Disciplinary Injunction’: Considering the Suspension of Senator Akpoti-Uduaghan from the Senate

This article by Sylvester Udemezue isn’t a commentary about the merit of the accusations by, or actions of the Senate leadership against Senator Natasha Akpoti-Uduaghan, nor about the propriety or legality of Senate’s power of discipline against its members, nor about the allegations by Senator Natasha Akpoti-Uduaghan against the Senate President, but a focus on examining the extent of legal propriety and validity (if any) of the proceedings and procedural steps leading to suspension of Senator Natasha Akpoti-Uduaghan on March 6, 2025

This article by Sylvester Udemezue isn’t a commentary aboºut the merit of the accusations by, or actions of the Senate leadership against Senator Natasha Akpoti-Uduaghan, nor about the propriety or legality of Senate’s power of discipline against its members, nor about the allegations by Senator Natasha Akpoti-Uduaghan against the Senate President, but a focus on examining the extent of legal propriety and validity (if any) of the proceedings and procedural steps leading to suspension of Senator Natasha Akpoti-Uduaghan on March 6, 2025

Background

Dissatisfied with the Senate resolution to refer her to the Senate’s Disciplinary Committee, Senator Akpoti-Uduaghan had proceeded to Court to seek redress in Suit No. FHC/ABJ/CS/384/2025. On 05 March, 2025, the Federal High Court issued an interim injunction restraining the Senate from conducting disciplinary proceedings against Senator Natasha Akpoti-Uduaghan, following an altercation with Senate President Part Godswill Akpabio on February 20, 2025. According to the document, the Kogi Senator prayed that the court grant an order restraining the Senate and its Ethics Committee from ‘proceeding with the purported investigation’ against her. Akpoti-Uduaghan asked the court to grant an order ‘declaring that any action taken during the pendency of this suit is null, void, and of no effect whatsoever’. The Kogi Senator also prayed for a court order allowing the Defendants to be served with the originating summons and other related documents through substituted means. ‘An order of this honourable court granting an Interim Injunction restraining the 2nd Defendant/Defendant’s Committee on Ethics, Privileges and Code of Conduct headed by the 4th Defendant from proceeding with the purported investigation against the Plaintiff/Applicant for alleged misconduct sequel to the events that occurred at the plenary of the 2nd Defendant on the 20th day of February, 2025, pursuant to the referral by the 2nd Defendant on 25th February, 2025 pending the hearing and determination of the Motion on Notice for Interlocutory Injunction’, a part of the application read. In his decision, the trial Judge, Justice Egwuatu ruled that the Defendants should come and show cause within 72 hours, upon the service of the order, why an interlocutory injunction should not be issued against them. Justice Egwuatu granted the prayer that the Defendants should be served by substituted means. The Judge adjourned the case to March 10, 2025, for the Defendants to show why the Applicant’s reliefs should not be granted.

Professor Ali Ahmad

However, Professor of Law and former Speaker of the Kwara State House of Assembly, Ali Ahmad, faulted the interim injunction from courts stopping the National Assembly from performing its constitutional function. In a chat with Daily Trust in Lagos shortly after the injunction, Prof Ahmad said:

“It is unfortunate that the court has just issued an interim order, stopping the Senate from performing its constitutional function. This is an aberration. Sections 4,5,6 of the Constitution grants each of the arms of government its distinct powers, adding, It’s wrong for an arm of government to purport to stop another arm from exercising its constitutionally donated powers, it cannot do that. When a court stops the Senate from performing its constitutionally guaranteed powers, it’s not done anywhere, it’s just like the assembly and the executive passing a law and assenting to the law, to say that the court cannot pass the judgement, that it is unconstitutional, or National Assembly passing a resolution that the President cannot sign a budget or cannot present a budget. These are presidential executive powers. Judicial powers, nobody can stop the Judiciary, legislative powers of investigation under Section 88, no court in the land can stop them. So, if a court is now issuing an interim order to stop the ethics and privileges committee, I’m not saying what the Senate President did is good or not, I’m concerned about the powers of the legislature. This has gone far, for too long. There have been several judgements, even in the Appeal Court, saying procedurally, no court can stop the National Assembly from performing its legislative, investigative function especially in this matter when the investigation centres on another Senator. Our courts should be mindful of granting interim orders. It is an abuse of the judicial powers, and it should stop. That is my honest opinion. Look at the Diezani (former Petroleum Minister) cases, the Senate wanted to investigate but she would rush to court for interim orders which are all unconstitutional, stopping the Senate, the National Assembly from performing its constitutionally mandated functions. We have said it, but the courts continue to do that. Something should be done. No interim order can stop the National Assembly from performing its constitutionally mandated power in Section 4. Judiciary purports to use its power under Section 6. Section 6 is not above Section 4, neither are both sections above Section 5. Sections 4, 5 and 6 are on the same plain.” [See: *”Natasha: It’s an aberration for courts to stop Senate from performing its duty – Ex-Kwara Speaker”*; 06 March 2025; Daily Trust]

