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Germany and Nigeria: The 2024 German President’s Visit and Nigeria’s Diplomacy of 4-Ds
Bola A. Akinterinwa
Vsit is a critical instrument of bilateral diplomacy and inter-personal relationships. At the level of the inter-personal relationships, it compels the host individuals to clean up the house and make it quite presentable. Entertainment becomes a priority on the reception agenda. In fact, more often than not, the best of the best food is generally reserved for the visiting guest. This is the African tradition.
At the international level, it is generally more interesting. When foreign leaders are expected, preparations for the visit often begin from where he or she should be accommodated, especially bearing in mind the status. The airport reception is also articulated, particularly determining the level of the public official to receive him or her. The issue of who should receive the visiting leader is a resultant of many factors: reciprocal treatment; status of the relationship in terms of whether the visit is official, unofficial, working, officious, or state; self-esteem or holier-than-thou or superior-than-thou mentality of the receiving state, mutual regard, and nature of the visit, etc.
During the time of the French Community as established under the French Fifth Republic in 1958, Francophone African leaders like Félix Houphouët-Boigny of the Côte d’Ivoire and Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal were normally received at the airport by the French President. All others were received by assigned Ministers to receive them at the airport and would later be received at the Elysée, the presidential palace. It is against this background that we begin the analysis of the Germano-Nigerian relations as a prolegomena to the visit of the German President, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, to Nigeria.
Germano-Nigerian Relations
Nigeria’s bilateral relationship with Germany is maintained at the ambassadorial level, with Nigeria maintaining its diplomatic mission in Berlin and its Consulate General in Frankfurt. German Embassy in Nigeria is located in Abuja while its Consulate General is in Lagos. The location of diplomatic mission in the political capital of every sovereign State is as required by international diplomatic law and practice.
In general practice, embassies are located in the political capital majorly because of nearness to the seat of Government of the host country. This facilitates the performance of the representational and national interest duties of diplomatic missions. When, for instance, embassies are located in the political capital, it might be because the seat of government is not in the capital city, or the diplomatic relationship is not of significance, or because of funding, and thus requiring finding a place in the suburbs of the capital city. In the context of Germany and Nigeria, they have always had their embassies in their political capitals. German Embassy used to be in Victoria Island in Lagos before the capital was moved to Abuja on 12 December, 1991 under General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida. In the same vein, following the reunification of West and East Germany on 3 October 1990 and the reinstatement of Berlin as the capital city of united Germany, Nigeria established her mission in Berlin. Both countries simply turned their former embassies in Lagos to consulates-general.
Germano-Nigerian relations cover cooperation in different areas: cultural, trade, technical and technological. At the cultural level, for instance, in 2021, the German Minister of Culture, announced that his country would be returning hundreds of art objects that were ill-gotten from the Benin royal palace to Nigeria. About 83000 Nigerians live in Germany as at 2021 and were reported to ‘have very high rates of employment in Germany among immigrants, second to the Pakistanis. Nigerians live mainly in Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg, Hanover, and Munich, Cologne, Frankfurt, Stuttgart, in all of which more than one thousand Nigerians live. In fact, most Nigerians reside in the Rhein-Ruhr, Berlin, Köln-Bonn, Rhein-Main, and Hanover-Braunschweig regions of Germany. If most Nigerians are gainfully employed in Germany, it not only reflects their competencies, but also why the ‘japa syndrome’ cannot but continue in the foreseeable future.
At the level of economic ties, especially commercial exchanges, the German Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development, Ms. Svenja Schulze, paid a courtesy visit to the Permanent Secretary of the Federal Ministry of Budget and National Planning, Mr Nebolisa Anako. During the visit, Mr Anako noted that Nigeria-German mutual commitment ‘is a testament to the strength of the Nigerian-German development cooperation, paving the way for achieving our shared objectives.’ He noted further Nigeria’s satisfaction with Germany’s priority areas of support with Nigeria’s National Development Plan (NDP) 2021-2025. This confluence of interests underscores the depth of their relationships.’ In reaction, Ms Schulze underscored the enduring ‘good relationship’ between the two countries and the purpose of her visit which was to ‘discuss new partnerships in light of the dynamics and regional security threats, and to strengthen their bilateral relations.
In terms of trade, Nigeria’s exports are mainly crude oil ($2.14bn), cocoa butter ($39.1 m), and nitrogenous fertilizer ($35.4m) while the exports have increased at an annualised rate of 5.76% since 2020. As shown by the records of the OEC.world, ‘in 2017, Germany exported to Nigeria goods worth $1.246bn. The main products exported from Germany to Nigeria were wheat ($142m; washing and bottling machines ($53m); and cars ($48.3m). During the last five years, the exports of Germany to Nigeria have decreased at an annualised rate of 0.57% from 1.28bn in 2022 to $1.24bn in 2017. Explained differently, could it be that Nigeria is exporting more to Germany or that Germany is not buying more from Nigeria? Whatever is the case, what is the rationale for the situation?
