Declining Consumer Trends in China: Utter Failure of CCP’ “China Dream”

Cultivating consumerism has served as a key element of China’s Reform Period economic development strategy, and it became the key means of constituting and differentiating the new social classes that emerged in the wake of economic reforms. From fanatical consumption of global luxury brands in the Reform Period to the growth of China’s own indigenous luxury brands in the Xi era, consumption trends reveal status anxieties both within Chinese society and around China’s position in an imagined global developmental hierarchy. Concerns with the quality of Chinese goods, evidenced by food safety scandals and the proliferation of counterfeits, have fed into broader discourses of the “qualities” of the Chinese nation and the moral health of Chinese society.

China’s largest annual online sales event, Double-11, extended its duration this year, starting on October 14, marking the longest Double-11 in history. The extended length of this year’s sales event compared to last year inflates the total sales figures, making direct comparisons less meaningful. While nominal growth is observed, the strongest gains came from products supported by trade-in programs and government-issued cash vouchers, particularly digital electronics, computers and office equipment. These purchases mostly involve high-value, non-recurring items like large home appliances or electronics. While they drive short-term sales, they may not translate into sustainable domestic demand or consistent revenue growth for individual companies.

Chinese cities like Beijing and Shanghai have introduced tax breaks to reduce home purchase costs, helping to stimulate demand in the housing market. Concerns remain about the sustainability of these trends and whether more policies directly supporting welfare and domestic demand will be introduced in 2025. Most of the stimulus measures implemented so far have focused on debt restructuring and supply-side adjustments. Without substantial macroeconomic changes, particularly on the demand side, the CCP-projected “rebound in growth” figures lack a solid foundation for long-term growth. It is evident from close scrutiny that many Chinese urban residents have moved to suburban and even remote rural areas for living, establishing and operating businesses over the past decade.

On 18 Nov 2024, China’s National Bureau of Statistics reported that in Oct 2024, the unemployment rate for 16–24-year-olds was 17.1% (this figure excludes current students and rural populations). After international scrutiny of June 2023’s record 21.3% youth unemployment rate, Beijing successfully diverted attention by revising its calculation criteria in Dec 2023. Or did they? Behind these polished numbers lies a forgotten demographic: the COVID graduating class—a term for college graduates whose education was largely confined to online learning due to lockdowns. They endured the worst college experience, graduating into the worst job market in recent memory, only to face prejudices from recruiters. Some employers perceive them as unsociable, addicted to social media, impatient, and lacking professional skills.

During the “golden September, silver October (金九银十)” job-hunting season, stories emerged of new graduates struggling to secure jobs. While several provincial-level local state media from Sichuan, Yunnan and Zhejiang quickly published op-eds denouncing this growing trend, the effectiveness isn’t guaranteed. Like what happened to age or gender-related workplace discrimination, these recruiters could just learn to bury their discrimination instead of saying out loud. The college graduates are encouraged to take off their scholarly robe, take on blue-collar jobs, and “eat bitterness”. It is under this kind of environment that some of them also feel defeated.

As a reaction to fierce competition and non-stop overwork, a movement of young people started to deliberately reject society’s ideas of success by “lying flat” (躺平 tangping). A recent research study has investigated how the lying-flat movement serves as a barometer for how young adults negotiate their personal development in socially and politically unwanted though not entirely new ways. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has even tamed fandom culture to promote pro-governmental nationalist activism. However, this soft propaganda has often proved to be counterproductive. Metaphors are a powerful rhetorical tool that can shape perceptions, frame political ideologies, and enhance the persuasiveness of communication. Xi’s use of metaphorical language is strategic and multifaceted, serving to connect with the populace on an emotional level while elucidating the CCP’s vision for China’s future. A recent study has examined how politics is culturally constructed, or culturalized, in the official Chinese textbooks for the guiding political doctrine Xi Jinping Thought, the teaching of which has been mandatory in schools and universities since 2021.

Since Xi Jinping became leader of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012, he has promoted the goal of realizing the “China dream,” which centres on the effort to sustain rapid economic growth so that China can join or even surpass the rich countries of the world. Given the slowing of economic growth even before the 2020 coronavirus epidemic, debate has arisen about whether China can achieve this ambitious goal.

However, Xi’s China Dream has become overshadowed by a series of nightmares: The Covid-19 pandemic; the Ukrainian leg of Xi’s OBOR (aka BRI) in ruins; and prolonged internal lockdowns entailing public demonstrations demanding Xi’s resignation. Much scholarship and global media have examined the official China Dream, yet few studies have analysed China’s nightmares. A recent research study shed light China’s contemporary vernacular culture in the digital age and its visual art narratives on the theme of the China Dream and its nightmares, experimenting with direct and indirect strategies to critique the regime. China’s dramatic and surprising acceleration of economic growth in the decades after 1978 was driven by circumstances and forces that no longer work in China’s favour, and that the nation now faces several serious problems that could make realization of Xi’s China dream problematic.

By positioning itself as the inheritor of China’s cultural heritage and reminding the public of its revolutionary successes against imperial and feudal oppressors, the CCP thus puts forward an emphatic argument that it is the only vessel capable of achieving the China Dream. From Halloween to riding bikes, the seemingly mundane things in China are being put to an end because the CCP officials are highly paranoid about anything that would stir up collective emotions — like what white-paper movement did in late 2022. This is making China increasingly like a high-pressure cooker. And the opposite side of the coin is non-incidental accidents that, unfortunately, may continue to happen. Thus, the declining consumer trends in China subtly reflect the mood of the nation, revealing the sheer fiasco of the CCP in realising Xi’s China Dream.

By Chandu Doddi, a PhD Candidate (Junior Research Fellow) in Chinese Studies at the Centre for East Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University (New Delhi, India).