Questions and Answers

One question arising from Prof Ali Ahmad’s suggestions, is whether the Senate is entitled to disobey or flagrantly flout an order of a court of law, on the ground that the Senate believes that “no court can stop the National Assembly from performing its legislative, investigative function, especially in this matter when the investigation centres on another Senator”, or because the Senate thinks that “It’s wrong for an arm of government to purport to stop another arm from exercising its constitutionally donated powers?” The second question arising, is this: What is the proper course of conduct on the part of the Senate, whenever the Senate feels that a court of law has improperly issued a restraining order against the Senate? 

With due respect, while I agree that “it’s wrong for an arm of government to purport to stop another arm from exercising its constitutionally donated powers”, I respectfully submit that the Senate of the Federal Republic is not entitled, nor at liberty to disobey any order of a court of law, however perverse or wrong or improper the Senate thinks the order is. Disobedience of a court order is an act of grave contempt against the institution of administration of justice, and an affront against the rule of law. The right step open to the Senate where it believes that a restraining order has been improperly made by a court against the Senate, is to take necessary legal steps to have such a restraining order set aside or otherwise vacated. Until the order is set aside or vacated, the Senate and every person or institution against whom the order is made, are bound by the order and must obey the order. 

The rule of law demands that all orders issued by a competent court, unless and until set aside, overruled or otherwise repealed, must be obeyed to the letter. It’s immaterial that anyone or group thinks the order(s) is valid, invalid, or whatever. Ogundare, JSC, in Rossek v.A.C.B. Ltd. (1993) 8 NWLR (Pt. 312) 382 at Pg. 434-435 said: “A party, who knows of an order, whether null or valid, regular or irregular cannot be permitted to disobey it….. It would be most dangerous to hold that the suitors, or their solicitors, could themselves Judge whether an order was null or valid – whether it was regular or irregular…. As long as it existed, it must not be disobeyed”. This view was earlier stated by Romer L.J in Hadkinson v Hadkinson (1952) 2 All ER 567 where he observed that “It is the plain and unqualified obligation of every person against, or in respect of whom an order is made by a court of competent jurisdiction, to obey it unless and until that order is discharged. The uncompromising nature of this obligation is shown by the fact that, it extends even to cases where the person affected by an order believes it to be irregular or even void…. If that Court never had jurisdiction in the matter, then its decision is, without jurisdiction, void, but, then should a court of law not even decide the point? That is, the court without jurisdiction decided without jurisdiction? Should the decision be ignored? Surely, it would not make for peace and finality which a decision of a court seeks to attain. It would at least be against public policy for persons, without the backing of the court, to pronounce a court decision a nullity, act in breach of the decision, whereas others may set out to obey it. In my respectful view it is not only desirable but necessary to have such decisions set aside first by another court, before any act is built upon it despite the colourful dictum of the law Lord in U.A.C. v Macfoy (Supra).” Generally, therefore, orders of a competent Court must be obeyed as long as they subsist, if the authority and administration of the Court are not to be brought into disrepute, scorn or disrespect. They remain binding on parties thereto until set aside by a superior court of competent jurisdiction, or declared null and void. Thus, once a party knows of the subsistence of an order of Court, whether valid or not and whether regular or irregular or even perverse, he is obliged to obey it. It is therefore, submitted that the Senate has no right or power to disobey any order of a court of law, on the ground that the court has no power to stop performance of Senate’s constitutional responsibility. 