There is also the problem of declining need for oil and gas and the politics of clean energy. The German State Secretary and Special Envoy for International Climate Action, Mrs Jennifer Morgan, paid a three-day visit to Nigeria in May 2024. In her lecture delivered at the University of Lagos, the objective of the visit was made clear: gain deeper insight into the energy transition scene in the country, as well as advocate for collective efforts to promote cleaner and more sustainable energy.
As explained by Mrs Morgan, ‘we are experiencing multiple crises at once – debt, development, energy, climate and food security. At the same time, we are also in the middle of a global economic transformation. This new kind of economy aims at inclusive growth, energy security and universal access to clean and affordable energy. It is increasingly based on renewable energies such as solar, wind and green hydrogen.’ In fact, she added, ‘these are the sectors, where the jobs of now are growing and the jobs of the future can be found.’
In essence, Mrs Morgan came to warn Nigeria about the dangers of transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy and about the problem of global climate crisis which can engender extreme heat waves, flooding and poor air quality, as well as cause food insecurity. She wanted Nigeria to take advantage of the benefits that exist for Nigeria in the global energy transition. It is against this background that the visit of the German president’s visit to Nigeria and to other African countries should be understood. The issue of energy, its opportunities and challenges are a major feature in the various discussions of the German leader.
The German President’s Visit
The visit of the German President, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, was state in design, meaning that it is at the crescendo of the continuum of visits. In the words of PBAT, the visit ‘is a significant milestone.’ It was a return visit or a follow-up to PBAT’s own visit to Germany. The cardinal purpose not only reflects the projection of Nigeria’s diplomacy of the 4-Ds (Development, Democracy, Demography, and Diaspora), but also the fostering of the principle of interdependence in international diplomacy.
In terms of the focal application of the diplomacy of the 4-Ds, it is mainly divided into two: tactical and strategic. The ultimate focus is sustainable development in various ramifications. This is the strategic focus, which is enabled by the other three Ds serving as the tactical tools. As tactics, they witness changes while the ultimate objective of sustainable development remains constant.
Without whiff of doubt, the PBAT administration is much aware that the current globalising world has been insisting on democratic governance since the Franco-African Summit of 20 June, 1990 held in La Baule, a coastal resort in the Southern Brittany of France. At the summit, then French President, François Mitterrand, made democratisation a conditionality for the grant of development aid to developing countries. It is against this background that in the restructuring of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union, emphasis is generally placed on the promotion of good governance and democracy.
For instance, the African Governance Architecture (AGA) was put in place in 2011 as a platform for dialogue between and among all stakeholders with the mandate to promote good governance and democracy as required by the AU Constitutive Act and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and governance (ACDEG). Besides, there is also the Africa Facility to Support Inclusive Transitions (AFSIT), an initiative by the AU and the UNDP to promote democracy governance, peace, and security.
And perhaps more notably is the provision (Chapter 22) of the African Charter of Human and People’s Rights which has prompted the ECOWAS zero tolerance for unconstitutional change of government. Christopher Nyinevi and Richard Fosu noted in March 2023 in their article (The African Union’s Prohibition of Unconstitutional Changes of Government: An Uneasy Choice between Fidelity to Principle and Pragmatism) differentiated between three types of unconstitutional change of government.
The first is coups d’états, coupled with other violent changes of democratically-elected governments. The second covers the refusal of an incumbent government to hand over power following loss of election or prolonging its tenure; and the constitutional manipulations to win. Nyinevi and Fosu said ‘apart from cases of coup d’état and other violent overthrows of government, the AU has not been consistent with its application of the sanction regime.’ This is an observation that the PBAT administration is much conscious of and therefore trying to tell the world that Nigeria is a country and people of democracy. This is how the adoption of democracy as a constituent pillar of Nigeria’s foreign policy has become a desideratum.
Demography and the Diaspora naturally go pari passu, that is, hand-in-hand as they constitute the two sides of the same development coin. Development is, at best, meaningless without the people as catalytic agents. The people with a multi-dimensional and experiential background and wrapped up with globally-sought professional expertise, cannot but be well capitalised upon in every development calculation. Nigeria does not simply have the biggest population, but particularly also has the largest area of arable land in Africa.
Put differently, Nigeria’s foreign policy strategic calculations is to use Nigeria’s big population, big arable land to endear the very vibrant Nigerians in Diaspora to invest in Nigeria’s future. Inflow of funds from the Nigerians in Diaspora has been about $25 billion in the average in the past one decade. While the Nigerians in Diaspora are helping with funding, the development partners of Nigeria, like the Federal Republic of Germany, are expected to assist in the area of technology infrastructure investment in order to stimulate the economy in various ramifications
PBAT summarised the essence of his 4-Ds diplomacy thus: ‘Nigeria is going through a transformative period and trying to align with the best strategy and practices on good governance globally.’ More importantly, PBAT had it that ‘we like our relationship with you (Germany) as friends and partners. Germany is well-industrialised and renowned for its sustainable infrastructure.’ It was partly because of this PBAT’s conviction that he said ‘Nigeria is ready and open for business, since the German President himself has indicated his country’s readiness to further support Nigeria in the energy sector. PBAT put it succinctly thus: ‘in alternative energy, we have the sun, and you have the technology. We should continue our partnership in every way we can.’ And to a great extent, PBAT tried to insist on this factor in many aspects of his discussion during the visit.
