]he revision of their nuclear strategy and the statement that it will be major escalation if Ukraine uses the ATACMS is also probably a bluff.’ 

I was a post-doctoral student at the School of Public Policy, University of Maryland, in 1989. I was part of the US Foreign Policy Process Programme under the management of Professor Marc Destler, and, therefore, I do have a good idea of the seriousness of purpose always attached to policy analysis and conjectures. In other words, Professor Fetter’s analysis of the likely attitudinal disposition of Russian President Putin can be taken as a Russian bluffing. However, it is precisely the seriousness often attached to the non-likelihood of use of nuclear arms that has the great potential to precipitate a nuclear war. A war that is planned should not be confused with a war that is imposed on one.

In this regard, because of the belief, which can be erroneous, that President Putin cannot afford the luxury of engaging in a mutually assured destructive nuclear war. The policy of MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction), which is a principle of deterrence according to which any nuclear attack by one superpower cannot but also warrant a reciprocal overwhelming nuclear counterattack in such a manner that both the initiator of the first attack and the victim would both be annihilated at the end, is the pillar on which Professor Fetter et al is relying. And true, this was a popular doctrine during the first Cold War. The tenability of the MAD doctrine is remote in the second Cold War that is already in the making and that is between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China, on the one hand, and between the United States and Russia, on the other hand.

Consequently, contrarily to the observation of Professor Fetter of the University of Maryland, President Putin can use nuclear weapons and cause more damage to the West than what the West might be able to do in reaction. This is largely a function of the intensity of the first initial nuclear attack. It is useful to learn lessons from the Little Boy and Fat Man atomic bombs used by the United States on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945 during World War II. 

Put differently, when the Japanese launched a surprise military attack on US Pearl Harbour on December 7, 1941 at about 7.55 am local time, which lasted for about one hour,  they did not know that the United States had more than conventional weapons to which the Japanese were used. Possession of atomic weapons by the United States was not known to the world. The strategic calculation of the Japanese was to prevent the United States from entering into World War II on the side of the Allies by destroying the Pearl Harbour. Japan also thought that it would take Americans, at least, six months, before the reconstitution of the harbour and US entry into the war against the Axis Powers (Japan, Germany and Italy.’ And true, the Japanese destroyed the harbour, made it ineffective for war purposes, and delayed US entry into the war. Many cruisers, destroyers and anti-aircraft training ship were damaged. 

Most unfortunately for Japan, the United States had atomic weapons that were waiting for opportunity to be tested and the Japanese miscalculations gave the opportunity to launch the ‘Little Boy’ at about 8.15a.m., on August 6 from a B-29 bomber Enola Gay. It contained 26,000,000 pounds of high explosives. On August 9, 1945 the United States detonated a second atomic bomb, code-named the ‘Fat Man, on Nagasaki. Not less than 100,000 people, mostly civilians, were killed. The very destructive impact of the attacks compelled the surrender of Japan unconditionally to the Allies on August 15, 1945 and thus bringing World War II to an end. Even though the United States is on record to have the best missile technology and having the fastest ones like the Minuteman III Missile and the Trident 2 with a range of 11,000 km at a speed of 13,000 mph, it cannot but be a strategic miscalculation to underrate Russia.

Russian Nuclear Doctrine and Oreshnik Missile

Russia’s new nuclear doctrine should not be simply looked at from the perspective of the Russo-Ukrainian war. It actually has global implications, especially for Africa, a continent of non-nuclear States. The Russian new nuclear doctrine is about attack by non-nuclear countries and active support to them. Russia is at hot war with Ukraine and not with European or African countries directly. The problem here is which countries are considered non-nuclear states?

Grosso modo, it is only the Five Permanent Members (P-5) of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) that are often referred to as the Nuclear Weapons States (NWS). By implication, Ukraine is not a nuclear State. By detonating the ATACMS on Russia means that the Russian new doctrine is referring to Ukraine as a non-nuclear State. More importantly, the United States and its other allies that are giving assistance to Ukraine are also eligible to be attacked by Russia, regardless of whether they are NWS, like France and the United Kingdom, or not. 