Again, even where No express restraining order has been issued, the rule of law and the doctrine of Lis Pendens require that a party who is aware of a pending application seeking injunctive reliefs against the party, is no longer entitled to take any further steps that could frustrate the pending matter or alter the status quo. Temitope Onabanjo wrote on DNLLEGALANDSTYLE, and I agree, as follows: “The meaning of lis pendens is – ‘a pending legal action’, wherein Lis means the ‘suit’ and Pendens means ‘continuing or pending’. The doctrine has been derived from a latin maxim ‘Ut pendent nihil innovetur’ which means that during litigation nothing should be changed”. Gbenga Ojo wrote: “Lis pendens denotes those principles and rules of law which define and limit the operation of the common law maxim, to the effect that nothing relating to the subject-matter of a suit can be changed while the suit is pending”. [See: ”Defining the Scope and Limit of the Doctrine of Lis Pendens: Need for a Restatement of Principles” by Gbenga Ojo published in The Gravitas Review of Business & Property Law, Vol.6 No.3 (Sept 2015)]. The implication of the aforesaid, in the instant case, is that No arm or organ of the Senate was entitled to take any further steps in respect of the suit pending against the Senate, unless and until the final determination thereof. 

In Akiboye v Adeko (2011) 6 NWLR (Part 1244) 415, the Court of Appeal stated that the doctrine of lis pendens had evolved for the purpose of preventing one party from fraudulently seeking to overreach the decision of the court. However, for the doctrine to apply, the following mandatory conditions must be fulfilled: (I) That at the time of taking the action complained of, the suit regarding the dispute/subject was already pending. The doctrine of Lis Pendens will apply, only if the action was taken after the matter was already brought before the court. In this instance, did the suspension of Senator Natasha Akpoti-Uduaghan happen during the pendency of the suit instituted by her against the Senate? (II) That the other party had been served with the originating processes in the pending action. Had the Senate been served with the court processes, as of the time the Senate suspended Senator Akpoti-Uduaghan? (III) That the action complained of relates to the subject of the dispute, and is capable of overreaching the decision of the court in the suit. Does the subject-matter of the matter that led to her suspension relate to or connected to the pending lawsuit? It’s respectfully submitted that, by virtue of the fact that the Senate itself and the Ethics Committee are parties to the pending lawsuit, the Senate and all its organs and arms were bound by both lis pendens and any outcome and legal implications or effects of the pending suit, even if the Court had not made any restraining order yet. In Military Government of Lagos State v Emeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu (1986) 1 NWLR (Pt.18) 621, the Supreme Court stated as follows: “After a Defendant has been notified with the pendency of a suit seeking an injunction against him, even though a temporary injunction be not granted, he (the Defendant) acts at his own peril, and subject to the power of the court to restore the status wholly irrespective of the merits as may be ultimately decided…. They [parties] have no right to take the matter into their own hands once the court was seised of it”. In the United States of America case of Porter v Lee, 328 U.S. 246 at Page 251, 66 S.Ct. 1096, at Page 1099, 90 L. Ed. 1199, the court had declared that ‘where a Defendant with notice in an injunction proceeding completes the acts sought to be enjoined, the court may by mandatory injunction restore the status quo’. In the case of Bello v AG of Lagos State (2007) 2 NWLR (Pt.1017) Pg.115, while the matter was still pending in court, the Appellant did a publication in a newspaper in respect of the subject-matter of the suit, the lower court held that the Appellant (as Appellant/Plaintiff in the court below) was in contempt of court. The Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the lower court. In Peter Obi v INEC (SC No:2) [2007] Vol. 9 M.J.S.C 1, the Supreme Court said: “As at 14th April, 2007 when the 1st Respondent (INEC) was conducting gubernatorial election in Anambra State, the seat of the Governor of that State was not vacant. That election was a wasteful and unnecessary exercise. The 1st Respondent (INEC) was aware at that time that, the Appellant was in court pursuing his legal rights. A body that has respect for the rule of law, which the INEC ought to be, would have waited for the outcome of the court proceedings; particularly when it was aware of it”.