As regards regional cooperation, his discussion with his German counterpart was quite interesting. PBAT told him that he would work towards the return of the ASS countries with wisdom and diplomacy which will make the difference in re-integrating them into the Commission. As PBAT put it, ‘our relationship of mutual respect will continue as we reappraise the situation in the three countries. What I can assure is that we will not give tolerance to unconstitutional government.’
Additionally, he said that ‘we will continue to lead by example. We have innocent citizens who are victims of the military. We will continue to explore diplomatic channels to navigate without punishing the innocent people. We will continue to allow free movement and trade. Though the transition programme is not sure or certain, we will not punish innocent citizens; they are not in possession of power.’
Most importantly, PBAT also said that ‘this is what ECOWAS will stand for.
Whatever is happening in the countries, we are mindful of the wellbeing of the citizen. I don’t want to personalise issues as ECOWAS Chairman. We will leave the door for collaboration.’ Two points are noteworthy in PBAT’s statement. First, he said that ‘we will not give tolerance to unconstitutional government.’ What is the current implication of the zero tolerance for unconstitutional change of government? It is the withdrawal of those accused of engagement in unconstitutional change of government. This is a reflection of the limitation of the supranational authority of the ECOWAS.
On the second factor, PBAT said ‘we will continue to lead by example. We have innocent citizens who are victims of the military. We will continue to explore diplomatic channels to navigate without punishing the innocent people. We will continue to allow free movement and trade.’ Again, PBAT easily forgets that the people he is seeking to protect are the very people giving active support to the military junta. By implication, the use of diplomacy in the sense of government-to-government is not what is required but more of citizen diplomacy which can compel the military junta to review or reconcile its position along the position of the three peoples in the ASS countries.
The German President’s response to the issue of regional integration also lends credence to our point. As President Steinmeier put it, ‘we will talk bilateral and regional issues. We just had a meeting with the President of ECOWAS Commission. We know how important it is to have regional cooperation. We are a part of the European Union. For Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, there are serious security and economic consequences for not carrying on together. We understand why ECOWAS security members are insisting on diplomacy. It is not easy but you will need to use your diplomacy to keep the Commission and the region together.’ And perhaps more interestingly, the German leader said ‘while you are using diplomatic means to bring Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso to rethink their position, you should have emergency plans in place for future economic cooperation.’
Again, three points are noteworthy in this statement: the need to use diplomacy to keep the Commission and the region together; using diplomatic means to bring Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso to rethink their position; and having emergency plans in place for future economic cooperation. In this regard, the German leader is simply saying that it may not be sufficient defending zero tolerance for unconstitutional change of government but what will be sufficient cannot but include also ensuring unity of purpose. The need to have emergency plans is ambiguous: is it for the ASS countries as a body or as individual Member States? Is the emergency plan applicable after they might have returned to the ECOWAS? Is it an inducement to bring them back?
What is more critical to address in this case is the implication of Nigeria’s rapprochement with France which raises the problematic of how Nigeria’s pan-African stance will not be tainted by a Franco-Nigerian alliance against Nigeria’s immediate neighbours. In other words, can PBAT afford to evolve a Franco-Nigerian entente cordiale to kill the Nigerian people, bearing in mind the fact that the Nigero-Nigerian border communities are of the same ethnic stock.
Without whiff of doubt, the policy of zero tolerance to unconstitutional change of government should be with a dint of caution and sagacity. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger are no longer acting severally but as another body corporate like the ECOWAS. No matter the diplomacy and Solomonic wisdom that PBAT may want to deploy to bring the ASS countries back to the ECOWAS, it can no longer be on the basis of one-by-one. To expect their return to the ECOWAS as individual sovereign states is a myth. The perception of the ECOWAS as an instrument in the hands of the European powers and the anti-French policy of the people-supported military junta in the ASS countries necessarily make their return to the ECOWAS quite difficult. ECOWAS should begin to reckon with Senegal as a Member of both the ASS and the ECOWAS. Ditto for the ASS countries which naturally constitute a sub-region of the West Africa region in consonance with the provision of Article 1(e) of the 1991 Abuja Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community. What is left as a viable option for PBAT is to negotiate with the AES or ASS as a body corporate. Negotiations by the ECOWAS as a regional organisation and the ASS as a sub-regional organisation to which Senegal has the potential to also join in the foreseeable future, without ignoring Chad in the Central Africa region, serves the purpose of fast-tracking continental integration which is the main purpose of re-dividing Africa into five regions.