In this regard, should Ukraine be considered a nuclear or non-nuclear State by history and possession? Ukraine is on record to have had the world’s third-largest nuclear weapons stockpile, as well as 179 ICBMS (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles) and thermonuclear warheads before accepting to hand all of them over to Russia in a trade-off for Ukrainian identity and independence. By so doing, is Ukraine no longer seen as a nuclear State? 

As noted by the Nuclear Threat Institute (NTI) in Washington, ‘Ukraine had 1,900 Soviet strategic nuclear warheads and between 2,650 and 4,200 Soviet tactical nuclear weapons deployed on its territory at the time of independence in 1991.’ Russia inherited all of them in exchange for Ukrainian independence. Even if Ukraine were still to be in possession of the nuclear weapons, their deployment cannot but still be dependent on Russia’s consent because Russia was, before the independence of Ukraine, in full control of the authorisation, transmission, and codes to launch any nuclear attack.  

The problem now is that, on Thursday, 21 November, 2024, Ukraine was hit by a Russian ICBM missile which killed about 50 people. This shifted the debate from Russia’s likelihood of using nuclear weapons in reaction to Ukraine’s use of ATACMS on Russia. While Ukraine has argued that Russia fired an ICBM on its city of Dnipro, Russia says it was simply a hypersonic ballistic missile that was used as a warning to the Western world. As explained by President Putin, ‘in response to the use of American and British long-range weapons, on November 21 of this year, the Russian armed forces launched a combined strike on one of the facilities of the military-industrial complex of Ukraine.’ 

And more disturbingly, Putin added, ‘in combat conditions, one of the newest Russian medium-range missile systems was tested, among other things, in this case, with a ballistic missile in a nuclear-free hypersonic equipment.’ This is a reflection of a reactive and sharpened escalation of the conflict as the so-called hypersonic ballistic missile was not only fired for the first time since the conflict began in 2022, but also because of Russia’s consideration of the supply of ATACMS, the longest-range missiles by the United States to Ukraine, six of which were launched into Russia. By so doing, Russia believes that the red line had been crossed, meaning that the use of nuclear weapons can no longer be ruled out.

In other words, can Ukraine afford the luxury of engaging in a nuclear confrontation, especially in light of its 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster, a situation that prompted Ukrainians to feel ‘the need to eliminate nuclear weapons’? Besides, Russia has launched its Oreshnik missile which has a speed capacity of Mach 10, or 2.5-3km per second (10 times the speed of sound) and which, in the words of President Putin, ‘there are currently no ways of counteracting this weapon.’ President Putin said the Oreshnik is a ‘new conventional intermediate-range missile,’ meaning a hazel tree in Russian, in the words of Robert Greenall and Chris Partridge of the BBC News. Ukraine does not see it as a conventional intermediate-range missile, but as a new type of ICBM ‘travelling at Mach 11 and took 15 minutes to arrive from the launch site, more than 1,000km (620 miles) away in the Astrakhan region of Russia.’

And perhaps more provocatively, Greenall and Partridge reported further that ‘Western officials were quick to deny this, saying that such a strike would have triggered a nuclear alert in the United States.’ This observation is interesting only to the extent that it is largely predicated on the known old or existing nuclear technology, which under normal circumstance, alerts in the event of an ICBM attack. The truth, however, is that, in the US authorisation and deployment of the US ATACMS, military strategists either did not know about the existence or ignored the possibility of the use of the Oreshnit. Apparently, they do not know about its existence. The use of ATACMS has warranted the launching of the Oreshnik. There is therefore, the need to address the implications and global challenges, especially for Africa.