At this juncture, the question must be asked, Was the Senate Aware of the Pending Lawsuit, filed by Senator Akpoti-Uduaghan? I think the answer is Yes; the Senate was fully aware of the restraining order made against it on March 5 by the Federal High Court. A 05 March 2025 report by BusinessDay Newspaper, published under the heading, *”Natasha’s Sexual Harassment Petition dead on arrival – Senate”,* had it that “The Senate has declared that the sexual harassment petition filed by Senator Natasha Akpoti-Uduaghan against Senate President Godswill Akpabio is ‘dead on arrival’ on two grounds as disclosed by Neda Imasuen, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Ethics, Privileges, and Public Petitions:

Ground One: The Petition contravened Senate Rules as the petition was signed by Akpoti-Uduaghan herself. Senator Neda Imasuen cited Order 40(4), which prohibits Senators from presenting petitions signed by themselves, adding “No Senator may present to the Senate a petition signed by him or herself. That petition ought to have been presented by another Senator. That was not done, which is a direct contravention of our Rule Book”.

Ground Two: Senator Neda Imasuen explained that “The allegations contained in the petition were already before a Court. That petition, for what you read on the floor and for what I’ve seen, is making some allegations that are already in court. It is the procedure of this Committee that when a petition is before any law court, we do not touch such petitions”. Acknowledging that he had been served with legal documents from M.J. Numa and Partners, warning the Senate against intervening in the matter, Senator Neda Imasuen, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Ethics, Privileges, and Public Petitions, stated further: “They have presented to me a motion and a rule order from the court, attempting to stop this Committee from doing its work. This is unacceptable. We should actually let the world know that, there is what they call separation of powers in our Constitution”.

Two interesting facts emerge from Senator Neda Imasuen’s statements, above: (1). The Senator had been served with the Court processes in the case filed by Senator Natasha Akpoti-Uduaghan; hence the Senate was fully aware of the pendency of the lawsuit. (2) As of 05 March 2025, the Senate had been served with a copy of the Federal High Court injunction restraining the Senate, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Ethics, Privileges, and Public Petitions and the Committee Chairman, from proceeding with the disciplinary proceedings against Senator Natasha Akpoti-Uduagha; hence, the Senate was fully aware of the restraining injunction against the Senate. 

There’s a third, and even much more interesting takeaway from Senator Neda Imasuen’s statement; *”It is the procedure of this Committee that when a petition is before any law court, we do not touch such petitions”.* This, in effect, means judging by Senator Neda Imasuen’s own confessions, that the Senate Committee on Ethics, Privileges, and Public Petitions does not deal with any petition touching on any matter before a Court of law. Now look at these two scenarios:

Scenario One: Senator Natasha Akpoti-Uduaghan brought a Petition against the Senate President which petition was referred to the Senate Committee on Ethics, Privileges, and Public Petitions. The Committee dismissed the petition as “dead on arrival”, on grounds that “It is the procedure of this Committee that when a petition is before any law court, we do not touch such petitions”.

Scenario Two: However, when the Senate passed a resolution bringing a complaint/petition against Senator Natasha Akpoti-Uduaghan which petition was then referred to the Senate Committee on Ethics, Privileges, and Public Petitions, the Committee proceeded to deal with the petition, and recommended Senator Natasha Akpoti-Uduaghan’s suspension which was immediately approved by the Senate vide a resolution passed on 06 March, 2025. All this notwithstanding that the subject-matter of the complaint against Senator Natasha Akpoti-Uduaghan was pending in court, and notwithstanding that there was even a restraining order of court against both the Senate and the Committee, which order had been duly served on the Senate and on the Committee. 

