Rivers’ Emergency Rule: To Be or Not to Be? That’s Not the Question

By Marindoti Oludare

The declaration of a state of emergency in Nigeria has always been a contentious political and constitutional matter. The Nigerian constitution provides for a state of emergency under Section 305 — a provision that allows the President to intervene when the security or governance of a state is threatened by war, natural disaster, breakdown of law and order, or other extraordinary circumstances. While this authority is well-defined in theory, its application has been mired in political intrigue, power struggles, and constitutional gray areas. The unfolding crisis in Rivers State has once again put this delicate balance to the test — but the real question is not whether a state of emergency is justified, but rather what it means to have a state of emergency in Nigeria.

Historical Precedents of State of Emergency in Nigeria

The roots of Nigeria’s state of emergency framework can be traced to the post-independence era when the country was grappling with the fragile transition from colonial rule to self-governance. One of the earliest and most significant state of emergency declarations occurred in 1962 during the political crisis in the Western Region. The rivalry between Obafemi Awolowo and his former protégé Samuel Ladoke Akintola had plunged the Western Region into chaos. After a controversial split in the ruling Action Group (AG) party, violence erupted in Ibadan and other parts of the region, creating a state of lawlessness.

On May 29, 1962, Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa declared a state of emergency in the Western Region, citing the need to restore order. In an unprecedented move, Balewa suspended the Western Region’s government and appointed Dr. Moses Majekodunmi, a respected medical doctor (and founder of St. Nicholas Hospital) as the administrator of the Western Region. Under Majekodunmi’s leadership, the crisis was eventually subdued, and Akintola was later reinstated under the newly aligned political structure, which benefited the federal government’s preferred faction.

The Western Region crisis established an important precedent: a state of emergency could be used not only to restore order but also to reshape the political landscape in favor of the central government’s interests. The instrumentalization of emergency powers for political ends would become a recurring theme in Nigeria’s political history.

The Plateau State Crisis and the Obasanjo Playbook

Fast forward to 2004. Nigeria’s Fourth Republic was already facing deep political instability. In Plateau State, ethno-religious tensions boiled over into full-scale violence. Clashes between Christian and Muslim communities resulted in hundreds of deaths and widespread destruction of property. The situation spiraled out of control, leading President Olusegun Obasanjo to declare a state of emergency on May 18, 2004.

Obasanjo suspended the elected governor, Joshua Dariye, and the state House of Assembly. He installed Major General Chris Alli (retired) as the sole administrator of the state, effectively sidelining the political structures. The courts later challenged the legality of this action. When the Plateau State Attorney General attempted to sue for the restoration of the state government, the Supreme Court ruled that the administrator had not authorized the legal action — a technicality that led to the case being dismissed (Affirming the administrator’s authority). Justice Acholonu’s frustration with the dismissal was palpable in his consenting opinion:

“The issue before us in this case raises important constitutional questions which all things being equal would have enabled this court to give a careful consideration to it. It is disheartening and disturbing that a case is lost because of the inability of counsel briefed to determine or ascertain the procedural law that would enable the party complaining of infraction to have due access to the court, failing ignobly.I say no more.”

Obasanjo’s heavy-handed response to the Plateau crisis reinforced the precedent that the president could suspend state governments during an emergency — even though the constitutional basis for such suspension remained ambiguous.

Fayose’s Suspension and the Ekiti Crisis

Another notable case occurred in 2006 when Obasanjo wielded emergency powers in Ekiti State. Governor Ayodele Fayose faced impeachment proceedings on allegations of corruption and mismanagement. Political violence and unrest followed, creating a governance vacuum. Obasanjo responded by suspending Fayose’s government and appointing General Tunji Olurin as the administrator. Fayose’s impeachment was later upheld, but the precedent was again established that the president could override state-level political authority when state security and governance were threatened.

Jonathan’s Insurgency-Driven State of Emergency

In May 2013, President Goodluck Jonathan declared a state of emergency in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States in response to escalating Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast. Unlike his predecessors, Jonathan did not suspend the state governors. This decision was carefully calculated — Jonathan was sure to acknowledge in his address that the governors would remain in office, signaling that suspension was an option not warranted as the insurgency was not politically motivated by state-level actors.

However, Jonathan’s move revealed a constitutional ambiguity. A May 14, 2013 article in BBC.com noted that the Nigerian Constitution grants the President the power to suspend governors under a state of emergency, but Jonathan chose to exercise restraint. This decision reinforced the idea that a state of emergency could be tailored to fit the political context — suspension of state governments was not mandatory but remained an available tool.

The Rivers State Crisis and the Tinubu Dilemma

The crisis in Rivers State has exposed the fragility of Nigeria’s federal system and the blurred constitutional boundaries around emergency powers. Governor Siminalayi Fubara, within six months of taking office, attempted to unilaterally remove the Speaker of the House of Assembly. The House pushed back, and tensions escalated into open conflict. Fubara allegedly responded by demolishing the state House of Assembly building in a bid to nullify legislative opposition — a move that sparked constitutional outrage.

Fubara then convened a session with only four members of the 27-member House of Assembly, presenting and approving the state budget in violation of constitutional provisions that require a quorum of at least 9 members (one-third). For 1.5years, Rivers State has operated under an unconstitutional budgetary process, raising fundamental questions about governance, legislative oversight and accountability.

After the Supreme Court’s intervention, the House of Assembly moved toward impeachment proceedings against the governor — a constitutional right. However, politically motivated acts of pipeline sabotage and security breaches followed, raising suspicions that political actor were escalating the crisis for strategic gain.

State of Emergency: To Be or Not to Be?

The critical question is not whether President Bola Tinubu should declare a state of emergency in Rivers State. The real question is: What does a state of emergency mean in Nigeria?

In the United States, emergency powers are clearly defined by various acts such as the Insurrection Act and the Defense Production Act. During the Civil Rights Movement, President John F. Kennedy invoked the Insurrection Act to deploy federal troops to enforce desegregation at the University of Alabama. However, Governor George Wallace was not removed from office because the U.S. federal structure does not grant the president the authority to dismiss state governors. Similarly, the Defense Production Act was used to compel industries to produce medical supplies during the COVID-19 pandemic — but state authorities were not displaced.

If precedent is to guide Nigerian governance, Tafawa Balewa and Obasanjo’s actions suggest that suspension of state governments during emergencies is constitutionally tolerated, but Jonathan’s more restrained approach reveals that this is not mandatory.

Conclusion

President Tinubu’s critics have argued that his handling of the Rivers crisis reflects selective intervention. Some argue that Nigeria’s longstanding food insecurity should have justified a state of emergency on hunger long ago. Others blame Nyesom Wike as the true instigator of the crisis — but Wike, as a private citizen at state level, lacks official standing in the matter. The real conflict lies between the governor and the House of Assembly.

If the Nigerian people are dissatisfied with this ambiguity, the solution lies not in political rhetoric but in legislative clarity. As the Yoruba say, “Ìlú tí ò sófin kò sẹ́ṣẹ̀” — a city without laws knows no crime. The Nigerian National Assembly must define — with precision — the powers of the president under a state of emergency. The question is no longer whether Tinubu should act; the question is: What are the constitutional limits of emergency powers in Nigeria?