First, when will the war in Ukraine not precipitate another scourge of World War? The United States is fuelling crises and conflicts everywhere and yet it is supposed to be a major guarantor of global peace and security. For instance, the US has blocked a Gaza ceasefire draft resolution at the UNSC, the fourth time it has used its veto power during the conflict to shield Israel. 14 of the 15 UNSC voted in favour of the draft which says the Gaza war ‘must end immediately, unconditionally and permanently and all remaining hostages must be immediately and unconditionally released.’

Deputy US ambassador to the UN, Robert Wood, said the document ‘abandoned’ the necessity for there to be ‘a linkage between a ceasefire and the release of hostages. As for Israel’s UN ambassador, the resolution ‘was not a path to peace, it was a roadmap to more terror, more suffering and more bloodshed. Many of you attempted to pass this injustice. We thank the US for exercising its veto.’ (Malu Cursino of BBC News, “US vetoes Security Council’s Gaza ceasefire resolution, 21 November, 2024).

United States support is again sustained when President Joe Biden condemned the ICC’s issuing of warrants arrest against Israel officials, including Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu who described the warrant as ‘outrageous.’  Israel’s President says it is ‘a dark day for justice and humanity, saying the decision had chosen the side of terror and evil over democracy and freedom.’ For Netanyahu’s office, the warrant of arrest is ‘an anti-Semitic decision’. Thus with the US vetoing the quest for ceasefire in Gaza and Lebanon, peace in Gaza has been nipped in the bud in spite of the fact that 124 countries are signatories to the ICC Statute. The UK signed it but the US, Russia, China, and Israel did not. The fact that all the 15 members of the UNSC, with the exception of the Unite States voted in favour of the resolution, clearly suggests that the United States is one major obstacle to peace in the Arab world. In essence, the forceful self-projection by European powers in international relations is currently pushing the world into another World War. All the wars dubbed world wars are actually European in character but other countries of the world are brought in through the mainmise of the colonial powers. 

And true enough, Russia is as guilty as the United States in the promotion of global insecurity. In reaction to NATO’s policy of Westernising Ukraine, Russia launched its ‘Special Military Intervention’ in Ukraine in 2022. The intervention has engendered mutual destruction. Russia has not been able to suppress Ukraine with the active support of the West. The support reached its crescendo with the detonation of the American-supplied ATACMS in Russia. Russia responded with its Oreshnit. Nuclear observers now have to admit an unprecedented escalation of the conflict but there is no consensus on whether there can be a Russo-American nuclear war.

And true enough again, former President Donald Trump has made it clear that he is not interested in wars. In fact, in 2019, he pulled the United States out of the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. If he assumes duty on January 20, 2025, will he help to bring about a lasting ceasefire in Ukraine? Besides, on 15 November, 2024, German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz, reached out by telephone to President Putin probably to douse tensions. The telephone put an end to the almost two years of isolation of Russia in European politics. Though many allies frowned at the telephone call, the truth remains that there is fear of a nuclear war, which is currently creating restlessness.

Explained interrogatively, who can accurately predict what Russia has in its arsenal? Who knows whether Russia is prepared to damn the consequences of a nuclear war? What is the meaning of a court giving a death sentence to a suicide bomber taken to court for prosecution, and was sentenced to death? Is it not better to avoid the type of Japanese strategic miscalculation of 1941 by attacking US Pearl harbour? Are the United States and Russia not developing more dangerous weapons that are yet to be tested? After the deployment of the ATACMS and the Oreshnit, will there not be further attacks and counter-attacks? Will Russia not still come back to nuclearize fresh battles against Ukraine or any considered Western enemy? The late President of France, General Charles de Gaulle, said France lost the battle but not the war after WW II. Does the detonation of the ATACMS on Russia imply winning the battles or the war? While the Japanese attack on the Pearl harbour prompted the delayed entry of the United States into World War II, the use of nuclear weapons by Russia has the potential to precipitate a third world war, compelling the use of nuclear arms making US to also become the first and major victim of its nuclear invention. Africa should therefore be more cautious in not serving as a proxy theatre in the making of the nuclear war. This is the challenge that has to be addressed by all African leaders.