Different strokes for similar situations; a convenient adherence to Lis Pendens; a lopsided respect for the rule of law; and a clear violation of Quod Approbo Non Reprobo, the Latin legal maxim which means “that which I approve, I cannot disapprove”, and it translates to the legal doctrine of “cannot approbate and reprobate at the same time”, meaning once you’ve chosen a course of action or position, you cannot later contradict it to gain an undue advantage. The doctrine signifies that after a person has asserted or acknowledged a particular stand or position, they cannot later choose a different one to gain benefit from both. In the present case, the Senate wouldn’t deal with Natasha’s petition because it’s about a matter that’s pending in court, but, would readily deal with the complaint against Natasha even when it’s about a matter also pending in court and in respect of which there’s even a pending restraining order against the Senate, duly served on the Senate.

The Senate was deliberate about its decision to flout the Court order. Despite the court’s order for the Senate Committee halt its investigation into a petition against Senator Akpoti-Uduaghan, the Committee proceeded with deliberations on the matter. It was reported that the Chairman of the Senate Committee who acknowledged the court’s enrolment order, said the Committee would not defer to the directive, insisting that no court has the power to interfere in the internal affairs of Parliament. He was reported to have said: “There is a separation of powers. As parliamentarians, we know what our Rules say. What we do here, isn’t subject to any court. The issue before us, is alleged misconduct on the floor of the Senate. It isn’t subject to any court”.

On 06 March 2025, despite the court injunction, Senator Natasha Akpoti-Uduaghan was suspended for six months. The Senate also resolved to suspend Mrs Apoti-Uduagan’s salary and allowances while all her security aides would be withdrawn during the suspension period. The Senate suspended her for six months over alleged misconduct and refusal to comply with the Chamber’s sitting arrangement during the plenary session on 20 February, and resolved that if Senator Akpoti-Uduaghan submits a written apology, the leadership of the chamber may consider lifting the suspension before the six-month period expires. The Senate President, Godswill Akpabio, announced the suspension of Senator Akpoti-Uduaghan after it was supported in a voice vote by a majority of Senators during the plenary. The controversy began when Senator Akpoti-Uduaghan refused to occupy her new seat because it was done without her consent, insisting that the action violated her privileges.

Faith of Senate’s Resolution Suspending Senator Natasha Akpoti-Uduaghan

From the legal principles and authorities discussed above, it’s my respectful opinion that the Senate resolution suspending Senator Natasha Akpoti-Uduaghan may not survive the test of the rule of law. As a preview of the fate probably awaiting such a resolution, let me refer to two past but similar scenarios of flagrant disobedience of a court order, where the Court granted what I prefer to call Disciplinary Injunction to reverse preemptive actions taken by one of the parties during the pendency of a lawsuit and remedy the contemptuous situation; this type of order is usually made without the court considering the merits of the case.

Scenario One: “A breaking news in Nigeria on Monday, January 07, 2019, has it that a Federal High Court sitting in Port Harcourt, Rivers State, Nigeria, presided over by Hon. Justice Kolawole Omotosho, on Monday nullified the direct and indirect primary elections allegedly conducted by two factions of the All Progressives Congress (APC) in Rivers State. An online news medium, barristerNG.com, reports that the court order followed a suit filed by an APC Governorship aspirant in Rivers State, Senator Magnus Abe. According to the trial Judge, both factions of the APC had acted in disrespect of a pending suit before a Port Harcourt High Court by purporting to have produced candidates for Governorship, National and State Assembly polls, while the suit was still pending. The Judge accordingly, declared that “both the direct and indirect primaries purportedly held by the APC in Rivers State are illegal and cannot stand in the face of the law.” The Federal High Court decision subsequently went up to the Supreme Court through the Court of Appeal…was later endorsed by the Supreme Court of Nigeria’_ [See: *”Contempt of Court: Why Nigeria’s Federal High Court is Right on Rivers State APC”* by Sylvester Udemezue; 08 January 2025; BarristerNG]

Scenario Two: PremiumTimes’ report of 23 August 2022 had it that: “The Federal High Court in Abuja, on Tuesday, reversed the suspension Joyce Oduah as Secretary General of the Nigerian Bar Association (NBA). On Tuesday, the judge set aside the action of the NBA’s National Executive Committee (NEC) on the grounds that it constituted an affront to the rule of law and overreaching court’s proceedings in the suit. Justice Mohammed, while ruling on an application filed and argued by Ayotunde Ogunleye on behalf of Mrs Oduah, held that the NBA-NEC which gave legal effect to the General Secretary’s suspension acted in ‘bad faith and in utter disregard for the proceedings of the court.’ The judge agreed with Mr Ogunleye that the ratification done on 21 August ought not to have been carried out by the NEC in view of the pendency of a suit challenging Mrs Oduah’s suspension. [The Judge] further said that ‘The purported ratification (of the General Secretary’s suspension) was not only an affront to the court, but a denigration of the sanctity of the judiciary which, on several occasions, has been condemned by the Supreme Court of Nigeria… with or without express order of court, no party ought to have taken any further steps on the subject-matter of the litigation. The judge said that the action of the NBA-NEC in relation to the unlawful ratification was “irritating, annoying, condemnable and liable to be set aside since the actors in the illegal ratification cannot claim ignorance of the position of law on such contemptuous attitude.” [Read more: *”Court nullifies Suspension of NBA’s General Secretary, Joyce Oduah”* PremiumTimes; 23 August 2022]

In such cases of disregard for pending proceedings, what the courts will do and have always done, is to undo what the Defendant or Respondent has proceeded to do in the meantime, irrespective of the merits of the matter; an order of Disciplinary Injunction is granted to revert preemptive action taken by one of the parties to the pending lawsuit, and this is done without the court considering the merits of the case. See Ezegbu v First African Trust Bank Limited (CA4) (1992) 1 NWLR (Pt. 220) 699; Vaswani Trading Co. v Savalakh & Co. (1972) 1 All NLR 283…. A final lesson one must take away from all this is that, litigants and their Lawyers alike who are involved in proceedings before courts of law, must imbibe the appropriate manner of dealing with pending courts proceedings, court orders and the Judiciary as a whole, bearing in mind what negative or disastrous consequences their contemptuous and disdainful conducts towards judicial officers and their orders may have on the litigants themselves, and on administration of justice and rule of law, without which democracy cannot survive”.

Conclusion 

Finally, although this is not the focus of the present commentary, one other serious question that may arise in the Senator Natasha’s brouhaha, is whether the Senate President (Godswill Akpabio) who was allegedly insulted, complained against and personally accused by Senator Natasha! was entitled to have presided over the trial and determination of the charge of Senator Natasha in view of the requirements of the twin pillars of natural justice, especially the rule of nemo judex in causa sua (one cannot be a judge in his own case). The query may further be raised, whether the Senate President, in presiding over the case, has not turned himself into a judge in his own case, he being the Complainant, Prosecutor and Arbiter (Judge) all at the same time? In Danladi Kachia v Zaria L A 1969 N.N.L.R. 82, the Court had this to say:”This allegation, in our view, goes beyond contempt of court, but constitutes an imputation that may harm the reputation of the Judge. …. It is personal to the Judge. In our view, the Judge was therefore, personally interested in the case and was therefore, debarred from hearing the case…. We cannot envisage a case that would give raise to a higher reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the accused, than the present one. He was accused of defaming the Judge, who tried him and convicted him virtually of that offence. We must allow the appeal on this ground. The appeal is allowed. Conviction and sentences are set aside”. 

It is important to suggest that in determining the legal propriety or otherwise of Senator Godswill Akpabio presiding over the trial and suspension of Senator Natasha Akpoti-Uduaghan in this particular case, regard may be given to dictum of Lord Denning, MR, in the English case of R v Amber Valley DC, Ex Parte Jackson [1985] 1 WLR 298, [1984] 3 All ER 50), referred to with approval in the Nigerian case of Zaman v State (2015) LPELR-24595(CA): “The court looks at the impression, which would be given to other people. Even if he was as impartial as could be, nevertheless if right-minded persons would think that, in the circumstances, there was a real likelihood of bias on his part, then he should not sit. And, if he does sit, his decision cannot stand”. It is irrelevant whether he was in fact biased, because justice is rooted in [public] confidence”.

Sylvester Udemezue (Udems), Legal Practitioner, Law Teacher, and the Proctor of The Reality Ministry of Truth, Law and Justice (TRM) [A Nonaligned, Nonprofit Public Interest Law Advocacy Group]